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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIT COMMITTEES, CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION: 
UK EVIDENCE 
 Habiba Al-Shaer. 2013. 
Abstract 
The thesis examines the determinants of the volume of environmental disclosures and 
their quality, with particular reference to the role of audit committees and the role of 
such disclosures in the creation and sustenance of firms’ environmental reputation. It 
also examines the impact of environmental reputation on enhancing firm financial 
performance. Using a resource-based view (RBV) and quality signalling approach, this 
study examines three questions: first, to what extent are the volume and quality of 
environmental disclosures determined by the resource base of the firm and the quality of 
its audit committee?; second, does the combination of quality disclosures and audit 
committee add to the reputation of the firm?; and finally, what is the relationship 
between corporate environmental reputation and firm financial performance? 
Using a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies from 2007-2011, I found evidence that 
larger firms with higher quality audit committees make higher quality disclosures. 
These firms enhance their reputations by virtue of their size, the quality of their audit 
committees, the quality of their disclosures, and their board size. Larger firms with 
block shareholders tend to have greater volume of disclosures, whilst audit committees 
and larger boards tend to have no role in promoting such disclosures. Higher disclosure 
volume alone does not lead to increased reputation. These results therefore show 
support for the RBV quality signalling approach. Larger firms possess a greater 
resource base and, therefore, have the ability to invest in non-replicable corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) strategies. Audit committees, which possess Smith Report 
compliant features, promote reputation directly and through their determination of better 
quality disclosures that are difficult to replicate by competitors, thereby signalling the 
firm specific competitive advantage investments to the market.  
When revisiting the relationship between environmental reputation and financial 
performance, results indicate a positive impact of corporate environmental reputation on 
financial performance measured by both accounting and market-based measures, and 
were consistent with the RBV of the firm. Findings in this study have implications for 
managers in terms of disclosure practices where the quality of disclosure is an important 
aspect and of a higher value due to the difficulty of replication by companies not 
genuinely committed to environmental good practice. Moreover, the study aims to 
provide managers with a better view of how governance and specifically audit 
committee can impact the setting of environmental goals and enhance accountability. 
Finally, corporations looking to regain trust with investors and other stakeholders need 
to take steps towards an environmental agenda.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW  
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
         In light of the growing public awareness of environmental issues and hazards, 
firms’ environmental practices have become an important avenue in society to gain 
competitive advantage (Hart, 1995). The growth in community awareness and concerns 
has an influence on the decision by management to disclose information about the 
physical environment within corporate annual reports (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
Companies are also finding that they need to respond to the variety of stakeholders and 
satisfy their demands (e.g. shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, 
environmental groups, government). The voluntary disclosure of environmental 
information by business firms will improve corporate responsibility among stakeholders 
and arguably will enhance its competitive advantage (Hart, 1995). 
The government may also increase the legal requirements and regulations enforced 
on business activities as a reaction to the increasing environmental concerns in society, 
for example, the Energy Policy Act 2005 that has been adopted by the US government 
to provide incentives for firms to pursue effective environmental strategies. This energy 
legislation allows tax deduction for energy programmes (De Villiers et al., 2011). 
Moroever, pending regulations in the UK would require every publicly listed company 
to disclose ethical, social, and environmental risks in its annual report (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006), therefore companies are accountable for social issues to a large extent 
taking into consideration the financial risks associated with them. However, government 
itself complements rather than displaces or absorbs self-organising practices (Blanco et 
al., 2009: p.465). 
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     Corporate environmental costs such as global climate change and habitat 
destruction incur potential risks that need a response from management. This leads to 
the fact that environmental information has an impact on investors’ decision making 
(Murray et al. 2006). Investors may observe the risk to be similar across firms unless 
managers signal their actions and share certain information about their environmental 
behaviour, especially if higher returns are expected from such behaviour (Toms, 2002).  
 It is essential to consider the incentives and actions of those who are engaged in the 
policy and decision making process when examining firms’ environmental policies 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Arguably, research in the area of corporate environmental 
responsibility would not be considered as complete unless corporate governance (CG 
hereafter) factors are included such as board and audit committee (AC hereafter) 
monitoring strength (Brown et al., 2011; Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Aguilera et al., 
2006). Governance is an intervening variable that affects the firm’s policy in dealing 
with external pressures  (Blanco et al., 2009). The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
April 2010, which was considered the worst environmental disaster in US history, was 
linked to flaws in the CG system. This phenomenon shed light on the accountability 
value of CG in terms of structure and transparency (De Villiers et al., 2011). The issue 
that arises after the BP scandal was the lack of sufficient detail in determining how the 
company safety and risk management system has been strengthened, evaluated, 
mitigated and oversighted, and the role of the board and its sub-committees (Windsor 
and McNicholas, 2012).  If a firm causes environmental accidents, such as in the BP 
case, or defies environmental regulations, consequences are not only related to fines and 
penalties a firm is obliged to pay, but most importantly the damage and loss of the 
firm’s reputation and trust or a boycott of goods (Iwata and Okada, 2011).  
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 CG is about the governance of corporations and activities they are engaged in, and 
it is a vital tool in monitoring managers’ behaviour and facilitating their actions for the 
purpose of maximizing the value of the company (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  The 
Companies Act 2006 in the UK requires quoted firms to provide a business review that 
includes information about their environmental practices. Given the significant recent 
development in the area of corporate environmental responsibility and CG, it stresses 
the role that CG plays in promoting strong environmental performance.  
Increased international attention has been given to the potentially beneficial role of 
ACs, in the wake of Enron and other scandals. Scandals have eroded capital investors’ 
confidence and there is a role which CG mechanisms could play in regaining this 
confidence (Said et al., 2009).   In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) is the AC combined 
code of guidance; it covers a number of aspects related to ACs including its main role 
and responsibilities 3.1-3.4, meetings 3.5-3.10, resources 3.11-3.14, remuneration 3.15, 
skills, experience and training 3.16-3.19, relationship with the board 4.1-4.4. The Report 
states that “AC should include at least three members who should all be independent 
non-executive directors” (Smith, 2003). The chairman of the AC sets the number of 
meetings that should be held and the timing of those meetings. It is required that ACs 
must meet at least three times a year. The work of the AC is key to securing 
stakeholders’ confidence in the financial statements of the company; it is a source of 
strength to the company and to its shareholders (Smith, 2003). 
A recent global AC survey 2013 conducted by the Audit Committee Institute shows 
the importance of social responsibility issues in core practices. To a question related to 
risks that pose the greatest challenges on their companies (aside from financial reporting 
risk), 49% of respondents, representing the highest percentage, chose risks associated 
with uncertainty, volatility, economic, political and social risks. Another question 
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related to the frequency of discussing sustainability and CSR issues as part of the AC 
agenda; only 37% of respondents answered that these issues are not discussed (10% 
answered they should be), while 63% answered that these issues occupy a part of AC 
meetings either periodically (39%), annually (16%), or every meeting (8%) (KPMG, 
2013). ACs are aware that they need to spend more time discussing the quality and 
consistency of such issues so company disclosure can be improved to better tell the 
company’s story.  
AC is an important mechanism to increase company transparency and encourage 
management to disclose more information. Moreover, it oversees the quality of reported 
information which will lead to enhancing the relevance and reliability of the context and 
content of annual reports. Most importantly, it reviews risk management systems, 
including risk associated with corporate social responsibility (CSR hereafter) issues, on 
an annual basis. ACs should challenge management on key sustainability issues, and 
significant reporting issues such as the clarity and completeness of disclosure contained 
within the annual report (Smith, 2003), and evaluate how the company is incorporating 
them to suit its own business strategy and governance objective (KPMG, 2010). It has 
been argued that effective AC is essential for effective governance (Zaman et al., 2011), 
and it follows in so far as governance mechanisms promote accounting disclosure 
practices, that ACs, bringing accounting skills and experience to bear, will have a 
positive and important influence on disclosure, including social and environmental 
disclosures.  
ACs are associated with error reduction and regulatory compliance (Barako et al., 
2006) and, hence, enhance internal control and improve disclosure quality (Ho  and 
Wong, 2001). These effects are, in turn, reinforced by regulatory requirements. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code recommends that ACs be comprised of financially literate 
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members and at least one member should be a financial expert (FRC, 2010); such 
expertise assures the quality of financial reporting (Chen et al., 2006), and enhances the 
credibility of information provided to the market (Smith, 2003). Independent external 
assurance provided by ACs creates credibility and trust (Turley and Zaman, 2003), 
which in turn develops and maintains the intangible assets that comprise the firm’s 
reputation and valorises competitive advantage. The independence and knowledge of 
AC directors  play a role in determining, managing, monitoring and controlling the risks 
identified by management (Keinath and Walo, 2004). It is also likely that AC could help 
in assessing environmental reputation issues when auditing financial reports. It could 
help in enhancing the quality of environmental reporting by providing assurance, and 
therefore more reliable information to all stakeholders. Such audits will enhance the 
credibility of their environmental reports and build corporate reputation (Moroney et al., 
2012). 
 Although prior literature has investigated the relationship between CG mechanisms 
and voluntary disclosures broadly defined (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Barako et al., 
2006; Ho and Wong 2001), some were more specific and examined the relationship 
between CG and CSR (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Halme and Huse, 1997; Jamali et 
al., 2008).  To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has considered the specific 
impact of effective AC on disclosure practices and environmental reputation. This study 
also examines the role of other governance mechanisms in conjunction with audit 
committees. In doing so, it builds on prior literature that examines the determinants of 
the volume of disclosures and their quality, which include, size, financial and industry 
effects, and the role of such disclosures in the creation and sustenance of environmental 
reputation. Finally, the study examines the impact of environmental reputation, as a 
proxy of rated or scored assessments of environmental performance on financial 
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performance. Much of the literature suggests there might be a range over which 
environmental concern ‘pays’ but after a point there is a trade off between 
environmental concern and financial performance. The study revisits this relation and 
provides updates to the controversies in the literature within the resource-based view 
perspective (RBV hereafter). RBV supports a positive relation (reconciling to the above, 
it indicates, perhaps, that the above range might extend further than thought).   
Prior literature has aimed to explain accounting disclosures in terms of legitimacy 
theory (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001) where firms need to 
ensure that their activities are acceptable to society so they tend to disclose information 
about such activities to fulfil their needs for legitimacy. Other studies explain 
accounting disclosures and management strategy using a variety of stakeholder-based 
approaches (McGuire et al., 1988; Roberts,1992; Van Der Laan et al., 2008). A notable 
stakeholder three-dimensional approach has been provided by Roberts (1992) to explain 
the link between social disclosure and social and economic performance: (i) stakeholder 
power that represents the management strategy of being socially responsible to satisfy 
stakeholders; (ii) strategic posture where firms gain an active social position when they 
engage more in environmental and social practices; (iii) firms’ economic performance is 
the third dimension where it is positively associated with socially responsible practices. 
Finally there are studies that use agency theory to explain firms’ disclosure practices 
(Ness and Mirza, 1991; Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) where such disclosures reduce 
the  agency problem and have the purpose of increasing management welfare. To some 
extent these theories are mutually exclusive (Adams, 2002; Gray et al., 1995).  
The resource-based view quality signalling approach builds on the agency approach 
and the link between competitive advantage and CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Mallin 
et al., 2012). Competitive advantage according to the RBV theory could be achieved 
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when resources and capabilities related to natural environment are bundled and 
exploited efficiently (Barney et al., 2001). Russo and Fouts (1997) argue that firms 
endowed with tangible resources such as physical assets and technologies, intangible 
resources such as reputation for leadership in environmental issues, and personnel-based 
resources such as organisational pledge, engagement and skills are able to use such 
capabilities to achieve competitive advantage, and avoid a trade-off between green and 
being competitive (Blanco et al., 2009).  Thus, the RBV theory has motives of including 
CSR issues that can contribute to competitive advantage for green firms (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2011). CSR investment should only be made and only enhance competitive 
advantage when there are positive Net Present Values (NPVs). 
Another issue with prior literature is that empirical studies which have used the 
most standard methodology, i.e. content analysis of the annual reports in examining the 
relationship between environmental disclosure and environmental performance, will not 
necessary control for the realistic qualitative aspect of managerial action (Salama, 
2003). Firms with greater resource endowments have greater resource base allowing 
them to engage in strategic investments including CSR investments. Such investments 
need to be transmitted positively into the firm reputational capital, and this could be 
achieved through genuine qualitative signals to the most powerful stakeholder groups, 
since CSR investments give rise, at least in part if not substantially, to intangible assets 
creation.  
The volume of disclosure where data is captured by words (Gao et al., 2005), 
sentences (Perrini, 2005; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000), pages (Unerman, 2000) and 
high/low disclosure rating (Patten, 1991), gives an insight about the importance of such 
disclosures. However, volume alone cannot be used appropriately to analyse the firm 
commitment to the environment. It could be interpreted as pure narrative, lack 
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credibility, be less reliable and more self-congratulatory, thus is insufficient itself to 
create reputation (Toms, 2002). In prior literature, quality relates to the 
comprehensiveness of disclosures based on best practice (Hooks and Van Staden, 
2011), and degree of specificity (García-Meca and Martínez, 2005; Ryan et al., 2002; 
Tooley and Guthrie, 2007). In this study, quality specifically relates to the difficulty of 
replication by competitors. Building on the work of Hasseldine et al. (2005), disclosures 
are measured in this study using both quantitative and qualitative indicators and with 
combinations of both. The study’s position follows from earlier empirical studies; Toms 
(2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005), that have shown a stronger impact for higher 
quality difficult to replicate disclosures. These studies’ methodology gives a higher 
qualitative scale to the difficulty of imitation and a lesser qualitative scale was given to 
general rhetoric which by definition is easier to replicate. However, these studies did not 
consider certain CG variables, particularly the role of ACs in the creation of reputational 
capital. There are good reasons to expect that ACs add to the quality of environmental 
disclosures, and by the same virtue increase firm environmental reputation.  
Finally, prior literature addressed the modelling issue between financial 
performance, environmental disclosure and environmental reputation where these 
relationships suffer from measurement problem, fail to deal with causality, and omitted 
variables problems, which are often compounded by inadequate theory. For Ullmann 
(1985: p.552), the omitted variable is management strategy. RBV quality signalling 
approach finds a solution to these modelling problems. CSR activities and disclosure 
follows form resource endowment, since without such endowment, quality signalling of 
competitive advantage investments is not possible. Therefore, it is more likely that 
qualitative difficult to replicate disclosure is a proxy for managerial strategy, i.e. 
managerial CSR strategy does not contribute to unobserved heterogeneity, and that 
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environmental reputation is an outcome for managerial strategy. Moreover, 
environmental disclosure is a function of CG that serves to enhance environmental 
reputation; therefore CG also corresponds closely to managerial strategy.  
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1.2 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE  
This thesis expects to contribute to the corporate environmental responsibility 
knowledge in three main areas. 
First, the study presents evidence to test how the quality of ACs impacts on 
disclosure practice. It thereby builds on prior studies that examined the relationship 
between CG and CSR (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Halme and Huse, 1997;  Jamali 
et al., 2008), by considering the specific impact of effective AC on environmental 
reputation. The study also examines the role of other governance mechanisms in 
conjunction with ACs. It uses a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies during the period 
2007-2011, and thereby updates the evidence from earlier empirical studies that have 
shown a stronger impact for higher quality, difficult to replicate disclosures (Toms, 
2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005).  
 Second, the study measures disclosures in corporate annual reports using the 
consolidated narrative interrogation instrument (CONI hereafter) approach that has been 
introduced to the literature by Beck et al. (2010). CONI is based on dual qualitative and 
volumetric measurement which is therefore particularly suitable to a study of this kind, 
which requires a measure of disclosure quality that corresponds to the difficulty of 
replication in terms of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-replicable reputational assets, 
as well as an aggregate volume measure. As a consequence, this study will be the first to 
apply the CONI approach to examine CG and related determinants of environmental 
disclosures.  
The CONI approach consists of three steps (Beck et al., 2010): Step1- coding 
content diversity where the narrative of firms’ annual reports is analysed into categories 
at phrase level. Such coding increases validity, for example, by decreasing the 
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likelihood of double coding (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010). Step 2- coding 
content quality based on five types that provide an indicator of quality disclosure: 
Type1- a pure narrative disclosure such as issues related to categories definition; Type 
2- a pure narrative disclosure with more details related to disclosure in each category; 
Type 3-quantitative disclosure addressing issues related to categories mentioned in 
Appendix1; Type 4- quantitative and qualitative disclosure of the categories; Type 5- 
quantitative, qualitative and comparable disclosure. Although CONI is a new approach, 
the typology used in the language of CONI in terms of disclosure quality provides a 
similar, incremental hierarchy method of classifying the quality of disclosures to that 
used by Toms, (2002) which applies thresholds according to relative difficulty of 
replication. According to CONI, disclosure of quantitative information is of higher 
quality than a mere narrative because it either cannot be replicated without actual 
investment at a similar level or can only be claimed through deliberate misstatement. 
Cross coder reliability tests resulted in a Krippendorff alpha value of 87.8% 
(Krippendorff, 1980).  
Third, the study provides an up-to-date empirical investigation on the relationship 
between corporate environmental reputation and corporate financial performance on 
companies covered by the Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC) survey carried 
out by Management Today in terms of ‘community and environmental responsibility’ 
for the period 2007-2011. In doing so, this thesis aims to extend previous literature and 
address the controversy regarding the impact of environmental performance, taken to 
correlate with environmental reputation, on firm financial performance. Such 
controversy relates to the proper role and activities of corporations. For instance, do and 
should businesses concentrate only on profit making or compromise on profits by 
extending environmental friendliness? Firm performance is measured using both 
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accounting and market-based measures. Combining both measures with research on 
environmental performance should cover the different views, and reach some agreement 
about how best to evaluate a firm’s financial performance. Moreover, this study uses a 
regression method that has been used in longitudinal studies, specifically panel data 
analysis with robust standard errors which helps to control for outliers and firm’s 
unobserved specific effects and consequently get more valid results (Elsayed and Paton, 
2005). 
Finally, the contribution of the study lies in its findings that could assist regulators 
and policy makers and be of relevance to the market community. I believe that 
managerial and regulatory implications should be strengthened in terms of the role that 
effective audit committee plays in improving environmental practices. Audit 
committees need to address environmental responsibility issues as vital elements of 
firms’ business strategies, and they need to monitor, manage, and modify the risks 
associated with these issues and their potential impact on the business environment.  
Audit assurance will help to discriminate between true commitments of firms towards 
environmental responsibility and false claims so the latter is unlikely to result in added 
value.  The difficulty of replication criteria of audited figures will develop and maintain 
firm’s environmental reputation and generate competitive advantage.  
Although social and environmental reporting is not mandatory, it eventually could 
become a standard aspect of the company annual report where a successful business 
needs to link company value with social progress. Engaging CSR issues in the audit 
process can impact the setting of social and environmental goals and enhance 
accountability. This can be achieved by reviewing and discussing social and 
environmental practices by firms during audit committee meetings on regular basis, 
challenge management on key sustainability issues and significant reporting practice, 
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and the identification and assessment of risks associated with social and environmental 
practices.  
RBV provides a suitable basis on the creation of reputational capital including 
environmental reputation. Firms with resource endowments, such as greater size, that 
give rise to scale and scope effects and higher profit provide managers with incentives 
to invest in firm-specific competitive advantage generating resources and engage in 
projects, including CSR projects, that are positive NPV. Moreover, pressure that 
managers face from shareholders will provide them with incentives to signal about their 
strategic activities that will lead to a reduction in information asymmetry problem 
(Toms, 2002). In order for such activities to be valorised by firms with higher 
capability, it is necessary that they are transmitted positively through qualitative 
channels into the firm’s reputational capital. Quality signals that are necessary through 
accounting disclosures are competitive advantage investment disclosures referring to 
those that evidence difficult to replicate investments and will fulfil the condition where 
disclosure is quantifiable, specific, therefore audited or auditable. Such disclosures 
contrast with mere volume disclosure that does not appear to offer any help than mere 
rhetoric in creating reputation. It could be interpreted as ‘vague statements’ of 
commitment to environmental protection or ‘greenwash’ that might be made by 
competitors unable to afford similar investment.  
CG and ACs are essential moderators of the relationship between resource 
endowment and disclosure and between the disclosure quality signal and the creation of 
reputation. They also moderate the pressure from shareholders which may affect 
managers’ capacity to develop new strategies (Toms, 2002). CG mechanisms help to 
create competitive advantage. The role of CG differs in different stages between 
providing resources that add value and providing monitoring expertise (Barney et al., 
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2011). The board of directors provides guidance on best practice, and weak governance 
mechanisms associated with spare cash flow will reduce shareholders’ value (Jensen, 
1986). AC reduces information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and uncertainty 
and provides increased assurance (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983), hence assisting 
investors in evaluating the impact of voluntary un-audited disclosures in terms of future 
earnings (Rajgopal et al., 2003). Audited figures disclosed in annual reports are more 
difficult to replicate; they will develop and maintain the intangible assets that comprise 
the firm’s environmental reputation and generate competitive advantage. This is 
especially enhanced through suitable professionals and different skills of audit 
committees. Most importantly, audit assurance will help discriminate between genuine 
investment or true claims and false claims from competitors about commitment to 
sustainability (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011). 
Signalling theory forms a link between resource endowment and governance 
perspectives in terms of their interpretation of signals about managerial activities 
provided in annual reports. Environmental disclosures are more likely where investors 
proactively and continually monitor using voice-based governance mechanism (Toms, 
2002: p.260) especially that investors are more interested in financial matters of the 
firm. Managers may also give little care to environmental issues because they lack 
knowledge and resources (De Villiers et al., 2011). The board that is composed of 
directors with different skills and experiences can provide access to useful 
environmental resources to assist in strategic decision making, and have the specific 
knowledge required for ensuring strong environmental performance (De Villiers et al., 
2011). 
Finally, according to RBV framework, the firm’s ability to collect, control, and 
exploit resources will result in greater long-term financial performance. Firms that 
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devote more resources to support its environmental commitment and improve its 
environmental performance will enhance its value in the market and secure better 
financial performance (Wahba, 2008). Corporate environmental responsibility is viewed 
as valuable resources that can be utilized to achieve a competitive advantage of the firm 
over its rivals (Wahba, 2008). Assets that are valuable and rare such as environmental 
reputation enjoy a sustainable advantage that expects to earn higher returns. Although 
researchers have been debating and giving rational theoretical justification for positive, 
negative and neutral links between environmental performance and firm financial 
performance, such debate is based on the proper role and performance of corporations. 
In other words, should business concentrate on profit making or compromise on profits 
by extending environmental friendliness? The RBV supports competitive advantage of 
green firms (Blanco et al., 2009). Firms that are endowed with a larger set of tangible 
and intangibles resources can increase their economic results for certain abatement 
efforts (Blanco et al., 2009).   
From the above expected contributions, the following main research questions will 
be investigated: 
1. If qualitative disclosures are indeed of greater value than a mere quantity, to 
what extent are they determined by the presence of robust governance procedures, 
including the use of ACs subsequent to the Smith Report and Combined Code? The 
answer to this question should provide stronger evidence related to determinants of 
environmental disclosures, specifically the quality and quantity of these disclosures in 
UK companies.  
2. Does the combination of quality disclosures and effective ACs add to the 
reputation of the firm? The answer to this question provides a foundation in terms of 
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determinants of firms’ corporate reputation, particularly the ‘community and 
environmental reputation’ (CER hereafter) of these firms. 
3. What is the relationship between corporate environmental reputation and firm 
financial performance? Through understanding this relationship, the direction of future 
research to improve environmental performance may be established due to the long-
term value it adds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 1.1 
Main Research Questions 
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1.3.  STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
This section will give a brief outline of each of the chapters in the thesis. Chapter 
two examines empirically the impact of CG mechanisms, specifically ACs on 
environmental disclosure practices in the UK, measured using the CONI approach by 
Beck et al. (2010) which is based on dual qualitative and volumetric measurement.  
Chapter three presents a comparison between qualitative and quantitative reporting 
of environmental information disclosed in annual reports and compares their relative 
impact on the environmental reputation of UK firms. It also considers the role of AC 
and board of directors in the creation of this kind of reputation. 
Chapter four provides up-to-date empirical evidence of the relationship between 
corporate environmental reputation and corporate economic performance within the 
British context.  
The conclusion of the study is presented in chapter five. It presents a synopsis of 
the study and its main findings, the implication of the research, its limitations, and 
potential future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUDIT COMMITTEES AND 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES

  
2.1  INRODUCTION  
There has been a growing public awareness of the environmental impact of 
companies and the role they can play beyond their primary economic functions 
(Belkaoui, 1976; Gray et al., 1995). This was also accompanied by the awareness of 
government and businesses that environmental security and economic growth are not 
always in conflict. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be defined as the voluntary 
action and initiation by companies to contribute to a better society and a cleaner 
environment hence satisfying a variety of stakeholders (Gyongyi, 2008). Corporate 
environmental responsibility is considered as the environmental aspect of CSR that 
covers all environmental implications of the firm’s activities.  
The growth in community awareness and concerns has an influence on the decision 
by management to disclose information about the physical environment within the 
corporate annual report (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Management may also need to 
disclose environmental information to satisfy the demands of a variety of stakeholders 
(Elkington, 1994). Such disclosures will improve corporate responsibility among 
stakeholders and arguably will enhance its competitive advantage. The government may 
also increase the legal requirements and regulations enforced on business activities as a 
reaction to increased environmental concerns in society. These new regulations will 
                                                          
 This chapter has been reviewed by the British Accounting Review (BAR) in a paper with co-authors: 
Professor Steven Toms & Dr Aly Salama 
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result in corporate management disclosing more environmental information 
(Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Sun et al., 2010). 
It is also essential to consider the incentives and actions of those who are engaged 
in the policy and decision making process when examining disclosure practices (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005). Arguably, research in the area of social and environmental 
responsibility would not be considered as complete unless CG factors are included such 
as board and AC monitoring strengths (Brown et al., 2011; Gibson and O’Donovan, 
2007; Aguilera et al., 2006). CG is about the governance of corporations and activities 
they are engaged in, and is a vital tool in monitoring managers’ behaviour and 
facilitating their actions for the purpose of maximising the value of the company (Cheng 
and Courtenay, 2006). Investors and regulators are becoming more aware of the 
reputational and financial risk associated with social and environmental issues. 
Therefore, board members and senior management need to alleviate shareholders’ 
concerns about such issues (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
Quoted companies are required by the Companies Act 2006 in the UK to produce a 
business review in which they must include information related to social and 
community issues and environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s 
business on the environment) (Out-Law, 2012). Accounting researchers view the 
function of ACs as a mechanism of accountability where it assures the quality of 
financial reporting (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). However, ACs’ accountability role 
needs to go beyond that to improve the quality of reporting as well by providing reliable 
and credible information to all stakeholders. Although the UK CG code 2010 does not 
mention explicitly the importance of social and environmental issues, there is some 
acknowledgment that the company’s duties extend beyond its shareholders: “the board 
should set the company’s value and standards and ensure that its obligations to its 
23 
 
shareholders and others are understood and met” (FRC, 2010) supporting principles, 
A1.1.  
Increased international attention has been given to the potentially beneficial role of 
ACs, in the wake of Enron and other scandals. In the UK, the Smith Report (2003) is the 
AC combined code of guidance where “it is designed to assist company boards in 
making suitable arrangements for their ACs, and assist directors serving on ACs in 
carrying out their role” (p.3). The code covers a number of aspects related to ACs 
including: its main role and responsibilities (2.1), membership and opportunities (3.1-
3.4), meetings (3.5-3.10), resources (3.11-3.14), remuneration (3.15), skills, experiences 
and training (3.16-3.19), relationship with board (4.1-4.4) where it states “ the audit 
committee should review annually its terms of reference, and its own effectiveness and 
recommend any necessary changes to the board” (4.2). Hence this addresses the point 
that effective AC is essential for effective governance (Zaman et al., 2011), and it 
follows insofar as governance mechanisms promote the quantity and quality of 
accounting disclosure, that ACs, bringing accounting skills and experience to bear, will 
have a positive and important impact on disclosure including CSR disclosures. AC may 
have an important role to play in addressing social and environmental responsibility 
issues through identifying, managing, and monitoring the risks associated with these 
issues. The CG code is concerned with securing the interests of all stakeholders as well 
as holding the balance between economic and social goals. ACs’ main goals are 
reviewing the company’s internal control and risk management systems, and assessing 
the effectiveness of company risks. AC could help in assessing not only financial risks 
but also those related to social and environmental risks when auditing financial reports.  
In theory, the study uses the RBV and quality signalling approach to examine the 
determinants of corporate environmental disclosures where ethical actions are designed 
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to create reputational assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-replicable 
(VRIN hereafter) (Barney et al., 2011). Managers have strong incentives to signal the 
value of their investment using annual reports disclosures. ACs reduce agency cost and 
the conflict running between managers and shareholders by providing substantive 
oversight of financial reporting (Collier and Gregory, 1999) and information asymmetry 
problem (Healy and Palepu, 2001), and uncertainty, and provides increased assurance 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Moreover, AC assurance will help discriminate between 
genuine investment or true claims and false claims (greenwash) (Lyon and Maxwell, 
2011), so that a mere volume of disclosure is unlikely to result in added value. The 
criteria mentioned above will help to develop and maintain the intangible assets that 
comprise the firm’s reputation and valorise competitive advantage, therefore, effective 
governance can itself be a source of competitive advantage.  
The study presents evidence to test how the quality of AC impacts on disclosure 
practice. It thereby builds on prior studies that have examined the relationship between 
CG and CSR (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007; Halme and Huse, 1997; Jamali et al., 
2008), by considering the specific impact of effective AC on environmental disclosure 
practice. The study also examines the role of other governance mechanisms in 
conjunction with audit committees. It uses a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies during 
the period 2007-2011 and thereby updates the evidence from earlier empirical studies 
that have shown a stronger impact for higher quality, difficult to replicate disclosures 
(Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005). Its purpose is to answer the question: if 
qualitative disclosures are indeed of greater value than a mere quantity, to what extent 
are they determined by the presence of robust governance procedures, including the use 
of ACs subsequent to the Smith Report and combined code? To answer this question, 
the study measures disclosures in corporate annual reports using the consolidated 
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narrative interrogation instrument (CONI) approach that  has been introduced to the 
literature by (Beck et al., 2010). CONI is based on dual qualitative and volumetric 
measurement which is therefore particularly suited to a study of this kind which requires 
a measure of disclosure quality that corresponds to the difficulty of replication in terms 
of VRIN characteristics as well as an aggregate volume measure. As a consequence, the 
study will be the first to apply the CONI approach to examine CG and related 
determinants of environmental disclosures.   
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section provides an 
outline of the prior literature that explored the relationship between corporate social and 
environmental disclosures and CG mechanisms leading to a hypothesis suitable for 
answering the research question in the second section. The research method applied to 
examine the data set is outlined in the third section. The fourth section presents data 
analysis and empirical results. The final section presents a brief conclusion.  
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.2.1. Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between CG mechanisms 
and voluntary disclosures broadly defined (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Barako et al., 
2006; Ho  and Wong 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003), and some were more specific in 
association with increases in the volume of CSR disclosures (Gibson and O’Donovan, 
2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  
A longitudinal study by Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) examine the link between 
good CG and the concept of corporate social and environmental responsibility. More 
specifically, improvements in CG are associated with increases in the volume of CSR 
disclosures, and it might be expected that these changes should also be associated with 
improvements in the quality of disclosure. The study relies on stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory and the political economy of accounting argument in explaining the 
reasons behind companies’ aims to disclose more environmental information within 
annual reports. Companies provide a wide range of information including 
environmental information within annual reports in order to satisfy a variety of 
stakeholders; priority is given to those who have control over firm resources. According 
to legitimacy theory, companies disclose information in order to fulfil society’s demand 
as if there is a social contract between organisations and societies. Finally Gibson and 
O’Donovan (2007) rely on the political economy argument where company disclosure 
is an attempt to avoid political costs due to information asymmetry among varying 
positions of stakeholders. The study shows that an increasing number of Australian 
companies disclosed environmental information during the period 1983-2003 
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concluding that the amount of environmental information provided in corporate annual 
reports will increase over time.  
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) investigate the potential effects of culture and CG on 
social disclosures of 139 listed firms on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
during the period 1996-2002. They measure corporate social disclosure in annual 
reports using an index that covers items such as environment, employee, community, 
and product and value added. Disclosure extent is measured by number of corporate 
social disclosure items included in the index while disclosure variety is measured by 
number of words used. The results show a significant positive association between 
corporate social disclosure and CG characteristics such as board dominated by 
executives, chair with multiple directorship and foreign ownership. However the study 
use of proxies to measure CG was limited by available data. In addition using words to 
measure the length of corporate social disclosure may be affected by the possibility of 
double coding when words take a part of one or more disclosure categories (Campbell 
and Abdul Rahman, 2010).  
Halme and Huse (1997) examine the relationship between corporate environmental 
reporting in annual reports and CG variables, industry and country variables. Firms’ 
annual reports were categorised into three groups based on the extent of corporate 
environmental information disclosed. The first group represents annual reports that 
contain little or no environmental information, the second group includes annual reports 
with environmental sections where firms go beyond recommended standards, and the 
third group contains firms that adopt environmental policy. Findings show that although 
CSR disclosures are associated with industry and country variables, there is no 
significant association with CG. The study uses a simple type of categorisation of 
environmental information disclosed in corporate annual reports, such categorisation 
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will not be able to capture the enriched extent of environmental information provided in 
annual reports.    
Said et al. (2009) examine the impact of CG characteristics namely board size, 
board independence, duality, AC independence, substantial ownership, managerial 
ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership on the level of CSR 
disclosures of Malaysian publicly listed firms. The study argues that firms engaging in 
CSR initiatives will secure better financial performance and access to capital. These 
firms will also enhance their corporate image and reputation, increase sales and 
customer loyalty, and attract ethical investors. CG system provides guidance and 
ensures that shareholders’ interests are met. The study uses a sample of 150 listed 
Malaysian firms for the year ended 2006. CSR data were collected from annual reports 
and companies’ websites. CSR index was constructed by adding all items from the two 
sources of data, and covering five themes, i.e. environment, community involvement, 
human resources, energy and product. Disclosure was measured using the dichotomous 
1 if the company discloses the items and zero otherwise. Control variables included 
were size and profit.  
Results indicate a significant positive relationship between government ownership 
and substantial ownership, and the extent of disclosure. AC independence also shows a 
weak positive association with the level of CSR disclosure. Results indicate that 
governments add pressure on firms to disclosure additional information because of the 
value of being a publicly trusted agency.  The study examines the impact of CG on CSR 
in one year; a longitudinal analysis is important and should add robustness to the 
findings. Moreover, the study uses only one aspect of AC, namely AC independence, 
arguing that the effectiveness of ACs are determined by their members’ independence 
due to the role they play in reducing agency costs and provide internal control which 
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should enhance the quality of financial reporting.  However, reflecting the impact of all 
AC characteristics, i.e. independence, meeting, size and expertise in one compute will 
provide a substantive oversight over the role that ACs could play in assessing CSR 
disclosures.  
Moroney et al. (2012) examine whether the quality of environmental reporting is 
better when assured. Assurance enhances the credibility of environmental information 
disclosed which should lead to a better environmental management system. An assurer 
could be an accountant or consultant. This study investigates the effect of each type on 
assured company. The study uses stakeholder-agency theory where it states that 
managers are unique stakeholders since they have control over the decision making 
process in the company. It is in their interests to enhance monitoring of financial and 
non-financial disclosure in order to satisfy stakeholders’ demands. Stakeholders’ 
interest in corporate environmental issues increases the demand of assured 
environmental disclosures. Thus, according to stakeholder-agency theory, the 
monitoring of management-stakeholder contracts moves to a new level that requires 
assured environmental disclosures.  
Moroney et al. (2012) uses a sample of the top 500 public companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using an index based upon the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), the study applies content analysis to measure the quality of 
environmental reporting. A rating scale from zero to six is used to measure the amount 
of disclosure in stand-alone reports and annual reports. Findings show that the quality of 
environmental disclosure is higher for assured companies than un-assured ones. Also, 
no difference in the results has been noted regarding the impact of the assurer whether 
accountant or consultant. This study highlights the importance of experience in 
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improving the quality of environmental reporting; however it ignores other factors that 
might affect the quality of environmental disclosure such as CG effectiveness.  
Kolk and Pinkse (2010) examine the notion that CSR disclosure reflects the 
expansion of CG accountability to suppliers of finance to include a broader range of 
stakeholders groups. The study focuses on multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) CSR 
policies, specifically Fortune Global 250 firms that report widely on social and 
environmental issues. Those companies are facing higher pressure to become more 
transparent in their disclosure practices where CG and CSR can become integrated. The 
study also tests whether other features such as sectors and country of origin will have an 
impact on CSR practices.  Corporate social responsibility has internal dimensions, such 
as employees’ working conditions and ethical behaviour of managers and employees, 
and external dimensions such as global environmental problems like those related to 
climate change. The study argues that CG has substantial influence on internal CSR 
issues. Thus, it is more likely to be integrated into MNEs CSR disclosures. However, 
only MNEs’ facing pressure to report extensively on social and environmental issues 
stress the importance of internal CSR and incorporate them in their disclosure practices.  
Kolk and Pinkse (2010) adopt the stakeholder approach which explains that profit 
maximisation is not the only goal for businesses but also stakeholders’ interests. Using a 
sample of 161 firms in the Fortune Global 250 firms, the study applies a quantitative 
scale of content analysis and uses two measures of the integration between CG and CSR 
based on binary indicator. The first measure investigates whether the concept of CG was 
explicitly linked to CSR issues, and the second measure tests whether companies using 
a separate section on CG in their CSR disclosures disclose more about CSR. Control 
variables include country of origin, sector, size and profitability. Findings show that 
firms with extensive reporting of social and environmental responsibility issues are 
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more likely inclined to explicitly integrated CG to CSR issues, and/or have a separate 
CG section. The insignificance of control variables suggests that the integration of CG 
in CSR reporting is becoming a global issue that goes beyond countries and sectors.  
Mallin et al. (2012) investigate the impact of CG on social and environmental 
disclosure. They develop holistic measures of both monitoring intensity and 
stakeholders’ orientation of CG. The study considers both the extent and the quality of 
social and environmental disclosures and argues that using both the extent and the 
quality of social and environmental disclosures helps to identify whether information 
disclosed basically is used to signal firms’ superior performance or rather as a 
legitimacy tool to cover poor performance. The monitoring intensity of CG is measured 
by the presence of independent directors on the board, the absence of CEO duality, and 
ownership structure, while the stakeholders’ orientation attribute of CG is captured by 
the presence of active institutional shareholders, ownership diversity, board 
composition, community influential, women directors, and CSR committee.   
Mallin et al. (2012) measure the extent of disclosure using content analysis 
techniques and disclosure quality is measured using a (0-3) scaling system where the 
highest score is given to quantitative or financial data. Using a sample of 100 US Best 
Corporate Citizens in the period 2005-2007, results show that CG is positively 
associated with corporate social performance and social and environmental disclosure 
for stakeholders’ orientation and monitoring measure.  
A number of studies were less specific, and examine the impact of CG on voluntary 
disclosure broadly defined.  Eng and Mak (2003) investigate the impact of ownership 
structure such as managerial ownership, block holder ownership and governmental 
ownership, and board independence on voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is 
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measured using an aggregate score of strategic, financial and non-financial information 
contained in the annual reports. Ownership structure measured by the proportion of 
shares held by managers and block holders is argued to be negatively associated with 
voluntary disclosure. Also board independence measured by the proportion of outside 
directors is argued to have a positive impact on voluntary disclosure. Control variables 
include size, leverage, growth opportunities, industry, auditors whether Big Four or not, 
number of analysts’ following, and profitability. Using a sample of 158 firms listed on 
the Singapore Stock Exchange, findings show negative correlation between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, inverse to the predicted direction, board 
independence proves to have negative impact on voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak 
(2003) explain that outside directors may be able to attain information directly rather 
than from public disclosure since they represent block holders’ interests. Also results 
show that larger firms with lower debt disclose more.  
Ho  and Wong (2001)  test the effect of four CG mechanisms viz. board 
independence, presence of AC, board duality and percentage of family members on 
board on voluntary disclosure. Dependent variable is measured using an importance-
adjusted relative disclosure index (RDI). It consists of 35 items in a survey 
questionnaire where analyst users were asked to rate the importance of items on a 5-
point scale. Using a sample of 98 Hong Kong listed firms’ respondents to a survey in 
1997-1998, results show that existence of AC is positively significantly related to 
voluntary disclosure. It enhances internal control and improves disclosure quality.  
Barako et al. (2006) also come up with similar findings in terms of AC impact. The 
study examines the effects of CG mechanisms, ownership structure and firm specific 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure in a longitudinal study applied on Kenyan listed 
companies during the period 1992-2001. The study uses weighted disclosure index to 
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measure the level of disclosure. Disclosure scores is based on whether the entity 
discloses an item or not where weights are given to rate the importance of each item on 
a scale from 0-4. Findings show that the existence of AC measured by a dichotomous 
variable is positive and significantly associated with voluntary disclosure. Also 
institutional and foreign ownership have significant positive impact on voluntary 
disclosure. However board independence proves to be significant but negatively related 
to voluntary disclosure. The study argues that board independence is a substitute of 
disclosure. It concludes moreover that audit committees are associated with error 
reduction and regulatory compliance.  
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) examine the association between CG variables viz. 
board independence, board dimension, CEO duality, and board structure and voluntary 
disclosure. The study tests whether CG and voluntary disclosure is a complement or a 
substitute for accountability. The study measures voluntary disclosure including 
financial and non-financial information by codifying qualitative and quantitative 
information into categories. It also uses a sample of 145 European biotechnology 
companies during the period 2002-2004, and controls for leverage, size, growth, 
profitability, country of origin and ownership strength. Results show that board-related 
variables strongly influence the quantity of information disclosed. However in terms of 
qualitative disclosure, not all governance variables proved to be significant. This could 
be due to the fact that the qualitative measure used in this study, which is based on the 
existence of historical or forward looking information, is subjective and complex.  
A number of studies have specifically examined the effects of AC characteristics on 
financial reporting. Abbott et al. (2004) examine the effect of certain AC characteristics 
identified by the Blue Ribbon Committee on reducing the frequency of restatements and 
consequently enhancing the quality of financial reporting. AC characteristics are AC 
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size, independence, expertise, and meetings where it is argued that they are all 
associated with lowering the level of restatement incidents. The study uses a sample of 
88 firms with restatement incidence in annual reports during the period 1991-1999. 
Results support BRC’s recommendations regarding AC independence, meetings, and 
expertise concluding that such recommendations support AC effectiveness. However 
AC effectiveness might vary in different regulatory and institutional settings.  
Magena and Pike (2005) also examine effective AC influence on interim disclosure 
policy. They empirically investigate the association between AC characteristics viz. AC 
independence, AC size and AC expertise and the level of disclosure in interim reports. 
Magena and Pike (2005) argue that auditing interim reporting should prevent any 
managerial opportunistic behaviour and reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. The study also controls for other CG mechanisms such as board 
independence, institutional shareholding and external auditors’ involvement. Also some 
firm’s specific characteristics were incorporated, such as firm size, multiple listing, 
gearing, interim profits, liquidity and executive director shareholding. Interim disclosure 
is measured using weighted and un-weighted disclosure index based on the publication 
of financial and nonfinancial information in interim reports. Using a sample of 262 
listed firms on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2001-2002, the study concludes 
that effective AC is essential in improving reporting oversight. A significant positive 
relationship was provided between AC expertise and interim disclosure. Moreover, AC 
independence measured by share ownership of AC members is proved to be negatively 
associated with interim disclosure. A possible drawback on this study is the subjectivity 
in measuring the level of disclosure in interim reports (giving weights to each disclosure 
item based on analyst perception). Also the study applies a cross-sectional analysis that 
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is unable to capture disclosure impact over time; hence a longitudinal analysis is more 
powerful.  
Beasley et al. (2009) provide a qualitative AC research using an interview 
technique to examine the monitoring role of AC. They argue that such technique is able 
to capture problems arising from personal relations with management more than the 
quantitative technique. The study uses a theoretical framework based on the conflict 
between agency theory and institutional theory. Agency theory views ACs as 
monitoring agents; they provide vigilant oversight to financial reporting whereas 
institutional theory looks at the AC role as ceremonial and intended to create legitimacy. 
The study interviews 42 AC members serving on US public companies in the period 
2004-2005. Respondents’ views on whether the AC role is substantive or ceremonial 
were mixed, however they were weighted more towards monitoring practices. The study 
concludes that AC role is based on management’s attitude towards governance and AC 
effectiveness. When management appreciates governance then audit committees are 
more likely to act as monitoring agents. Beasley et al. (2009) suggest a combination of 
agency theory and institutional theory for better overview and understanding of the AC 
role. This study is based on AC practices in 2004-2005 and it does not examine the 
changes that happen to those practices over time.  
Lin et al. (2006) examine the monitoring role provided by AC in reducing the 
occurrences of earning restatements, consequently enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting. The study suggests a negative association between AC characteristics, namely 
AC size, independence, financial expertise, and earning restatements. Since 2000 was 
the year that witnessed the main improvements in ACs, the study employ a matched-
pair sample of 212 firms based on four-digit SIC code and firm size in the 2000 fiscal 
year. Earning restatement is measured using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
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restated its earnings for the year 2000 and 0 otherwise. Results show that big-sized ACs 
add extensive oversight over financial reporting and reduce earning restatements. Other 
AC characteristics such as independence, financial expertise, and meeting proved not to 
be significant.  A longitudinal study on AC practices would provide an important 
insight into variations happening to AC over time and the reflection of such variations 
on the quality of financial reporting. 
Cohen et al. (2004) provide an overview of the major players in CG (board, AC, 
external auditors, and internal auditors) and their level of influence on financial 
reporting quality. The study argues that the interaction between those players and 
management is essential to effective CG. Moreover, there are external players that 
influence such interaction such as regulators, legislators, and financial analysts. The 
study defines the gaps in CG literature and suggests future research that broadens the 
view of CG for example the oversighting domain of governance to include CSR issues. 
The previous studies examine the impact of ACs in improving the quality of financial 
disclosure. This chapter will further examine the impact of effective ACs on enhancing 
the quality of CSR disclosure. 
2.2.2. Other Determinants of Environmental Disclosure  
There has been an increased interest in accounting disclosure studies. Some of these 
studies were based on different theories in examining the impact of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. Cormier and Gordon (2001) analyse their study results based 
on legitimacy theory. The authors argue that disclosing more social and environmental 
information is related to the firm’s need for legitimacy. The study examines three 
electric utility companies, two publicly owned and one privately owned. Also it uses a 
quantitative and qualitative measure for the period 1985-1996. The study argues that 
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legitimacy affects firms more than others depending on their visibility and 
accountability. Government owned companies are larger in size and politically 
supported thus they must disclose more information. The study concludes that firms 
from different ownership structure and size differentiate in their reporting policies. 
Findings show that publicly owned firms disclose more social and environmental 
information than privately owned ones.  
Another study based on legitimacy theory is done by Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) 
who examine whether a link exists between factors that affect corporate management 
decisions to disclose environmental information and the actual environmental reporting 
practices. According to legitimacy theory, firms need to make sure that their activities 
are acceptable to society. They need to satisfy stakeholders’ demands through 
environmental disclosure. The study develops a survey instrument on a sample of 105 
listed Australian companies for the period 1994-1995 from environmentally sensitive 
industries. Environmental disclosure is conducted using the content analysis approach 
and word count-based measure. Results show that respondents do not attach much 
importance to environmental issues who do not equate the amount of environmental 
information disclosed. Therefore the results provide limited support to legitimacy 
theory. However this study concluded on the quantity of environmental information 
disclosed rather than the quality of information disclosed. 
Ness and Mirza (1991) analyse their study on agency theory to determine if any 
relationship exists between the oil industry and environmental disclosure. Companies 
were classified into companies from the oil industry and companies form other 
industries. The study argues that companies in the oil industry disclose more 
environmental information in their annual reports than other companies since their 
activities are more damaging to the environment. Using a sample of 131 leading UK 
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companies in 1984, annual reports, frequencies of disclosures were recorded. Results 
show positive association between environmental disclosure and the oil industry. 
Moreover, results are in favour of agency theory and show that when a company 
decides to disclose more information, it will be for the purpose of increasing 
management welfare.  
Roberts (1992) tested the ability of stakeholder theory to explain corporate social 
disclosure. The study adopted the framework developed by Ullmann (1985), to explain 
the link betweeen social disclosure, and social and economic performance.  Three 
dimensions are incorporated and expected to affect the level of corporate social 
disclosure. The first dimension is stakeholder power. If being socially responsible is a 
strategy applied by management to statisfy stakeholders, then stakeholder power is 
positively associated with social disclosure. The second dimension is strategic posture. 
The company that discloses more in order to enhance their organisational status with its 
main stakeholders should gain an active social position. The third dimension is the 
firm’s economic performance where it is expected to be positively associated with 
socially responsible practices.  
Roberts (1992) uses scores published by the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) 
on 130 firms in the period 1984-1986, and controlled for size, age and industry. Results 
show that measures of stakeholders’ power, strategic posture and economic 
performance are related to the level of corporate social disclosure. Evidence proves that 
stakeholder theory is a proper basis for empirical analysis. This study includes three 
dimensions for predicting corporate social disclosure. However, there are other factors 
that affect the social responsibility decision making process in the complex nature of the 
business environment for example managerial strategy to use governance mechanisms 
and commitment towards CSR issues.  
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Other studies examining the relationship between the level of social disclosure and 
firm characteristics are applied to different countries, for example, studies on Australian 
companies (Trotman and Bradley, 1981), Canadian companies (Cormier and Gordon, 
2001), New Zealand companies (Hackston and Milne, 1996), French companies 
(Déjean and Martinez, 2009), Sweden companies (Cooke, 1989), Hong Kong 
companies (Gao et al., 2005), Saudi Arabia companies (Alsaeed, 2006) and UK 
companies (Gray et al., 2001).  
Several corporate characteristics have been examined to test their impact on social 
and environmental disclosure such as corporate size, profitability, listing status and 
leverage. Gao et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure in Hong Kong by analysing annual reports of 33 Hong Kong 
(HK) listed companies. The study argues that larger companies disclose more social and 
environmental information in their annual reports. Moreover, the study argues that the 
level of disclosure varies in different industries, different sections of annual reports, as 
well as the content themes of disclosure. The study uses a quantitative measure of 
content analysis based on word count. Their findings show that company size is 
significantly associated with the level of corporate social and environmental disclosure. 
However, the study shows that disclosure level varies among industries where utility 
companies disclose more corporate social and environmental information than property 
and banking firms.  
Hackston and Milne (1996) examine some potential determinants of social and 
environmental disclosure in New Zealand companies viz. size, industry type, 
profitability and country of ownership. The study develops an interrogation instrument 
to record disclosure in different categories. Annual reports from the largest 47 listed 
companies on the New Zealand stock exchange were used. Moreover disclosure level 
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was measured based on sentence count.  The study shows that most disclosure practices 
made by New Zealand companies are more descriptive and related to good news. Also 
results prove that large companies disclose significantly more social and environmental 
information than small companies. No significant association was found between 
profitability and disclosure volume.  
Cormier and Magnan (1999) seek to identify determinants of corporate 
environmental reporting using a cost-benefit framework. Environmental disclosure 
depends upon benefits obtained due to the decrease of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders. Also it depends on disclosure costs such as reputational, 
political and contracting costs arising from the actions taken by non-shareholder 
stakeholders. Such costs affect the firm financial condition. Management tries to weigh 
costs and benefits resulting from environmental disclosure. The study uses Wiseman’s 
scale to obtain both a qualitative and quantitative measure of environmental information 
disclosed. Moreover it focuses on a sample of Canadian firms subject to water pollution 
compliance regulation during the period 1986-1993. Results suggest that firm risk and 
trading volume is positively related to the extent of environmental disclosure while 
concentrated ownership is associated with less environmental disclosure. Also firms in 
good financial condition disclose more environmental information in their annual 
reports.  
Gray et al. (2001) explore the relationship between social and environmental 
disclosure and corporate characteristics over an eight-year period including size, 
profitability and industry. They argue that previous studies on the relationship between 
social and environmental disclosure and characteristics provide mixed results due to a 
failure to differentiate between mandatory and voluntary disclosure, countries’ different 
disclosure practices, and due to lack of a theoretical basis. The study analysis focuses on 
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distinguishing between whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntarily, different areas 
of disclosure such as environment, employees and community, and using eight years’ 
data that was divided into two sets of consecutive four-year periods which allows both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. Results show that the relationships between 
different measures of social and environmental disclosure on the one hand and corporate 
characteristics on the other vary with both variables used and time period selected. They 
conclude that the relationship between social and environmental disclosure and 
characteristics needs intensive researching where other factors need to be integrated 
such as organisational culture, relation with pressure groups, and media exposure.  
Adams (2002) identifies factors that have an impact on the extensiveness, quality, 
quantity and completeness of disclosure. Firms’ reporting practices should enhance 
accountability which will lead to better performance. Those factors are: (i) corporate 
characteristics such as size, industry and risk (ii) general contextual factors such as 
country of origin, time and cultural background (iii) internal organisational factors such 
as attitude to reporting, change of company chairperson, existence of social reporting 
committee, and audit. The study argues that previous studies examined social and 
environmental practices based on main social reporting theories such as stakeholder 
theory, legitimacy theory and political economy theory. Those studies either supported 
or rejected one or more of the theories. This essentially depends on the study range and 
variables included, thus claiming that any one of these theories can only deliver limited 
explanation.  
The findings of Adams (2002) came in favour of all theories of social reporting 
indicating that all these theories are mutually exclusive. Interviews were conducted with 
three British companies and four German companies in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sector among the largest 400 companies listed in The Times 1000 
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(1995). They were divided into themes; some themes focused on corporate reporting 
structure and others focused on corporate motives. Findings show that internal factors 
such as governance structure have an impact on reporting practices. However due to the 
small sample employed, such a conclusion needs to be taken with care. Therefore, 
further research examining social and environmental disclosures, governance structure 
and auditing rules is needed.  
In general, most previous studies conclude that the overall degree of association 
between size and social and environmental disclosure level is highly significant which 
could be explained by the fact that large companies are highly visible, enjoy diversified 
portfolio activities and can afford disclosure costs. 
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Table 2.1 
Empirical Studies of Corporate Governance Attributes To Voluntary Disclosures  
Author(s) and 
date 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent variables  
which proved significant 
General results Sample size 
Forker (1992) Share option 
disclosure  
 
Proportion of independent 
directors  
 
Existence of AC 
 
Board duality 
 
Positively significant  
 
Positively significant 
  
Negatively 
significant  
182 UK quoted 
firms in 1987-
1988 
Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) 
Financial 
disclosure  
Proportion of independent 
directors  
 
Positively significant  87 of HK listed 
firms  
Ho  and Wong 
(2001) 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
Existence of AC  
Percentage of family 
members  
Positively significant 
Negatively 
significant  
98 HK firm’s 
respondents to 
survey in 1997-
1998 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
Chair who is not executive 
director  
Ratio of family members on 
board 
 
Foreign ownership  
Ownership diffusion 
 
Proportion of bumiputra 
directors on board   
 
Negatively  
significant  
Negatively 
significant  
 
Positively significant 
Negatively 
significant  
Positively significant   
167 Firms listed 
in KLSE 
1995/1996 
Eng and Mak 
(2003) 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
Proportion of independent 
directors  
 
Managerial ownership  
 
Governmental ownership  
Size 
Leverage  
Negatively 
significant  
 
Negatively 
significant  
Positively significant  
Positive 
Negatively  
158 listed firms 
on Singapore 
Stock Exchange 
in 1995 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) 
Social 
disclosure  
Board with executive 
directors 
Chair with multiple 
directorship  
Foreign share ownership 
 
All proved to be 
positively and 
significant  
139 listed firms 
on KLSE in 1996-
2002  
Magena and Pike 
(2005) 
Interim 
disclosure  
AC financial expertise  
AC independency  
Positively significant  
 
Negatively 
significant  
262 UK listed 
firms  
44 
 
Barako et al. 
(2006) 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
 
 
 
 
Presence of AC  
Proportion of non-exclusive 
directors 
Institution and foreign 
ownership   
 
Positively significant 
 
Negatively 
significant  
Positively significant   
54 companies 
listed on NSE in 
2002 
 
Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) 
 
 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
 
Proportion of independent 
directors on the board  
 
 
Positively and 
significant  
 
115 Firms listed 
in SGX in 2000 
Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) 
Voluntary 
disclosure  
Proportion of independent 
directors  
 
 
Board leadership  
Positively with 
quantity and quality 
of disclosure  
Positively with 
disclosure  quantity 
and negatively with 
disclosure quality  
 
Biotechnological 
firms listed on the 
stock market of 
European 
countries in 2002-
2004   
Baek et al. (2009) voluntary 
disclosure   
Proportion of independent 
directors  
Managerial ownership  
Positively significant  
 
Negatively 
significant  
374 listed 
companies on 
S&P 500 in 2000 
Mallin et al. (2012) 
 
Social 
disclosure  
Board independence  
CEO duality  
Ownership concentration  
Women directors  
CSR committee  
Positively significant  100 US Best 
Corporate 
Citizens 
 2005-2007 
Notes:  
Voluntary disclosure: voluntary dissemination of quantitative and qualitative information which exceeds 
mandatory disclosure requirements, accounting standards, or stock exchange requirements regulations 
(Watson et al., 2002). 
Financial disclosure: the disclosure of financial information in firms’ financial statements, i.e. showing 
the details of income and expenses as well as assets and debts.  
Interim disclosure: disclosing information in interim financial reports which permits less information to 
be reported than in annual financial statements but provides an update to these statements. 
Social disclosure: disclosing information relating to employees and consumer issues, community 
involvement, energy and product safety (Gray et al., 2001). 
Share option disclosure:  the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information increases the scope of 
opportunistic behaviour, in the case of share options, these may be granted in circumstances to which 
shareholders would object had more information been available (Forker, 1992, p.3). 
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2.2.3. Theoretical Development  
CG is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals. The CG framework is there to encourage the 
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of 
those resources (Cadbury, 2003). The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests 
of individuals, corporations and society (Cadbury, 2003).  ACs can play a key role in 
providing oversight of risk management. An AC of independent and knowledgeable 
directors is in a good position to determine not just what management has done to 
identify the risks, but also what they have done to adequately manage, monitor and 
control the risks (Keinath and Walo, 2004).  
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, the main role and 
responsibilities of AC should include reviewing the company’s internal control and risk 
management systems (FRC, 2010). The revised guidance for directors on the Combined 
Code (FRC, 2005) discusses board committee duties on reviewing the effectiveness of 
internal control: “The role of board committees in the review process, including that of 
the AC, is for the board to decide and will depend upon factors such as the size and 
composition of the board; the scale, diversity and complexity of the company's 
operations; and the nature of the significant risks that the company faces. To the extent 
that designated board committees carry out, on behalf of the board, tasks that are 
attributed in this guidance document to the board, the results of the relevant committees' 
work should be reported to, and considered by, the board. The board takes responsibility 
for the disclosures on internal control in the annual report and accounts” (Section Three, 
No: 25).  
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Boards around the world are sharpening their focus on social and environmental 
issues. Many implications arise from anti-social behaviour of a business including the 
rising costs of related higher energy prices and the impact of climate change policy, 
damaging firm reputation (KPMG, 2010).  From the perspective of risk management 
and reporting oversight, ACs may have an important role to play in ensuring these 
issues receive the attention they require. ACs review risks associated with CSR on an 
annual basis, and monitor performance through the annual control self-assessment 
process conducted by the internal audit function, and regular meetings with board and 
CSR committee.  
Agency theory states that CG mechanisms and environmental disclosure help 
reduce agency conflicts and information asymmetry problems between managers and 
shareholders. Shareholders are the principals in CG and managers are the agents. Boards 
of directors assign managers who should provide the board with the required 
information about the firm’s activities (Buchholtz et al., 2008). Managers who are 
engaged in corporate environmental practices could be running these practices at the 
expense of shareholders. Although agency theory is primarily focused on shareholders’ 
returns and does not engage with risk consequences associated with environmental 
activities, it views environmental investments as a source of long-term wealth creation 
to shareholders, and risk reduction to the firm which offsets all costs involved (Salama 
et al., 2011). Agency theory supports the AC role as a monitoring instrument stating that 
firms with high information asymmetry and agency costs will be inclined to reduce such 
costs by providing substantive oversight of financial reporting through audit committees 
(Collier and Gregory, 1999).  
The RBV quality signalling approach builds on the agency approach and the link 
between competitive advantage and CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Firms with 
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resource endowments such as greater size that gives rise to scale and scope effects and 
higher profit provide managers with the resource base to invest in firm-specific 
competitive advantage generating resources. Competitive advantage investment 
disclosures refer to those that evidence difficult to replicate investments, and will fulfil 
that condition where the disclosure is quantitative, specific and therefore audited or 
auditable. Such disclosures contrast with the vague statements of commitment to 
environmental protection or ‘greenwash’ that might be made by competitors unable to 
afford similar investments. CG and ACs are essential moderators of the relation 
between resource endowment and disclosure of competitive advantage investment. 
Audit is specifically important in such relationships for several reasons. First, because 
auditable or audited figures disclosed in annual reports are more difficult to replicate; 
engaging in the audit process is an important part of the generation of competitive 
advantage. Second, firms are more likely to do this when they are able to access 
relevant expertise and experience, for example where the firm AC comprises suitable 
professionals. Third, the presence of effective audit as part of the governance structure 
is more likely to lead to support for CSR investments that are positive NPV.  
Management need to look at corporate environmental responsibility practices as a 
competitive advantage (Salama et al., 2011). Companies might be exposed to financial 
risks if they fail to manage social and environmental risks (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
For example firms investing in clean technology are less susceptible to any increase in 
energy prices (Salama et al., 2011). Salama et al. (2011) argue that firms that provide 
the market with information about their environmental behaviour will be able to secure 
a sustained risk premium.  
The study examines the determinants of environmental disclosures in terms of size, 
prior profitability, AC, and CG mechanisms, substantial ownership, leverage and 
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industry as control measures. A specific aspect of these tests is that quality and volume 
of disclosures are contrasted, where the former refers to difficult to replicate disclosures 
and the latter to generalised, difficult to verify disclosures. Expectations are that the 
relationship will be stronger for the former than for the latter.  It is important to note that 
disclosure, if measured in an RBV framework, is a proxy for managerial environmental 
strategy. Such logic follows from the relationship between managerial strategy and 
competitive advantage.  CSR activities and disclosure follows from resource 
endowments, since without such endowments quality signalling of competitive 
advantage investments is not possible. Moreover, if a qualitative ranking of disclosures 
is used based on difficulty of replication, it is likely that disclosures measured thus will 
be an accurate proxy for managerial strategy. It is also possible that CG corresponds 
closely to managerial strategy as accounting disclosure is a function of governance and 
the governance function can serve to enhance firms’ reputation.  
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2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Environmental disclosure, and specifically the quality of environmental disclosure, 
is determined by the resource base and moderated by CG mechanisms. Quality in the 
RBV framework specifically relates to the difficulty of replication by competitors 
(Hasseldine et al., 2005). In prior studies, firm size leads to higher disclosure because 
large firms are more publicly visible (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), and therefore 
subject to greater scrutiny and for similar reasons engage in greater CSR activities 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997). For both reasons, the volume of disclosures is likely to 
increase. In the RBV approach, the scale and scope of the firms’ operation1 is also likely 
to increase the quality of disclosure, as such firms engage in activities that are difficult 
to replicate from the point of view of competitors. Profitability (PROFIT) is another 
firm-related factor expected to affect the study model. Firms that possess cash and 
resources are more likely to be able to invest in difficult to replicate CSR projects. Prior 
literature suggests that profitable firms are keen to disclose more environmental 
information to attract investment (Cormier and Magnan, 1999). In the RBV signalling 
approach, the resource base is measured by prior profitability, which is a proxy for cash 
flow, and size, measured by natural log of total assets, which is a proxy for the scale and 
scope of the resource base.  
According to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010, the board should establish 
AC that must be composed of at least three members; all members must be independent 
directors with at least one member having relevant and recent financial expertise (FRC, 
2010). The Audit Committee Combined Code of Guidance (Smith, 2003) was 
established to help company boards in making appropriate arrangements for their ACs 
                                                          
1
 Economies of scale is about gaining cost advantage by producing large volume of products and 
involving in large set of investments whereas economies of scope generates benefits by producing a 
wide variety of products by efficient use of resources. 
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regarding responsibilities and meetings. The Report states that “AC should include at 
least three members who should all be independent non-executive directors” (Smith, 
2003). The chairman of AC after discussion with the company secretary sets the number 
of times meetings should be held and the timing of those meetings; it is required that 
ACs must meet at least three times a year (Smith, 2003).  The work of AC is key to 
securing stakeholders’ confidence in the financial statements of the company; it is a 
source of strength to the company and to its shareholders (Smith, 2003). ACs  review 
and challenge where needed the actions and judgments relating to significant reporting 
issues such as the clarity and completeness of disclosure contained within the annual 
report before submission to the board (Smith, 2003).  
The role of AC and its possible impact on enhancing the quality of environmental 
disclosures has not been investigated in prior literature. Prior CG literature shows that 
an effective board of directors composes of  AC which oversees financial statements, 
ensures their accuracy and enhances audit quality, and  improve financial reporting  
(Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2004). The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010 
recommends that AC be comprised of members with financial literacy and at least one 
member to be a financial expert (FRC, 2010), and the requirement for such expertise in 
the face of increasingly complex accounting and auditing information (Abbott et al., 
2004; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2004) in assuring the quality of financial 
reporting (Chen et al., 2006).  An AC of independent and knowledgeable directors is in 
a good position to determine not just what management has done to identify risk, but 
also what they have done to adequately manage, monitor and control it (Keinath and 
Walo, 2004). Such expertise enhances the quality and credibility of information 
provided to the market (Smith, 2003). A number of studies have specifically examined 
the positive effects of AC characteristics on financial reporting, e.g.Abbott et al. (2004) 
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and Magena and Pike (2005). In view of this apparent relationship, it is also likely that 
AC could help in assessing social and environmental responsibility issues when auditing 
financial reports, e.g. asset values that are subject to environmental concerns and 
product redesign costs (Dixon et al., 2004). Such an auditing role should help provide 
reliable information to all stakeholders, enhance the credibility of environmental 
reports, and build the corporate image (Moroney et al., 2012).  
Some previous studies argue that individual CG components do not reflect the 
governance effects as do the combination of those (e.g. Black et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 
2011). Black et al. (2006) construct a CG index for 515 companies listed on the Korean 
Stock Exchange arguing that individual characteristics do not help governance but 
combining them in one index does.  Zaman et al. (2011) also argue that the interactions 
of four AC dimensions viz. AC independence, AC financial expertise, AC size, and AC 
meeting that have been the subject of UK governance codes (Smith Report, 2003; and 
Higgs Report, 2003) are likely to have to the most impact on AC quality instead of 
taking them individually.  
2.3.1 AC Characteristics 
2.3.1.1. AC independence 
The existence of AC is associated with error reduction and regulation enhancement 
(Barako et al., 2006). According to agency theory, the existence of AC reduces agency 
costs. Independent non-executive directors are the main members of AC. This fact will 
ensure that information will not be withheld from outsiders hence enhancing internal 
control and improving disclosure quality (Ho and Wong, 2001). Directors who are 
independent from management will require that more information be disclosed 
voluntarily in the firms’ annual reports. Studies show a positive association between the 
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existence of AC that comprise of only independent directors and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008) arguing that ACs provide a 
substantive monitoring and oversight to financial reporting.  Ho and Wong (2001) find a 
significant and positive association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and AC 
using Hong Kong firms’ data. The study shows that AC of independent directors 
reduces the amount of information withheld, and consequently improves disclosure 
quality. The fact that the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 requires boards to 
establish AC composed only of independent directors should add an effective 
monitoring tool over management activities and demand managers to disclosure more 
information voluntarily in their annual reports. 
2.3.1.2. AC meetings 
An active AC enhances its effectiveness where members during their meetings 
oversee financial statements, reassure their accuracy and improve audit quality (Beasley 
et al., 2009). Frequent AC meetings can be a sign of increased vigilance and monitoring 
and hence are associated with higher quality and quantity of financial reporting (Chen et 
al., 2006). Beasley et al. (2009) address some issues linked to AC meetings such as 
“time spent on important issues, agenda settings, information flow, reliance on 
management and review of information” (p.69) concluding that meetings could be more 
effective when ACs probe challenging questions to management and auditor. Previous 
research suggested the importance of active ACs and found positive association 
between frequent meetings and higher voluntary disclosure (Beasley et al., 2009). 
2.3.1.3.  AC financial expertise 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (FRC, 2010) recommends that AC be 
comprised of members with financial literacy and at least one member to be a financial 
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expert (FRC, 2010). Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) defines financial literacy by the 
ability to read and understand fundamental financial statements (Abbott et al., 2004: 
p.73). Due to the increasing complexity of accounting and auditing information, the 
expertise of AC acts as a valuable tool in reducing financial misstatements (Abbott et 
al., 2004; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2004) and evaluating the quality of 
financial reporting (Chen et al., 2006). AC expertise enhances the quality and credibility 
of information provided to the market (Smith, 2003). Abbott et al. (2004) show a 
positive association between AC financial expertise and financial restatements by 
examining a set of firms during the period 1991-1999. The study argues that AC 
internal control prevents or detects material misstatement. Beasley et al. (2009) examine 
the relation between AC inputs, including independence and expertise, and financial 
reporting outputs such as restatements and fraud by interviewing 42 AC members 
serving on US public companies. Results show notable differences in AC members’ 
responses associated with accounting expertise. This supports the argument that 
auditing expertise enhances reporting quality. 
2.3.1.4.  AC size 
Smith (2003) states that ACs must consist at least of three members. Big ACs 
receive more legitimacy and authority. It brings a variety of skills, experiences and 
energy hence increasing the likelihood to resolve potential problems in financial 
reporting process, and finishing the task in a suitable time (Smith, 2003). They can 
attain greater power and monitoring practices over the top management team due to the 
fact that they will enhance the status of internal audit function and its effectiveness 
(Abbott et al., 2004), thus in turn affecting the amount and quality of information 
disclosed. Li et al. (2008) find a significant positive link between AC size and 
intellectual capital disclosure. The study argues that larger size AC is considered as a 
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powerful monitoring device that is associated with more reliable and higher quality 
reporting. Magena and Pike (2005) find no significant association between AC size and 
the extent of disclosure in interim reports in a sample of 262 UK listed companies. 
This study will measure the joint effects of AC characteristics in one composite 
measure (Zaman et al., 2011) and would expect that AC quality will be associated with 
management disclosing environmental information in its annual reports that have 
difficulty in replicating nature. AC quality is characterized by, audit committee 
composed of at least three members; all members are independent non-executive 
directors; at least one member of the AC has financial expertise and finally AC should 
meet at least three times a year following (Smith, 2003).  In combination, the resource 
base of the firm, and its governance effectiveness, specifically the quality of its audit 
committee leads to the hypothesis:  
H: The quality of environmental disclosure is positively related to the quality of the 
audit committee.   
Much of the literature reviewed above might lead to suppose that there is such a 
relationship. Insofar as these effects are driven by competitive advantage strategies 
leading to VRIN assets, or in other words determined by an RBV and quality signalling 
framework, the expectation is that the hypothesis will be supported for the quality of 
disclosure but not necessarily for the volume of disclosure.  
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2.4 METHODOLOGY  
2.4.1 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
A financial reporting system is considered a basic tool to provide shareholders with 
the information they need and to assist in communication with stakeholders; such a 
system can control any managerial manipulation behaviour (Wu et al., 2010). 
Disclosure is delivered through regulated financial reports including financial 
statements, footnotes, management discussion, and analysis (Healy and Palepu, 2001: 
p.406). Corporate disclosure is considered as the main mechanism that helps reduce 
information symmetry between the company and its stakeholders (Ion, 2008).  
Voluntary disclosure can be defined as voluntary dissemination of quantitative and 
qualitative information which exceeds mandatory disclosure requirements, accounting 
standards, or stock exchange requirements regulations (Watson et al., 2002). It 
represents the management’s free choice to provide the information needed for the 
decision making process of those who use the firm’s annual reports (Gray et al., 1995). 
Studies covering voluntary disclosure have increased over the last two decades (for 
example, Gray et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Adams et al., 1995; Watson et al., 
2002). Academic literature focuses on different types of voluntary disclosure, such as 
earnings and management forecasts, social and environmental disclosure, CG and share 
option disclosure (for example, Skinner, 1994; Forker, 1992; Gray et al., 2001; Sun et 
al., 2010; Laksmana, 2008).  
Social and environmental disclosure includes disclosing information relating to 
employees and consumer issues, community involvement, energy and product safety 
(Gray et al., 2001). The corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) is defined as 
“the process of providing information designed to discharge social accountability; 
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typically this act would be undertaken by the accountable organization and thus might 
include information in the annual report, special publication, or even socially oriented 
advertising” (Waller and Lanis, 2009: p.110). Social disclosure represents ways on how 
an organisation communicates with society and its stakeholders hence legitimising its 
action. Stakeholders may include shareholders, lenders, suppliers, customers, 
environmental activists and employees (Elkington, 1994). However, legitimacy could 
affect some organisations more than others depending on their visibility or their need 
for political and social support (Cormier and Gordon, 2001).  
Corporate environmental responsibility disclosure (CERD hereafter) may be 
defined as the preparation and provision of information by management on the impact 
corporate economic activities have on the physical or natural environment in which they 
operate for the use of relevant stakeholders in assessing their relationship with the 
reporting entity (Gray et al., 1993). Most studies on environmental disclosure have 
examined the content of annual reports and proved that environmental discourse varies 
across companies, countries, industries and time, (for example, Gray et al., 1995; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Gray et al., 2001; Adams, 2002).  
Studies on CERD have applied the content analysis technique measuring either the 
quantity or the quality of information disclosed in firms’ annual reports. Krippendorff 
(1980) defines content analysis as a “research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context” (p.21). It is important that content analysis 
replicates the data available by using database structure, checklists and decision rules 
that will help achieve such a goal (Gray et al., 1995). There have been two widely used 
measures of content analysis in the accounting literature: quantitative measure and 
qualitative measure. The quantitative approach focuses on the volume of information 
disclosed or frequency captured. This approach, also called the mechanistic approach, 
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was the subject of long debate among researchers mostly centred on the “unit of 
analysis” whether it is word, sentence, page or phrase. The word is used as a unit of 
analysis for some studies applying the mechanistic approach (Gao et al., 2005; 
Campbell, 2003) . It can also be used as a coding unit to resolve the information quality 
of narrative in disclosure index-based instruments (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 
2010). Words are applicable when each word is weighted for meaning before being 
included in the narrative, however sometimes words may be part of one or more 
disclosure categories which would cause double coding (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 
2010). On the other hand, the page is considered a very straight forward technique for 
detecting the quantity of disclosure but it can only describe one single large category 
without being able to capture the narrative tangled in subcategories (Campbell and 
Abdul Rahman, 2010). Also pages may include pictures (graphs, tables) that include no 
information on environmental activities. In contrast, sentences and words ignore that 
some important tables or graphs may be related to environmental issues (Al-Tuwaijri et 
al., 2004).  
Studies applying the quantitative approach find that sentences are more reliable as a 
basis of coding than words or pages, “as natural units of written English which clearly 
exist between two punctuation marks, sentences are also likely to provide more reliable 
measure of inter-rater coding than words” (Hackston and Milne, 1996: p.86). However, 
sentences differentiate in length, style and grammatical choice; in addition one sentence 
can reflect the information content in more than one category (Campbell and Abdul 
Rahman, 2010). Finally Campbell and Abdul Rahman, (2010) argue that phrases, 
clauses or themes are very powerful tools that allow capturing of both meaning and 
volume of content; they are not constrained by a grammatical unit such as a word, 
sentence or page but they are groups of words where each forms a theme with a 
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different meaning. Using themes as a unit of coding helps categorizing the whole 
narrative without being obliged to allocate meaning by word, sentence or page; hence 
subcategories captured in a small number of words is efficiently coded (Campbell and 
Abdul Rahman, 2010).  
Mechanistic content analysis studies also capture the frequency of disclosure; those 
studies apply the benchmark approach that analyses the content of disclosure using a 
dichotomous categories index (Kolk, 1999). Dichotomous indices measure the 
frequency of disclosure and give information on a company disclosing, or not, a specific 
theme. The more complex the indices, the more valuable the data captured (Beck et al., 
2010). On the other hand, to assess the objectivity of the mechanistic approach, a 
number of social and environmental studies apply an empirical tool by adding weights 
to different quantitative disclosure items based on their perceived importance. 
Qualifying the importance of each item by giving it a relevant weight is based on survey 
questions among users groups (Beattie et al., 2004). These studies apply a quality-
adjusted quantitative measure by adding a rating or quality score for every sentence or 
word in the annual report to create an aggregate variable (Hasseldine et al., 2005). 
However, Beattie et al. (2004) argue that having a large number of items tends to give  
same results for weighted and un-weighted items.  
While the quantitative approach using volume or frequency-base data is limited in 
its ability to designate content and trends (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010), the 
qualitative or the interpretative approach focuses on the narrative of every theme being 
analysed. It is considered as more reliable and descriptive to stakeholders (Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004). To gain a better understanding of its meaning and the richness of that 
meaning, the qualitative approach tends to give various ratings to different levels of 
social responsibility disclosure (Beck et al., 2010). A study by Robertson and Nicholson 
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(1996) reveals a hierarchy of three levels of social responsibility disclosure, i.e. 
corporate rhetoric, specific endeavour and implementation and monitoring. The 
hierarchy of importance gives low rate to “non-quantified information” and high rate to 
extremely monitored social information. Toms (2002) developed a rating scale for 
social disclosure where he gives a (0) score to non-disclosure (1) to general information, 
(2) to special endeavour, policy only, (3) to specified policy, (4) to implementation and 
monitoring, and (5) to implementation, monitoring and publication of results.. Table 2.2 
summarizes some social and environmental studies according to the content analysis 
measure used. 
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Table 2.2 
Prior Studies on Social and Environmental Disclosure Applying Different 
Measures 
 
 
Research paper  
 
Research contribution  
 
Content analysis approach/ tool  
   
Wiseman (1982) 
 
Relationship between environmental disclosure 
content and environmental performance 
 
Quantity with quality/ 18 index 
items classified into 4 categories 
 
Harte and Owen 
(1991) 
 
A look at the development of green reporting 
by British companies   
 
Quantity/ dichotomous disclosure 
index  
 
Ness and Mirza 
(1991) 
 
The relationship between environmental 
disclosure and the oil industry based on agency 
theory   
 
Quantitative/ frequency of 
disclosure based on prior 
framework   
 
Patten (1991) 
 
Examining whether public pressure or firm 
profitability is behind firm’s decision of 
disclosing social information voluntarily 
 
Quantitative/ pages counts and 
categories classified based on 
Ernst & Ernst (1978)  
 
Roberts (1992) 
 
The explanation of social responsibility 
disclosure based on stakeholder theory  
 
Quantity with quality/ CEP 
ratings (measure of both level and 
reliability of CSR disclosure 
Gray et al. (1995) 
 
Constructing a research database of social and 
environmental reporting by UK companies  
 
 
Quantitative/ Guthrie’s approach  
based on Ernest & Ernest 
database  
 
 
Hackston and 
Milne (1996) 
 
Examining some potential determinants of 
social and environmental disclosure in New 
Zealand companies  
 
Quantitative measure/ sentence-
based coding instrument  
 
Kolk (1999) 
 
An evaluation of environmental rating system 
 
Quantitative/UNEP, 
sustainability rating survey  
 
Milne and Chan 
(1999) 
 
Investigating the impact of narrative social 
disclosures in the annual reports on investment 
decision making  
 
Narrative textual disclosure/ 
investment decision experiment 
using survey questions  
 
Milne and Adler 
(1999) 
 
A study of inter-coder reliability of 
environmental disclosure content analysis  
 
Quantitative/ based on (Hackston 
and Milne, 1996) instrument  
 
Wilmshurst and 
Frost (2000) 
 
A link between the importance of specific 
environmental disclosure issues and actual 
environmental reporting   
 
Quantitative/ sentence count  
 
Cormier and 
Gordon (2001) 
Relationship between company disclosure, size 
and ownership  
 
Disclosure index based on 
(Wiseman, 1982) 
 
Gray et al. (2001) 
 
Exploring the relationship between social and 
environmental disclosure by large companies 
and corporate characteristics  
 
Quantitative/ content analysis 
employed in the CSEAR database 
(data are collected by volume 
categorized by subject) 
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Milne and Patten 
(2002) 
 
 
The legitimized impact of environmental 
disclosure provided in chemical firms’ annual 
reports on investors  
 
Narrative/ investment decision 
experiment based on (Milne and 
Chan, 1999) 
 
Toms (2002) Relationship between environmental disclosure 
and environmental reputation  
Quantitative measure/ quality 
signalling based on the volume of 
information  
 
 
Campbell (2003) The UK environmental disclosure as a 
mechanism of legitimating  
 
Quantitative/ word count  
 
Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004) 
 
An analysis of the interrelation among 
environmental disclosure, environmental 
performance and economic performance  with 
a joint determination of the three functions  
 
Quantitative/ dichotomous 
scoring index  
 
 
Hasseldine et al. 
(2005) 
 
The impact of environmental disclosure on 
environmental reputation  
 
Qualitative measure with 
weights/ based on (Toms, 2002) 
 
Perrini (2005) Corporate social responsibility themes and 
topics among European companies  
Quantitative/ sentence count with 
checklist instrument classified 
into 8 stakeholders-based 
categories  
 
Gao et al. (2005) Examining the determinants of social and 
environmental disclosure in Hong Kong  
 
Quantitative/ word count 
Sun et al. (2010) 
 
The association between corporate 
environmental disclosure, earning management 
and the impact of CG on that association  
Quantitative/ Environmental Key 
Performance Indicator (KPI) 
required by UK government  
  
Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) 
Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the cost 
of equity capital: The initiation of CSR 
reporting 
Disclosure index based on 
different categories of CSR issues 
employed by KLD 
 
From Table 2.2, it is noteworthy that most environmental and social disclosure 
studies focus on the quantitative technique rather than the interpretative technique 
proving the fact that the majority of empirical studies that have been done on social and 
environmental disclosure captured the volume of information disclosed without giving 
an account of the significance of this information or the completeness of company 
disclosing environmental disclosure practices (Beck et al., 2010).  
This study will examine the effects of AC on environmental disclosure by adopting 
a method that has been outlined in Beck et al. (2010). The CONI approach measures 
information diversity, content and volume. It involves dual qualitative and volumetric 
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measurement.  Beck et al. (2010) applies the CONI instrument to a matched sample of 
14 pairs of companies from the United Kingdom and Germany over a five-year period. 
Findings show that information diversity has broadened over time, however in terms of 
information content, there is supremacy of narrative disclosure over numerical 
disclosure with little narrative, quantitative and comparable disclosure.  
This study will extend Beck et al.’s (2010) work by using the CONI research 
instrument in analysing environmental disclosure of a sample of UK FTSE 350 
companies. The study will add to the academic literature being the first that applies the 
CONI research instrument in other area of disclosure studies that is the association 
between environmental disclosure and CG mechanisms within the British context. The 
CONI approach has an advantage over other content analysis approaches by the ability 
to capture both the mechanistic and the interpretative measures of content analysis 
instead of applying them separately (Beck et al., 2010). Beck et al. (2010) state that “a 
perfect content analysis instrument would be to capture the totality of meaning from a 
narrative and convey this in a coded numerical form” (p.218). CONI is based on dual 
qualitative and volumetric measurement which gives it an advantage over an index-
based meaning oriented analysis in that the latter does not combine the meaning with 
disclosure volume (Beck et al., 2010).  
CONI applies a matrix instrument that captures all information disclosed and gives 
it a scale that will allow a qualitative analysis of disclosure based on Wiseman (1982). 
This instrument is divided into 12 categories that include subcategories which make it 
easier to measure the data analysed. This variety of categories helps in capturing the 
totality of environmental reporting, decreasing double coding and drawing conclusion 
about the studied firms (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010).  Categories were 
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established by analysing previous literature for common patterns and themes (see for 
example Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Wiseman, 1982)  
Categories adopted from Beck et al. (2010) are:  
1. General environmental-related disclosures including aims, any mention of long-
term policy, and results resulting from that policy.  
2. Information related to who is responsible for implementation of policies such as 
top management or board, committee and audit. 
3. Pollution-related disclosures including air, water and land emission, and actions 
undertaken. It also includes information about waste reduction, recycling, and product 
development. 
4. Disclosure related to sustainability and firms’ commitment to the United Nations 
Conference on Environmental Development (UNCED). 
5. Environmental liabilities related to financial disclosure. 
6. Environmental activities including staff training, awards, sponsorships, and 
project involvement. 
7. Business-related risks associated with environmental behaviour, costs involved, 
and procedures adopted to mitigate these risks. 
8. Pressure groups such as shareholders, government, and other stakeholders. 
9. The availability of separate environmental reports referenced within annual 
reports. 
10. Energy-related disclosures including energy conservation, energy saving 
programmes, and alternative energy sources. 
11. Feedback received from stakeholders.  
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 Categories are explained in Appendix1 and adopted from Beck et al. (2010). A 
reliability test was run by coders with different experience and academic base in content 
analysis and environmental disclosure issues.  
There are three types of reliability testing (Krippendorff, 1980). The first type is the 
stability test referring to the ability of the coder to agree with herself/ himself over time. 
The second type involves running two kinds of testing, i.e. reproductivity testing that is 
achieved due to an agreement between two coders, and replicability testing occurring 
when multiple groups of coders apply a coding theme reliably (Rourk et al., 2000). This 
type of reliability measurement is also called inter-coder reliability; it helps in assisting 
with the constancy of coding decision (Beck et al., 2010). The final test is the accuracy 
test of coding performance against a predetermined standard set known from previous 
studies and experiments (Milne and Adler, 1999).  
The study applies the most commonly used measure of reliability which is the inter-
coder reliability test considering that stability test does not give sufficient results and 
accuracy test rarely exists (Beattie et al., 2004). The alpha coefficient of agreement is 
used to measure reliability: “it is the ratio of the number of pairwise inter-judge 
agreement to the total number of pair wise judgements” (Milne and Adler, 1999: p.240). 
It has been argued that the smaller the number of coding categories, the higher the 
probability of getting random agreement in coding decisions; hence the alpha 
coefficient will give overestimated results (Milne and Adler, 1999; Beattie et al., 2004). 
The study includes a large number of coding categories; therefore the alpha coefficient 
of agreement should be applicable. The alpha co-efficient was calculated according to 
the method outlined by Krippendorff (1980). Krippendorff alpha value of 87.8% was 
achieved.  
65 
 
This study will be the first that applies the CONI approach on the most recent 
period of 2007-2011. This will help explain the UK firms’ concentration on 
environmental issues and the “going green” concept. Managers may need to increase 
their attention to environmental issues especially after the announcement by the UK 
government stressing the significance of many elements of social and environmental 
reporting (Sun et al., 2010). The location of environmental disclosure might take 
different sections of the annual reports. Companies disclose environmental information 
within the business review or reporting and financial review in annual reports and 
accounts (Sun et al., 2010). It could be located in the chairman’s statement and 
director’s report, but most importantly in the CSR report. Some companies also publish 
stand-alone reports, however these reports will be excluded from this study following 
the work by Beck et al. (2010) arguing that most vital information will still be found in 
the annual reports.  
The CONI approach consists of three steps according to Beck et al. (2010):  
Step 1- coding content diversity: instead of capturing the relevant meaning by words, 
sentences or paragraphs, the study analyses the narrative of firms’ annual reports at the 
phrase level which will help coding the totality of meaning.  
Step 2- coding on information content quality: the level of information provided will be 
combined with the depth of disclosure based on five types: 
 Type1- a pure narrative disclosure such as issues related to categories definition.  
 Type2- a pure narrative disclosure with more details related to disclosure in each 
category. 
 Type3- quantitative disclosure addressing issues related to categories mentioned 
in Appendix1.    
66 
 
 Type4- quantitative and qualitative disclosure of the categories.  
 Type5- quantitative, qualitative and comparable disclosure.  
Step3- volumetric measurement: number of disclosure items per category using phrase 
counts which helps to indicate the importance of each category of disclosure to the 
company.  
The qualitative measure is based on testing type (1-5) disclosures as thresholds as a 
measure of disclosure quality. Each company is scored with reference to its highest 
ranking phrase where scores are given to the highest level observed not the level that 
has the highest frequency. 
2.4.2 Sample Selection  
 All companies that were continuously listed in the UK FTSE 350 in the period 
2007-2011 inclusive were selected as the initial sample. This created a balance panel 
with five years’ data per company. The study’s sample represents the top 350 UK-listed 
firms by total market capitalisation which guarantees both a wide range of data 
available and statistical power in the tests. Elimination of companies with missing data 
reduced the sample size to 224 firms in each year with a total firm/year sample size of 
1120 observations. The final sample size is among the highest compared to prior 
literature in the area of disclosure practices which should add reliability to the study 
findings. The study uses up to date data; the most recent data at the time of the 
conducted study (2007-2011). This will help to capture the increased and most recent 
awareness of CG and reporting practices. The annual reports, for five years 2007-2011 
for each firm in the sample, will be selected as a primary source for environmental 
responsibility disclosure. These reports are our basic data source for environmental 
disclosure and CG information since they are publicly available, produced regularly, 
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management implement editorial control over them, and finally they have been used as 
a basic source in previous research (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Financial data related 
to firms’ specific characteristics will be collected from DataStream. 
2.4.3 Independent Variables Measurement 
The resource base is measured using firm size which is the natural log of total 
assets (SIZE). It is a proxy of the extent of information costs. Disclosing information 
voluntarily by large companies incurs slight costs comparing to the costs that would be 
associated if shareholders needed to collect their own information about the firm 
(Cormier and Magnan, 1999). Large companies tend to disclose more information 
voluntarily since they are highly visible and exposed to higher agency costs (Alsaeed, 
2006). Legitimacy theory also supports the fact that large companies are more visible 
and they need to disclose more depending on the fact that those companies are involved 
in more activities with a substantial influence on society; some of them might dominate 
the market (Cormier et al., 2004; Cormier and Gordon, 2001). Other studies also 
suggest that large companies sometimes attempt to reduce political costs that may affect 
negatively on the management prosperity by disclosing more social and environmental 
information (Hackston and Milne, 1996).  For all previous reasons mentioned, the 
volume of disclosure is likely to increase. In the RBV approach, firm size is likely to 
increase the quality of disclosure as such firms own the resources that lead them to 
engage in CA inimitable activities.  
Profitability measured by return on equity (ROE) is another resource base factor
2
. 
Shareholders require the firm to disclose environmental information related to operating 
                                                          
2
 For comparability analysis with Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005), ROE was used as a measure 
for profitability. Other measures such as return on asset (ROA), and return on capital employed (ROCE) 
were also used and results were consistent.  
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costs and capital disbursement, environmental management plans, and environmental 
obligations (Cormier and Magnan, 1999). The fact that environmental disclosure is 
costly makes it influenced by the firm’s financial health. Profitable firms can endure 
stakeholders’ pressure and afford the costs incurred from environmental disclosure 
when facing environmental problems (disclosing bad news) (Cormier and Magnan, 
1999). On the other hand, they are keen to disclose more environmental information to 
the public to attract more investors and publicise their environmental friendly 
performance (good news, such as environmental awards). These firms will gain 
credibility among all environmental groups as reliable and socially responsibility 
companies (Cormier and Magnan, 1999), also increasing investors’ confidence which in 
turn will increase management compensation (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). While firms 
suffering financial problems may feel that disclosing more social and environmental 
information in their annual report will not work in favour of their critical financial 
position, i.e. managers could be subject to corporate actions when the firm continues to 
perform poorly in the market, hence a decision of disclosing more will be threatening 
(Cormier et al., 2004).  
According to the RBV view, the study specifically aims to test the hypothesis that 
ex ante resources lead to strategies that must be disclosed in order to be valorised in the 
form of CA investment and hence superior reputation. Lagging ROE provides a test of 
this hypothesis and mitigates modelling issues which tend to confound analysis of the 
link between financial performance and higher disclosure that leads to superior 
reputation (Ullmann, 1985).  
CG has been recognised as an essential mechanism in monitoring managers’ 
behaviour and facilitating their actions for the purpose of maximising the value of the 
company (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). CG is about the governance of corporations and 
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the activities they are engaged in (Brown et al., 2011). The Cadbury Committee 1992 
set the first version of the UK Code “best practice” on CG. Researchers in CG often use 
the Cadbury Report as a starting base (Brennan and Solomon, 2008). CG is defined as 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled (FRC, 2010). According to 
the Corporate Governance Code (2010), the board of directors’ role is presented through 
evaluating the company’s position and projections while the shareholders’ role is to 
choose the auditors and directors that should form governance. Similarly, the AC is 
expected to check the financial statement of the company and review any related 
financial reporting judgements (FRC, 2010). Finally, CG can play a wider role, “holding 
the balance between economic and social goals and between individuals and communal 
goals. The CG framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and 
equally to require accountability of the stewardship of those resources” (Buchholtz et 
al., 2008: p.327). This will help in fulfilling the goals of individuals, firms and society.  
The study aims to examine audit committee contribution above that provided by 
board of directors on environmental disclosure. AC quality is measured in composite 
fashion to reflect compliance with the recommendations of the Smith Report (2003). 
Compliance indicated where all committee members are independent-non-executive 
directors, there are three or more meetings per year, there is at least one committee 
member with financial expertise and the committee size composed of at least three 
members. In addition to the composite measures, AC individual components are also 
used separately to examine their individual contribution. 
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2.4.4 Control Variables  
The mediating effective role of the board is measured using a series of mainly count and 
dummy variables. 
Board Size: The UK Corporate Governance Code suggests that board size should 
comprise of an appropriate range of members. Prior studies discuss agency problems 
resulting from the separation of management and control and the role that the board can 
play in reducing agency costs (Jensen, 1993). Proponents of agency theory argue that 
larger boards may be more independent of management, and thus will be linked to a 
better firm performance where firms are expected to pay more attention to 
environmentally friendly activities (Halme and Huse, 1997). Halme and Huse (1997) 
state that “in the case of a large board, there is a higher probability of a broader range of 
stakeholders and multitude values to be presented than if the number of board members 
is small” (p.142). Proponents of stewardship theory argue that smaller in size boards 
endure involvement and social decisions hence better decision making (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Board size is measured by the number of board members.  
Board independence: This is defined as the proportion of outside directors to the 
total number of directors. Agency theory states that more independent directors on the 
board helps increase monitoring and control of managers’ actions due to their 
opportunistic behaviour which will lead to a reduction in agency costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Previous studies argue that the firm’s selection of a greater number of 
independent directors signals its interest in legitimacy and the external environment, 
hence showing more interest in environmentally friendly activities (Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011). Stewardship theory states that executive directors provide expertise 
and create sources of communication needed for effective board functioning (Muth and 
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Donaldson, 1998). Some argue that a vast majority of independent directors are hired 
for their financial expertise, a fact that will make them more inclined to evaluate firms’ 
historical financial information rather than uncertain long-term investments such as 
corporate environmental responsibilities activities, R&D investments and internal 
innovation (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011: p.138). Since independent directors are 
appointed to protect shareholders’ interests, they might consider that engaging in 
corporate environmental responsibility activities is not in the firm’s interest due to their 
uncertain returns. Moreover, firms might appoint non-executives to specifically cover 
CSR briefs (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011).  
Cheng and Courtenay’s (2006) results show a significant and positive association 
between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure on a sample of 
104 firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2000. Chen and Jaggi’s (2000) 
results show a positive association between the proportions of independent directors and 
the quality/extent of financial disclosure. Studies that are in contrast with high 
proportions of independent directors on board (Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002) based their argument on the assumption that independent directors may lack both 
real independence from management and inside business knowledge; also they may 
bring excessive monitoring (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). A significant negative 
relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure was proved by Eng 
and Mak (2003), Barako et al. (2006) and Ho and Wong (2001). Lim et al. (2007) 
examine the effects of board composition on non-financial disclosure; this includes 
social and environmental disclosure. Their findings show no significant association 
between the two.   
Board meeting: This refers to the number of times that the board of directors meets 
during the year. It is one of the essential board duties that will allow sharing and 
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oversighting of financial information among directors; that fact should add more 
transparency and quality to information reporting practices and enhance the 
effectiveness of board decisions (Carcello et al., 2002). A study by Laksmana (2008) 
finds a positive association between board meetings and disclosure quality.  
Board Duality: This means that one person is holding the chair of board of directors 
and CEO positions. Agency theory supports the view that the separation of the two 
roles, that is the absence of role duality, increases internal control of companies and 
provides a rigorous monitoring policy for the firm to reduce information asymmetry 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). This separation of the chairman and chief executive 
would increase the need for disclosure (Barako et al., 2006).  On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the existence of role duality would enhance the domination effects of 
the CEO over the board hence improving the board effectiveness by controlling the 
selection process of other board members (Barako et al., 2006). The CEO may feel 
bound to the firm future performance because of long-term employment (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Some studies show that no significant relationship exists between 
role duality and voluntary disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001; Barako et al., 2006). Forker 
(1992) argues that combining the roles of the chair executive and the chairman affects 
negatively on monitoring value which will consequently affect the quality of disclosure. 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) also find positive association between board leadership 
and quantity of information disclosed. Board duality is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one in case of duality and zero otherwise.  
Board diversity: The correlation between CG and CSR may be related to board 
diversity. Board composition consists of board independence and leadership, 
membership criteria, and directors qualifications and nomination process (Buchholtz et 
al., 2008). It should also highlight the issue of diversifying the board to include more 
73 
 
women. FTSE 350 companies have been encouraged to promote greater female 
representation on boards (12.5%) after the publication of the Davies Report “Women on 
Boards” in Feb 2011. The Davies Report states that diversifying the board with the best 
people from a range of perspectives and backgrounds should help improve business 
performance and promote equal opportunities for women (Davies, 2011). Ramirez 
(2003) argues that diversifying the board would broaden the decision making process 
and prevent the group thinking dynamics that share the same ideas, experiences and 
features. Dallas (2001) argues that board diversity stresses the firm’s principles in 
ethical and social responsibility issues. He finds that diversifying the board improves 
negotiations, counter argument and the decision making process. Francoeur et al. (2008) 
examine gender diversity and the impact of an increased number of women in 
governance systems on firm performance. The results show that firms with a higher 
proportion of women on the board and top management positions generates positive and 
significant abnormal returns. Board diversity is measured by the number of women on 
the board.  
Prior literature indicated the potential importance of further variables that were added as 
controls. 
Substantial ownership: This is measured by the percentage of outstanding common 
shares (5% or more) held by substantial shareholders who are unaffiliated with 
management. The separation of ownership and control causes a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. This fact will lead to higher agency costs since 
it is expected that outside shareholders will increase monitoring of managers’ behaviour 
hence increasing monitoring costs. However, those costs can be reduced by disclosing 
additional information voluntarily such as social and environmental information (Halme 
and Huse, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003). Managers would expect that such action will help 
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compensate for the agency problem and that the cost of non-disclosure is higher than the 
cost of disclosure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Scholars in contrast with the previous 
argument argued that the annual report is not the only major element to solve 
monitoring problems between managers and shareholders. Thus when ownership is 
diffused, disclosing more information within the annual reports will not be sufficient to 
monitor managers’ behaviour (Raffournier, 1995). Some studies show a positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and substantial ownership (Barako et al., 
2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Other studies show negative association (Raffournier, 
1995), and there are also studies that show no significant association between 
substantial ownership and environmental disclosure (Halme and Huse, 1997).  
Leverage:  Companies’ activities are funded from a mixture of debt and equity. 
Companies with high leverage ratio have an incentive to disclose more information to 
satisfy creditors’ need of information. Creditors usually request more information to be 
disclosed before making any confirmed decision (Naser et al., 2002). Firms with higher 
debt need to disclose more information to assure creditors that they are in a good 
position and that they will attain their obligations towards them. Highly leveraged firms 
incur monitoring costs, so they tend to reduce such costs by disclosing more 
information in firms’ annual reports (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Previous studies come 
up with mixed results regarding the association between leverage ratio and the level of 
disclosure. The findings of Naser et al. (2002) and Hossain et al. (1995) show a positive 
association between leverage ratio and the level of information disclosed while Wallace 
et al. (1994) observe no significant relationship between leverage ratio and disclosure 
level.  
Industry Distribution: The final control variable is the allocation of the sample to 
industry groups using the DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1 
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industries. This creates ten industry groups that reflect the differing exposure of firms to 
environmental issues. 
2.4.5 Model Specification  
To test the study hypothesis, the following model was used: 
 
                 1       2    t-1  3        4        
   5          6       7            
Where: 
ENDISC = environmental disclosure aggregate score measured using CONI approach. 
Two measures were used. First, QUALDISCQ, which is the highest recorded level 
achieved in step 2 of the CONI typology. Second, VOLDISCV, which is the volumetric 
measure used as a proxy for total disclosures according to step 3 of the CONI approach. 
 
SIZE = natural log of total assets 
ROEt-1 = prior year return on equity 
 ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive directors and 
ACMEET ≥3, and ACEXP ≥1, and ACSIZE ≥3], otherwise = 0 
 
BODVAR = board characteristics including: BODSIZE = number of board members; 
BODMEET = number of board meetings held during the year; BODIND = board 
independence [proportion of independent non-executive members on board] 
BODDUAL = status of board chair [chairman and chief executive = 1, otherwise = 0]; 
BODDIV = proportion of women on board. 
 
SUBOWN = total percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders (5% or more)  
 
LEV = debt to assets ratio 
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INDUSTRY = industry classification 
ε = error term 
β 0 = intercept 
β1 - β15 = coefficients  
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2.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
2.5.1 Introductory Findings  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the number of disclosures per category and year. Thematic 
analysis using CONI showed an increasing pattern in disclosure practice over a five-
year period, specifically disclosures related to pollution and energy. The theme related 
to pollution disclosure rounded up to 24% of the volume of information disclosed in 
2011, and 31% in 2010 as measured by an aggregate phrase count per category
3
. The 
large increase in pollution disclosures in 2010 reflects the increasing awareness in the 
management of UK firms of the strategic importance of the natural environment after 
the BP oil spill natural disaster in April 2010 causing the company to trade at 20% 
discount to its rival, Royal Dutch Shell (De Villiers et al., 2011). 
The oil spill phenomenon in the Gulf of Mexico led to voting against BP’s reports 
and accounts by a global coalition of fund managers due to risk management flaws.  
Their vows agreed that the annual report of BP does not provide shareholders with 
sufficient details to determine how the company’s safety and risk management system 
has been evaluated, managed, and mitigated, and how the oversighting role of the board 
and its sub-committees has been strengthened (Kendall, 2011). This case illustrates that 
environmental issues can result in billions of dollars in clean-up costs, fines and 
settlements for implicated firms if not assessed, managed and measured sufficiently (De 
Villiers et al., 2011). Therefore, good environmental performance is a good tool to 
reduce firms’ risks and attract investors, which explains the increasing trend in 
disclosure practice related to pollution in 2010. 
                                                          
3
 Categories SER and IRP were merged with GEN category due to the scarcity of information disclosed in a large 
number of sample firms’ annual reports. 
78 
 
The theme related to energy disclosure rounded up to 34% of the volume of 
information disclosed in 2011, and 28.3% in 2010. The cost reduction related to energy 
saving programmes and exploration of alternative energy sources required firms to 
disclose such behaviour in their annual reports, especially that environmental efforts 
will help increase competitive advantage and improve investor financial returns (Hassel 
et al., 2005). 
Overall there is an increasing trend in disclosures categories recorded by CONI 
over the five-year period which help to capture the diversity of information disclosed. 
However, disclosure in these categories is measured based on volumetric measurement, 
i.e. an aggregate phrase count. It has been argued that the volume itself could be used by 
firms to improve their corporate image or it could be a mere narrative that does not 
reflect real commitment of firms towards environmental matters. The volume in 
voluntary non-regulated disclosures could be merely descriptive, self-congratulatory, 
and therefore less reliable (Toms, 2002). 
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Figure 2.1 
Number of disclosures per category 2007-2011 
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2.5.2 Disclosure Content  
In order to establish whether there is any significant increase in disclosure content, 
Figure 4 illustrate the disclosure volume per quality type. Overall, there is an increase in 
disclosures over the five-year period. An increase in Type 1 and Type 2 disclosures in 
2011 and 2010 indicates a trend towards more company-specific and detailed reporting 
on environmental issues. Moreover, there is a significant increase in Type 3 and Type 4 
disclosures in 2010 and 2011 over previous years reflecting a trend towards more 
transparency and accountability in reporting, given an increase in numerical and 
potentially audited information (Beck et al., 2010: p.216).  
In RBV and indeed CONI language, numerical information captures the real 
commitment of firms towards the environment that is difficult to replicate by others 
unless they are engaged in investment at similar level of environmental impact. 
Although the graph shows that the majority of disclosures were made purely in a 
narrative from Type 1 and Type 2 level, the qualitative measure applied in this study is 
based on the highest scaled phrase observed rather than the frequency of phrases. Over 
the five-year period of the study, the appearance of Type 3, Type 4, Type 5 disclosures 
has increased. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the quality of reporting is improving 
over time. 
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Figure 2.2 
Disclosure Content per Type (1-5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
4500 
5000 
type 1 type 2 type 3 type 4 type 5 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
82 
 
2.5.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics for CERD, resource base variables, AC 
quality and AC individual variables, board variables and control variables. Continuous 
variables, i.e. ROE, SIZE, SUBOWN and LEV, demonstrate significant non-normality 
as a function of the outlaying observations which were dealt with by winsorising in the 
tests below. The mean (median) for environmental disclosure volume score is 40.04 
(33). It ranges from 0 minimum score to 243 maximum score. The mean (median) of 
qualitative disclosure score is 3.177 (4), and it ranges from 0 minimum score to 5 
maximum score. These variations in environmental disclosure scores among the sample 
firms during the five-year study period (2007-2011) indicate that some companies show 
more interest than others in disclosing information about their environmental practices 
within their annual reports; also the importance of corporate environmental 
responsibility issues has increased over the years.  
Of the resource base variables, the mean firm size measured by natural log of total 
assets (SIZE) is 14.76 and it ranges from 7.11 minimum score to 21.59 maximum score 
indicating that our sample is composed of both large and small firms, and the mean 
profitability measured using ROE is 34.1%. With respect to AC characteristics, the 
mean for AC independence (ACIND) is 94.2% and the median is 1 which indicates that 
compliance with the UK CG code is high. AC meets on average four times a year. The 
mean for AC size (ACSIZE) is 3.78 and the median is 4. The mean percentage of AC 
members with financial expertise (ACEXP) is 39.7% indicating that almost 40% of 
companies are complying with UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (FRC, 2010). It is 
noteworthy that the mean for AC quality (ACQUAL) is 0.839 which is higher than the 
equivalent figure of 0.16 applied to a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies between 
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2001-2004 inclusive (Zaman et al. (2011), demonstrating the changes brought about by 
the Smith Report (2003) recommendations.  
With respect to board characteristics variables, the mean percentage of non-
executive directors on board (BODIND) is 66.6% which means that more than half of 
the board members are independent as defined in the UK Code 2010. This figure is 
higher than the findings of Zaman et al. (2011) which show that 58% of board members 
are independent for a sample of UK FTSE 350 and lower than Laksmana’s (2008) 
findings which report that 79% of board members are independent for a 2002 sample of 
US firms. This can be explained by the mandatory settings of CG adopted in the US. 
The mean average number of members on boards (BODSIZE) is 9.372, lower than the 
average mean of 11.33 and 12.02 for 2002 and 1999 US sample firms reported by 
Laksmana (2008).  
The mean number of board meetings (BODMEET) is 8.444 which is close to the 
findings of Zaman et al. (2011) who report an average of 8.78 meetings for their UK 
sample, and Laksmana’s (2008) study which shows a mean number of board meetings 
of 8.74 for her US sample firms. This indicates that the frequency of board meetings in 
the UK and US are similar. Only 2.5% of the sample companies have the chairman and 
chief executive role combined (BODDUAL) meaning that 97.5% of companies have no 
duality role. The percentage mean of board diversity (BODDIV) is 9.19% indicating 
that few women directors currently sit on boards. However, this figure is higher than the 
findings of Francoeur et al. (2008) of 7.02% average representation of women directors 
of a sample taken from the 500 largest Canadian firms (FP500). Finally, other controls 
show a mean percentage of substantial shareholdings (SUBOWN) of 25.4%, which is 
lower than the mean of 62% blockholder ownership reported in Eng and Mak (2003), 
and the mean of 44.6% reported by Chen and Jaggi (2000), and a mean of leverage 
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(LEV) of 23% indicating that debt represents a substantial portion of sample firms’ 
capital structure.  
Skewness and kurtosis test for normality assumption. Specifically, the skewness 
measures the symmetry of distribution while kurtosis measures the flatness or 
peakedness of the distribution (Hair et al., 2010:35-36). Data is considered normal if 
skewness is within ±1.96 and kurtosis is within ±2. It can be seen from Table 2.3 that 
both skewness and kurtosis for some variables show high values, and therefore are not 
normally distributed. Since most variables do have a problem related to skewness and 
kurtosis, the study tends to fit the data by transforming independent variables using 
natural logs; in addition to that, the study applies winsorising of continuous variables as 
a function of outlying observations.  
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Table 2.3- Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = 
qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are 
independent non-executive directors and ACMEET =>3, and ACEXP =>1, and ACSIZE  =>3], 
otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = proportion of independent non-
executive directors on AC; ACMEET =  number of AC committee meetings; ACEXP = proportion of 
AC members with financial expertise;  BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 
=otherwise; BODDIV = number of women on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive 
directors on board; BODSIZE = number of members on board; BODMEET = number of board 
meetings; BODDIV = number of women on board; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial 
shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZE = natural log of total asset; ROE = return on equity; LEV = 
debt to asset ratio; INDUSTRY = industry dummies. 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Mean Median  Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness  Kurtosis 
        
VOLDISC 40.04 33 35.84 0 243 1.779 7.228 
QUALDISC 3.177 4 1.54 0 5 -0.528 1.779 
SIZE 14.769 14.439 1.801 7.109 21.59 1.006 5.404 
ROE 0.341 0.153 2.304 -1.61 72.06 26.63 812.81 
ACQUAL 0.839 1 0.367 0 1 -1.851 4.427 
ACSIZE 3.781 4 0.935 2 7 0.947 3.75 
ACIND 0.942 1 0.184 0 1 -3.386 13.792 
ACMEET 4.23 4 1.655 1 17 2.079 11.134 
ACEXP 0.397 0.333 0.236 0 1.25 1.371 4.337 
BOARDSIZE 9.372 9 2.760 3 21 0.501 3.484 
BOARDIND 0.666 0.667 0.144 0 1 0.501 3.484 
BOARMEET 8.444 8 3.016 1 33 1.803 10.753 
BOARDDUAL 0.025 0 0.158 0 1 5.974 36.693 
BODDIV 0.091 0.091 0.094 0 0.5 0.872 3.54 
SUBOWN 0.254 0.220 0.186 0 0.99 1.146 4.525 
LEV 0.229 0.194 0.234 0 5.268 8.938 185.448 
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2.5.4 Correlation Matrix  
Table 2.4 presents the Spearman correlation matrix for the dependent and 
independent variables. Correlation above 0.8 between independent variables indicates 
that multicollinearity is present and might affect the results (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Gujarati, 1995). Correlation coefficients in Table 2.4 show that collinearity is not 
present. As the table shows, environmental disclosure quality and volume is positively 
correlated with resource base variables viz. SIZE and ROE, and with key CG variables 
viz. AC composite measure (ACQUAL), board size (BODSIZE), board meeting 
(BODMEET) and board diversity (BODDIV). Moreover, disclosure volume and quality 
is negatively correlated with board independence (BODIND) while substantial 
ownership (SUBOWN) is positively correlated with the volume of disclosure (VOL) 
and negatively correlated with disclosure quality (QUAL). As the table illustrates, there 
is high degree of cross-correlation between key variables, including the governance 
variables, which means that care is required when constructing models to capture their 
individual and joint effects. Table 2.5 shows that the variance inflation factors on these 
variables (VIF) are all within acceptable limits (less than 10) thus confirming that 
multicollinearity is not an issue (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
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Table 2.4- Spearman Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** indicates p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<0.1 
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive 
directors and ACMEET=>3, and ACEXP =>1, and ACSIZE  =>3], otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = proportion of independent non-executive directors on AC; ACMEET =  number of AC committee 
meetings; ACEXP = proportion of AC members with financial expertise;  BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 =otherwise; BODDIV = proportion of women on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive 
directors on board; BODSIZE = number of members on board; BODMEET = number of board meetings; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZE = natural log of total asset; PROFIT 
= return on equity; LEV = debt to asset ratio; INDUSTRY = industry dummies.  
Variables QUAL VOL ACSIZE ACIND ACMEET ACEXP ACQUAL BODDUAL BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET BODDIV SIZE ROE LEV SUBOWN 
                 
QUAL 
 
1 
 
               VOL 
 
0.6836 
*** 
1 
 
              ACSIZE 
 
-0.0893 
*** 
-0.0855 
*** 
1 
 
             ACIND 
 
0.0173 
 
-0.0317 
 
0.0288 
 
1 
 
            ACMEET 
 
0.1798 
*** 
0.1212 
*** 
0.161 
*** 
0.072 
** 
1 
 
           ACEXP 
 
-0.0516 
* 
-0.0912 
*** 
-0.3815 
*** 
0.0287 
 
-0.0994 
** 
1 
 
          ACQUAL 
 
0.1342 
*** 
0.1193 
*** 
0.0418 
 
0.588 
*** 
0.2691 
*** 
0.0563 
* 
1 
 
         BODDUAL 
 
0.0216 
 
0.0219 
 
-0.0912 
*** 
-0.0138 
 
-0.001 
 
0.0879 
*** 
0.0125 
 
1 
 
        BODSIZE 
 
0.1746 
*** 
0.1686 
*** 
0.3726 
*** 
0.0941 
*** 
0.4023 
*** 
-0.1857 
*** 
0.1975 
*** -0.0371 
1 
 
       BODIND 
 
-0.2127 
*** 
-0.2181 
*** 
0.2232 
*** 
0.1223 
*** 
0.0236 
 
0.05 
 
-0.0239 
 
-0.0659 
** 
-0.1342 
*** 
1 
 
      BODMEET 
 
0.1647 
*** 
0.1441 
*** 
-0.051 
* 
0.0192 
 
0.2329 
*** 
-0.0504 
* 
0.0996 
*** 
0.022 
 
0.0142 
 
-0.1074 
*** 
1 
 
     BODDIV 
 
0.0263 
 
-0.0478 
 
0.1467 
*** 
0.0505 
* 
0.0555 
** 
-0.0423 
 
0.0228 
 
-0.0036 
 
0.1431 
*** 
0.043 
 
0.0247 
 
1 
 
    SIZE 
 
0.1492 
*** 
0.0857 
** 
0.2806 
*** 
0.0982 
*** 
0.3968 
*** 
-0.155 
*** 
0.1731 
*** 
-0.0593 
** 
0.5718 
*** 
0.1005 
*** 
0.1103 
*** 
0.1456 
*** 
1 
 
   ROE 
 
0.0923 
*** 
0.1315 
*** 
-0.0113 
 
-0.0284 
 
0.0085 
 
-0.0994 
*** 
0.0226 
 
0.0694 
** 
0.0495 
* 
-0.1507 
*** 
0.0463 
 
-0.0215 
 
-0.0249 
 
1 
 
  LEV 
 
0.095 
*** 
0.1091 
*** 
-0.0192 
 
-0.0581 
** 
0.0183 
 
-0.0885 
*** 
-0.0062 
 
0.0077 
 
0.1034 
*** 
-0.0546 
* 
0.0805 
*** 
0.0832 
*** 
0.2026 
*** 
0.0287 
 
1 
 
 SUBOWN 
 
-0.0148 
 
0.0556 
* 
-0.1334 
*** 
-0.0798 
*** 
-0.0542 
* 
0.054 
* 
-0.0636 
** 
0.0774 
*** 
-0.1132 
*** 
-0.0095 
 
-0.0668 
** 
-0.186 
*** 
-0.163 
*** 
0.0026 
 
-0.0037 
 
1 
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Table 2.5- VIF Value for Disclosure Model  
 
Variable VIF 
  
BOARDSIZE 2.01 
SIZE 1.84 
ACQUAL 1.52 
ACMEET 1.5 
ACIND 1.45 
ACSIZE 1.38 
BODIND 1.37 
BODMEET 1.13 
ACEXP 1.13 
LEV 1.05 
BODDIV 1.04 
ROE 1.04 
BODDUAL 1.02 
  Mean VIF 1.35 
 
ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive directors and ACMEET =>3, and ACEXP =>1, 
and ACSIZE  =>3], otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = proportion of independent non-
executive directors on AC; ACMEET =  number of AC committee meetings; ACEXP = proportion of AC members 
with financial expertise;  BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 =otherwise; BODDIV = 
proportion of women on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive directors on board; BODSIZE = 
number of members on board; BODMEET = number of board meetings; SUBOWN = total percentage of 
substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZE = natural log of total asset; ROE = return on equity; LEV 
= debt to asset ratio 
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Table 2.6 reports mean values of key variables by industry. The data show that the 
basic materials and the oil and gas industry tend to disclose the most by volume and 
quality of disclosure. These firms also have high resource base in terms of both capital 
and profitability. It is also interesting to note that companies from the oil and gas sector 
enjoy large number of members on the board and high mean of audit quality index 
suggesting that audit committees and governance structure play a mediating role and 
help firms engaging in sensitive activities towards the environment to disclose and 
signal to the market about their environmental behaviour where those signals need to be 
difficult to replicate by competitors. Financial services disclose the least on both 
measures, and these industries illustrate the contrast in relative sensitivity of activities 
towards the environment. In general industries disclosing high volume tend to also 
make high quality disclosures, although not in all cases. Consumer services firms, for 
example, have high quality disclosure but not a correspondingly high volume.  
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Table 2.6- Variables by Industry  
 
 
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive 
directors and ACMEET =>3, and ACEXP =>1, and ACSIZE  =>3], otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = proportion of independent non-executive directors on AC; ACMEET =  number of AC committee 
meetings; ACEXP = proportion of AC members with financial expertise;  BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 =otherwise; BODDIV = proportion of women on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive 
directors on board; BODSIZE = number of members on board; BODMEET = number of board meetings; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZE = natural log of total asset; ROE = 
return on equity; LEV = debt to asset ratio; INDUSTRTY = industry dummies.  
 
Variable QUALDISC VOLDISC SIZE ROE ACQUAL BOARDSIZE BODIND BODMEET BODDUAL BODDIV SUBOWN LEV 
Oil & Gas 3.57 57.91 14.59 0.207 0.946 11.13 0.617 8.70 0.036 0.081 0.251 0.132 
Basic Materials  3.73 71.20 14.26 0.375 0.848 9.35 0.728 7.63 0.038 0.075 0.367 0.204 
Industrials  3.73 56.86 14.72 0.261 0.835 8.76 0.601 9.09 0.030 0.064 0.217 0.227 
Consumer Goods 3.56 40.36 15 0.562 0.885 9.60 0.651 8.59 0.000 0.136 0.245 0.250 
Health Care 3.28 46.28 15.16 0.209 0.960 10.44 0.745 7.96 0.000 0.111 0.161 0.267 
Consumer Services  3.63 38.15 14.75 0.789 0.813 9.50 0.628 8.77 0.030 0.117 0.279 0.300 
Telecommunications  3.96 42.4 14.61 0.516 0.640 10.88 0.675 8.00 0.040 0.115 0.224 0.256 
Utilities  3.52 57.96 14.45 0.241 0.926 10.07 0.603 8.81 0.037 0.114 0.216 0.568 
Financials  2.04 16.42 14.76 0.092 0.827 9.23 0.742 7.77 0.024 0.089 0.236 0.187 
Technology  3.27 41.02 15.15 0.050 0.836 8.64 0.644 9.24 0.018 0.057 0.329 0.090 
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2.5.5 Results and Discussion  
The results for measuring the effects of CG mechanisms on environmental 
disclosure are presented in Table 2.7. The main regression model is run in parts. Models 
(2.1), (2.3) and (2.5) use VOLDISC as the dependent variable, which is a count measure 
and therefore negative binomial specifications are employed
4
. Models (2.2), (2.4) and 
(2.6) which use QUALDISC (a1-5 ascending scale variable), employ an ordered-Probit 
specification. All tests use random effects with robust standard errors. Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan LM tests confirm this as the correct specification
5
. Models (2.1) and 
(2.2) show the effects of the resource base variables (SIZE and ROEt-1) plus control 
variables on the quality and volume of disclosures. Models (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6) 
add board and AC variables.  
The study runs panel data regression instead of pooled regression to be able to 
control for firm’s unobserved specific effects and consequently get more valid results 
(Elsayed and Paton, 2005). The conditional fixed effects negative binomial model for 
count data due to Hausman et al. (1984) does not control for true individual fixed 
effects. It does not necessary remove the individual fixed effects in count panel data. It 
allows, moreover, for individual specific variation in the dispersion parameters rather 
than in the conditional mean (Allison and Waterman, 2002). Greene (2007) argues that 
in the fixed effects negative binomial model, the fixed effects enter the model through 
the dispersion parameter rather than the conditional mean function. This has the 
inference that time invariant variables can coexist with the effects. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclude that fixed effects negative binomial estimator is a consistent factor 
of a model that contains heterogeneous mean thus it does not control for heterogeneity. 
                                                          
4
 Pearson goodness of fit tests suggested over-dispersion in alternative Poisson models. 
5
 Only random effects are feasible in 2.2, 2.4, and 2.6. There is no command for conditional fixed effects 
model with ordered Probit.  
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Greene (2007) claims that fixed effects negative binomial estimator does suffer from the 
incidental parameter problem. Allison (2012) suggests that random effects negative 
binomial model is the solution as it does not require the estimation of individual specific 
parameters. Hence, there is no reason to expect that it would suffer from incidental 
parameter bias.  
The advantage of CONI data is that it allows us to test 1-5 type disclosure as 
thresholds, as a measure of disclosure quality. The traditional Ordered Probit model 
implies that all variables are constraints and it neglects possible heterogeneous effects of 
explaining factors. On the other hand, the statistic for computing Ordered Probit model 
with fixed effects is extremely complex where estimator is not consistent, and the most 
appealing alternative is random effects Ordered-Probit.  
Previous CG literature highlighted the endogeneity issue (Roberts and Whited, 
2011; Armstrong et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2007)  arguing that using 
cross-sectional analysis will cause researchers to treat CG variables as exogenous in the 
model where they might have endogenous effects (Brown et al., 2011). Endogeneity 
exists due of simultaneity or omitted variables where explanatory variables will be 
endogenous and correlated with the error term which will lead to biased results. The 
study reports Durbin-Wu test (Hausman, 1978) to investigate the presence of 
endogeneity (Gujarati, 2003). Accepting the null hypothesis that variables are 
exogenous confirms the absence of endogeneity effects. Durbin-Wu-Hausman results 
confirm that the hypothesis could not be rejected as the F-test is not significant for each 
measure of environmental disclosure viz. quality and quantity.  
Results of Model 2.1 and 2.2 that show the effects of resource base variables on the 
quality and volume of disclosure indicate that size but not profit determines disclosure 
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quality and volume. This supports the view of legitimacy theory that states large 
companies are highly visible and most likely engaged in activities with substantial 
influence on society so they tend to increase the volume of information disclosed about 
these activities including environmental activities (Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Cormier 
et al., 2004; Deegan, 2002). In the RBV approach, the scale and scope of the firm 
operation is also likely to increase the quality of disclosure, as such firms engage in 
activities that are difficult to replicate from the point of view of competitors. Table 2.4 
shows that ROEt-1 is negatively correlated with SIZE and SUBOWN. However in the 
absence of these variables, ROEt-1 remained insignificant as a determinant of 
QUALDISC and VOLDISC.  
Of the control variables, substantial ownership (SUBOWN) is significant in models 
where VOLDISC is the dependent variable. It is shown to be positively associated with 
the volume of disclosure but not quality at p<0.05, suggesting that ownership blocks 
promote the volume but not the quality of disclosure. Table 2.4 shows that size is 
negatively correlated with SUBOWN, suggesting that firms with influential block 
holders are typically smaller. In models where SUBOWN is insignificant (i.e. where 
QUALDISC is the dependent variable), the results stand when the SIZE variable is 
dropped from the model. Previous studies (e.g. Halme and Huse, 1997; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Barako et al., 2006) argue that substantial shareholders tend to disclose more 
information voluntarily in order to compensate for any conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management due to the separation between ownership and control; 
such a fact incurs monitoring costs that can be reduced by additional disclosure. Most of 
these studies measured disclosure based on a mere volume, or developed a disclosure 
index based on ratings of the most used disclosure items. Such techniques do not help in 
VRIN asset creation. Results indicate that substantial shareholding tends to increase the 
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volume of disclosure but not the quality that fulfils the difficulty of replication 
conditions. Disclosure volume could be a mere narrative, and thus classified as false 
claims “greenwash” that is unlikely to result in added value.  
Tests featuring the governance variables in Model (2.3) and Model (2.4) show that 
ACQUAL significantly increases the volume of disclosure at p<0.01 level. In Model 
(2.4), ACQUAL has a similar effect on quality at the same level of significance. Of the 
BODVAR set, board size (BODSIZE) is significant and positively related to VOLDISC 
and QUALDISC at p<0.01. Table 2.4 reveals that BODSIZE is negatively correlated 
with BODIND, BODDUAL, and SUBOWN. In the absence of these variables, 
BODSIZE is not significant. Board independence (BODIND) is significant at p<0.01 
but inversely related to QUALDISC and VOLDISC. This indicates that independent 
directors might reduce attention to CSR, focusing instead on financial matters, or 
conversely firms appoint non-executives to specifically cover CSR briefs (Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011). De Villiers et al. (2011) argues that firms with a high level of 
independent directors may lack the firm specific knowledge and awareness required for 
ensuring strong environmental performance. Board meeting (BODMEET) shows 
positive significant association at p<0.01 with VOLDISC and marginally significant 
with QUALDISC.  This is in line with previous studies (e.g. Carcello et al., 2002; 
Laksmana, 2008), and supports the argument that more meetings enhance vigilance of 
financial reporting and board decision making.  
Other CG variables are not shown to be significant. The components of the 
ACQUAL variable were also tested separately in Model (2.5) and (2.6) but were not 
individually significant except for ACMEET, suggesting that the Smith 
recommendations are only effective in combination. An interaction variable combining 
ACQUAL and BODSIZE was insignificant in all models suggesting the absence of 
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complementary effects. These results are consistent with the study hypothesis 
suggesting that Smith compliant audit committees increase the quality of disclosures but 
not necessary volume. They prove the RBV argument that AC is a competitive 
advantage assets because it promotes quality disclosures that are difficult for 
competitors to replicate, thereby signalling the firm specific competitive advantage to 
the market. Industry grouping variables in all models were significant for both quality 
and volume of disclosure indicating that industries disclosing high volume tend to also 
make high quality disclosure although not in all industries as shown in Table 2.6.  
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Table 2.7- Determinants of Environmental Disclosure  
Notes: Heteroscadasticity robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1                                                                                
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = qualitative measure of 
disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; ACQUAL  = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive directors and ACMEET 
=>3, and ACEXP =>1, and ACSIZE  =>3], otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on AC; ACMEET = number of AC committee meetings; ACEXP = proportion of AC 
members with financial expertise; BODSIZE = number of members on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive 
directors on board; BODMEET = number of board meetings; BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 
=otherwise BODDIV = proportion of women on board; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial shareholding who own 
5% or more; SIZE = natural log of market capitalization; ROE = return on equity; LEV = debt to asset ratio; INDUSTRY = 
industry dummies.  
 
 
Variable  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Dependent 
variable  
VOLDISC QUALDISC VOLDISC QUALDISC VOLDISC QUALDISC 
 Negative 
Binomial  
Ordered 
Probit  
Negative 
Binomial 
Ordered Probit Negative 
Binomial 
Ordered 
Probit 
SIZE  0.074*** 
(4.41) 
0.148*** 
(4.79) 
0.051*** 
(2.67) 
0.121*** 
(3.49) 
0.105*** 
(2.92) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
ROEt-1 0.011 
(0.35) 
0.037 
(0.58) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
0.046 
(0.73) 
0.034 
(0.55) 
0.020 
(0.64) 
ACQUAL  
 
 0.214*** 
(3.92) 
0.402*** 
(3.88) 
  
ACSIZE     -0.074 
(1.54) 
-0.033 
(1.17) 
ACIND     0.294 
(1.49) 
0.030 
(0.29) 
ACMEET     0.088*** 
(2.93) 
0.041** 
(2.56) 
ACEXP     0.046 
(1.00) 
0.033 
(1.33) 
BOARDSIZE  
 
 0.065*** 
(4.71) 
0.089*** 
(3.21) 
0.091*** 
(3.27) 
0.093*** 
(6.19) 
BODIND 
 
  -0.078*** 
(4.28) 
-0.122*** 
(3.36) 
-0.119*** 
(3.12) 
-0.109*** 
(5.11) 
BODMEET 
 
  0.017*** 
(2.73) 
0.023* 
(1.75) 
0.015 
(1.15) 
0.019*** 
(2.80) 
BODDUAL   -0.134 
(1.10) 
-0.069 
(0.30) 
-0.074 
(0.32) 
-0.142 
(1.08) 
BODDIV   -0.099 
(0.41) 
0.198 
(0.45) 
0.214 
(0.49) 
-0.048 
(0.19) 
SUBOWN 0.224** 
(1.97) 
-0.008 
(0.04) 
0.237** 
(2.05) 
0.046 
(0.21) 
0.014 
(0.06) 
0.165 
(1.32) 
LEV 0.073 
(0.48) 
-0.171 
(0.62) 
0.023 
(0.16) 
-0.195 
(0.74) 
-0.163 
(0.62) 
0.089 
(0.55) 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included Included  
_cons -0.955*** 
(3.55) 
0.320 
(5.10) 
-0.944*** 
(3.46) 
0.523 
(1.11) 
0.338 
(0.63) 
0.781** 
(2.39) 
Log likelihood -5074.82 -1492.69 -5048.96 -1475.15 -1477.7488 -5132 
N 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 
Hausman  21.77  40.13  40.10  
Durbin-Wu 1.113 1.527 0.316 1.274 1.112 1.133 
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2.5.6 Sensitivity Test 
 As an additional test, the study applies panel data random effects with robust 
standard errors. Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests confirm this as the correct 
specification and Durbin Wu tests confirm the absence of residual endogeneity. Results 
of tests of the four models are presented in Table 2.8. Model (2.1) and (2.2) indicate that 
size but not profit determines the quality and volume of disclosure consistent with the 
main test. Of the BODVAR variable set, BODIND is significant and negatively related 
to QUALDISC but not VOLDISC. Moreover, BODMEET is also shown to be 
significant and positively related to disclosure quality but not volume.  
ACQUAL significantly increases the volume and the quality of disclosure. Control 
variables viz. leverage and substantial ownership are insignificant except the industry 
grouping variables that are shown to be positive and significantly related to disclosure 
volume and quality. These findings support the hypothesis that the quality of 
environmental disclosure is positively related to the resource base of the firm and the 
quality of AC. These relationships are driven by competitive advantage strategies 
leading to VRIN assets, or in other words determined by an RBV and quality signalling 
framework.   
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Table 2.8- Disclosure Determinants with Random/Fixed Effects Panel Data 
Dependent 
variable  
VOLDISC 
(2.1) 
QUALDISC 
(2.2) 
VOLDISC 
(2.3) 
QUALDISC 
(2.4) 
VOLDISC 
(2.5) 
QUAL 
(2.6) 
Panel Data Analysis  
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
SIZE  3.45*** 
(3.50) 
7.70 
(1.58) 
0.157*** 
(4.11) 
0.338* 
(1.67) 
2.45** 
(2.34) 
7.60* 
(1.68) 
0.136*** 
(3.26) 
0.331* 
(1.72) 
2.19** 
(2.26) 
7.65*** 
(3.24) 
0.126*** 
(3.17) 
0.328*** 
(2.82) 
ROEt-1 0.091 
(0.06) 
0.083 
(0.06) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
0.092 
(0.06) 
0.029 
(0.02) 
0.009 
(0.13) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
0.055 
(0.04) 
0.026 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
0.009 
(0.12) 
ACQUAL  
 
   8.71*** 
(3.60) 
9.37*** 
(3.21) 
0.424*** 
(4.22) 
0.389*** 
(3.43) 
    
ACSIZE         -1.088 
(0.94) 
-0.477 
(0.35) 
-0.075 
(1.42) 
-0.05 
(0.74) 
ACIND         -0.447 
(0.10) 
-0.364 
(0.08) 
0.302 
(1.41) 
0.219 
(0.93) 
ACMEET         1.459** 
(2.0) 
1.205 
(1.34) 
0.075** 
(2.29) 
0.049 
(1.12) 
ACEXP         1.319 
(1.23) 
1.68 
(1.40) 
0.031 
(0.62) 
0.086 
(1.44) 
BOARDSIZE  
 
   1.32* 
(1.93) 
2.05* 
(2.23) 
0.088** 
(2.49) 
0.033 
(0.66) 
1.338* 
(1.93) 
1.97* 
(2.12) 
0.091*** 
(3.03) 
0.033 
(0.73) 
BODIND  
 
   -8.79 
(1.07) 
-13.20 
(1.18) 
-1.437*** 
(3.74) 
-0.151 
(0.29) 
-0.87 
(0.93) 
-1.703 
(1.44) 
-0.134*** 
(3.21) 
-0.007 
(0.13) 
BODMEET  
 
   0.547 
(1.54) 
0.684* 
(1.67) 
0.029** 
(2.15) 
0.030* 
(1.88) 
0.468 
(1.45) 
0.654* 
(1.77) 
0.025* 
(1.70) 
0.027 
(1.53) 
BODDUAL     -0.028 
(0.09) 
-6.39 
(0.97) 
-0.028 
(0.09) 
-0.311 
(0.85) 
-4.361 
(0.80) 
-6.19 
(1.02) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.313 
(1.05) 
BODDIV     0.22 
(0.46) 
-1.77 
(0.15) 
0.22 
(0.46) 
0.126 
(0.20) 
-1.72 
(0.16) 
-1.11 
(0.09) 
0.257 
(0.54) 
0.139 
(0.23) 
SUBOWN 8.863 
(1.30) 
2.73 
(0.35) 
-0.116 
(0.42) 
-0.297 
(0.85) 
9.58 
(1.44) 
3.45 
(0.45) 
-0.052 
(0.19) 
-0.286 
(0.83) 
8.708 
(1.60) 
3.57 
(0.54) 
-0.084 
(0.34) 
-0.272 
(0.84) 
LEV -5.897 
(0.93) 
-16.44 
(1.34) 
-0.234 
(0.76) 
-1.28** 
(2.07) 
-7.46 
(1.18) 
-19.01 
(1.56) 
-0.287 
(0.99) 
-1.31** 
(2.16) 
7.06 
(1.01) 
20.59* 
(1.78) 
-0.241 
(0.83) 
1.34** 
(2.35) 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES 
Included   Included   Included   Included   Included   Included   
_cons 36.71** 
(2.42) 
-70.74 
(0.99) 
-0.255 
(0.43) 
-1.437 
(0.49) 
32.24* 
(1.86) 
-81.14 
(1.23) 
0.600 
(0.92) 
-1.381 
(0.50) 
-31.44** 
(2.17) 
-88.04** 
(2.42) 
-0.362 
(0.61) 
-1.53 
(0.86) 
R-sq 0.265 0.006 0.242 0.003 0.278 0.022 0.285 0.008 0.27 0.014 0.27 0.003 
N 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 
Hausman Test 9.20 9.98 12.99 9.65 11.99 9.66 
BP-LM 266.58*** 100.50*** 297.13*** 144.90*** 299.1*** 145.23 
Durbin-Wu 1.113 1.527 0.316 1.274 1.222 1.113 
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Notes: Heteroscadasticity robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** indicates 
p<.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1                                                                                 
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = qualitative 
measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-
executive directors and ACMEET =>3, and ACEXP =>1, and ACSIZE  =>3], otherwise =0; ACSIZE = number of 
AC members; ACIND = proportion of independent non-executive directors on AC; ACMEET =  number of AC 
committee meetings; ACEXP = proportion of AC members with financial expertise; BODSIZE = number of 
members on board; BODIND = proportion of non-executive directors on board; BODMEET = number of board 
meetings; BOARDDUAL = 1[ IF chairman and chief executive ], 0 =otherwise BODDIV = proportion of women 
on board; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZE = natural log of 
market capitalization; ROE = return on equity; LEV = debt to asset ratio; INDUSTRY = industry dummies.  
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2.6 Conclusion  
The study focuses on the contribution that audit committees plays above that 
provided by the board of directors to CERD. It contributes to the global debate about the 
overall CG strength and addresses the role of effective ACs towards CERD.  
Environmental disclosure practice within annual reports is measured using CONI 
method that was introduced to the academic research by Beck et al. (2010), but to the 
best of my knowledge, it has not been used yet to measure CG effects on corporate 
environmental disclosure. Beck et al. (2010) define CONI as a quantitative 
measurement on a qualitative interrogation sufficient to measure the quality and the 
quantity of information disclosed. A quantitative measurement is employed based on the 
number of disclosure items per category using phrases count, and qualitative measure is 
based on testing type (1-5) disclosures referred to in CONI as thresholds as a measure of 
disclosure quality where the highest score is given to the highest ranking phrase. 
The study uses a resource-based view (RBV) and quality signalling approach to 
examine the extent that disclosures are determined by the presence of robust governance 
procedures, including the use of ACs subsequent to the Smith Report and combined 
code. According to this approach where ethical actions are designed to create VRIN 
assets, managers have a strong incentive to signal the value of their investment using 
annual reports disclosure. The study proposes that where firms create high quality AC, 
the apparent relationships and specifically how AC quality impacts on disclosure 
practice will be reinforced.   
A notable feature of the results was the lack of significance of individual 
governance variables either as features of the AC or the board. It could be concluded for 
example that because accounting expertise does not individually enhance CER, then 
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accounting skills and training are not useful for promoting this kind of practice, or that 
board diversity has no effect. However, caution is needed when interpreting this 
apparent lack of significance. Many of these features are time invariant, which can be a 
cause of apparent insignificance and model specification issues, a point widely 
recognised in CG research (Roberts and Whited, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010; Brown et 
al., 2011; Lim et al., 2007). In view of these data limitations, it is appropriate to 
conclude only on the variables where significance can be demonstrated.  
The empirical results show some support for the RBV quality signalling approach. 
Larger firms possess greater resource bases and have the ability therefore to invest in 
non-replicable CSR strategies. These firms do not merely increase the volume of 
disclosure, as might be predicted by the political costs and legitimacy approaches, but 
also the quality of disclosure. ACs which possess Smith Report compliant features also 
promote quality disclosures, which is not achieved by other governance features, 
including board size and structure.  
This study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of CG mechanisms by 
providing evidence on the positive impact of effective ACs in improving environmental 
practices. Although social and environmental reporting is not mandatory, it eventually 
could become a standard aspect of the company’s annual report. ACs need to address 
social and environmental responsibility issues as vital elements of firms’ business 
strategies, and they need to highlight the risk associated with these issues and its 
potential impact on the business environment. Companies are encouraged to integrate 
social and environmental responsibility issues  in core decision making processes based 
on the long term value they add (Mallin et al., 2012). Thus, this will demand a new role 
for boards, and AC in particular, in terms of corporate activities and accountability. This 
chapter examined the role of effective ACs on better quality disclosures. Perhaps audit 
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committees also have a direct impact on promoting environmental reputation along with 
the role of environmental disclosure in the creation and sustenance of such reputation. 
Detailed theoretical and methodological concerns are tackled in the following chapter in 
an attempt to answer the specific research questions addressed, as illustrated in the 
introductory chapter at the beginning of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCLOSURES AND AUDIT COMMITTEES ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION

 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter uses an RBV and quality signalling approach to examine the 
determinants of firms’ reputation for CSR, or specifically their environmental 
reputation. According to this approach, where ethical actions are designed to create 
reputational assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-replicable (VRIN) (Barney 
et al., 2011), managers have a strong incentive to signal the value of their investment 
using annual report disclosures, and will indeed enhance the reputation of the firm by 
making them (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005). To add to the knowledge of these 
relationships, the study proposes that where firms also create high quality ACs, the 
positive relationship between disclosure quality and reputation will be reinforced.  
Increased international attention has been given to the potentially beneficial role of 
audit, and audit committees, in the wake of the Enron and other scandals. In the UK, the 
Smith Report (2003) specified the role of the audit committee and its main 
responsibilities.
6
 It has been argued that an effective AC is essential for effective 
governance (Zaman et al., 2011), and it follows, insofar as governance mechanisms 
promote the quantity and quality of accounting disclosure, that audit committees, 
bringing accounting skills and experience to bear, will have a positive and important 
                                                          
 This chapter has been reviewed by the British Accounting Review (BAR) in a paper with co-authors: 
Professor Steven Toms & Dr Aly Salama 
6
 Main role and responsibilities, section 2.1, membership and opportunities 3.1-3.4, meetings 3.5-3.10, 
resources 3.11-3.14, remuneration 3.15, skills, experiences and training 3.16-3.19, relationship with the 
board 4.1- 4.4. 
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influence on disclosure, including CSR disclosure. It is also possible that AC could help 
in assessing CER issues when auditing financial reports and risks associated with these 
issues which should help in enhancing reputation and generating competitive advantage.  
Managers have potentially strong incentives to utilise governance mechanisms in 
this fashion. First, effective governance can itself be a source of competitive advantage, 
thereby forming a natural extension of the RBV framework (Madhok, 2000; Barney et 
al., 2011). The consequence may be, therefore, that managers receive guidance on 
developing and disclosing best practice. Second, because investors have difficulty 
evaluating the effect of voluntary un-audited disclosures in terms of future earnings 
(Rajgopal et al., 2003), audit reduces information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
and uncertainty, and provides increased assurance (Chow, 1982; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983) that with respect to CER, disclosure genuinely reflects the 
company’s achievements (KPMG, 2002).  
Audit committees in particular can reduce agency costs by providing substantive 
oversight of financial reporting (Collier and Gregory, 1999). Independent external 
assurance creates credibility and trust (Turley and Zaman, 2003), which in turn develop 
and maintain the intangible asset that comprises the firm’s CER and valorises 
competitive advantage. Most importantly, where CSR investments are intended to create 
VRIN assets, audit assurance will help further discriminate between genuine 
investments and false claims (‘greenwash’) (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011) from 
competitors about commitment to sustainability. With audit assurance, true claims are 
more likely to be correctly classified and false claims as ‘greenwash’, so that mere 
volume of disclosure is unlikely to result in added value. 
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The study presents evidence to test these apparent relationships and specifically 
how disclosure quality and possibly volume impacts on environmental reputation of the 
firm with AC quality moderating effects. It thereby builds on prior studies that 
examined the impact of disclosure on firms’ environmental reputation (Toms, 2002; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005) by considering the specific impact of effective AC on 
environmental reputation. The study also examines the role of other governance 
mechanisms in conjunction with audit committees. It uses a sample of UK FTSE 350 
companies during the period 2007-2011 and, thereby, updates the evidence from earlier 
empirical studies that have shown a stronger impact for higher quality, difficult to 
replicate, disclosures (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005). The study purpose is to 
answer the question, does the combination of quality disclosures and audit committee 
add to the reputation of the firm? To examine this relationship, the remainder of the 
chapter is in four sections.  The next section develops literature review and the 
theoretical framework leading to hypothesis suitable for answering the research 
questions. The third section sets out the research study in terms of sample data, and 
models. A fourth section reviews the empirical results. The final section deals with 
limitations of the study and draws conclusions.  
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Reviewing research into the relationship between corporate social and 
environmental disclosure and social and environmental performance, Toms (2002) links 
corporate strategy with disclosure strategy based on quality signalling. The author 
concentrates on what managers are actually doing to maintain competitive advantage 
rather on what they are trying to avoid based on a narrow range of economic theory, 
particularly the impact of size and public image. Toms (2002) offers a theoretical 
extension of the RBV of the firm to include quality signalling. The author provides a 
connection between RBV theory which is attributed to the firm’s ability to create 
inimitable assets, CG practices, particularly shareholders’ ownership, and signalling 
hypothesis theory. The study argues that investing in environmental initiatives is likely 
to create environmental reputation that will not be realized without making associated 
disclosures. Following the quality signalling hypothesis, those signals must be difficult 
to replicate by competitors in order to create competitive advantage.  
Toms (2002) examines the relationship between environmental disclosure and 
environmental reputation. Environmental reputation is measured using corporate rating 
for community and environmental responsibility as published in The Management 
Today survey of Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC). Environmental disclosure 
was measured using a disclosure level scoring system based on a qualitative hierarchy 
of disclosure adopted from Robertson and Nicholson (1996). The hierarchy of 
importance gives low rate to non-quantifiable information and high rate to extremely 
highly monitored social information. The study argues that disclosure practices play a 
role in creating environmental reputation where shareholders are active in monitoring 
disclosures. Therefore it includes some governance variables, particularly shareholders’ 
ownership as a mediating factor helping in the creation of corporate reputation. Other 
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mediating variables included in this study are firm size, industry grouping and 
systematic risk. Results support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
environmental disclosure and environmental reputation. Moreover, diverse institutional 
share ownership and low systematic risk are also correlated with positive environmental 
reputation. However, the study ignored the possibility of a similar relationship between 
quantitative disclosure measures and reputation. Moreover, other variables are omitted 
from the study and may affect the empirical model such as ACs and board of directors’ 
characteristics as mediating variables.  
Hasseldine et al. (2005) complement and extend the work of Toms (2002) and 
present a comparison between qualitative and quantitative measures of environmental 
activities disclosed in annual reports and compare their relative influence on corporate 
environmental reputation. Corporate environmental disclosure is computed using 
quantitative, qualitative and hybrid measure. Quantitative measure is based on content 
analysis where the total number of sentences is used to capture the total amount of 
environmental information within corporate annual reports. Qualitative disclosure score 
as defined by Toms (2002) ranges from (0) score for non-disclosure to (5) score for high 
quality disclosure. Finally, a quality-adjusted measure of disclosure is used by adding a 
rating or quality score for every sentence in the annual report to create an aggregate 
variable. Corporate environmental reputation is taken from the Management Today 
Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC) survey. The study argues that 
environmental disclosure may be complemented by investment in R&D which provides 
a prospect to invest in innovative and more environmentally friendly technology. Other 
control variables incorporated in this study are shareholders’ power, return on equity, 
firm size, systematic risk, corporate diversification and industry grouping.  
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Using a sample of 139 UK companies taken from the MAC survey, results suggests 
that the quality of environmental information disclosed within corporate annual reports 
has a stronger impact on the creation of environmental reputation rather than mere 
volume of disclosures. The study shows that RBV of the firm can only be meaningful 
where incorporated with quality signalling theory. Moreover, it advises managers to pay 
careful attention to the quality of information disclosed rather than mere quantity in 
order to create an environmental reputation and achieve competitive advantage. The 
study incorporates a proxy variable for institutional shareholders’ power arguing that 
governance structure would play a mediating factor in corporate reputation 
enhancement based on the monitoring role they provide. However, other CG variables 
are likely to be added and may affect the empirical results such as board of directors and 
audit committee effects. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) analyse the relationship between corporate reputation 
and social performance for a sample of UK companies based on different elements of 
corporate social performance. It also examines how reputation effects vary across 
industries. The study argues that corporate reputation is created through signals related 
to firms’ behaviour. Those signals are received either directly from the firm or through 
other information channels such as the media or the stock market. Reputation is 
determined by the firm’s social performance, financial performance, ownership 
composition, media visibility, size and industry. The study employs a sample of 210 UK 
firms that represent almost 90 per cent of FTSE 100 companies. Reputational data are 
taken from the Fortune Index, and social performance data are obtained from Ethical 
Investment Research Services (EIRIS) that provide social performance scores to UK 
firms covering three social performance issues viz. employment, environment, and 
community issues. Control variables used in this study are: financial performance, 
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leverage, systematic risk, size, media exposure, R&D and industry. Results show that 
social performance enhances corporate reputation. However, it varies across sectors and 
depends on social performance categories. Firms highly engaged in environmental 
activities may improve or damage their reputation depending on whether their activities 
reduce stakeholders’ environmental concerns; whereas community involvement has an 
overall positive impact on reputation as it is expected by stakeholders in all industrial 
contexts.  
Literature has also paid particular attention to the relationship between both CSR 
and reputation, and corporate financial performance (Ullmann, 1985; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004). They argue that good corporate reputations have a strategic value for the firm 
that obtains them. Ullmann (1985) suggests ways to improve the relationship between 
social disclosure, social performance and economic performance. He claims that the 
lack of theories, incomplete specification of empirical models applied, measurement of 
variables included, and time period are behind the inconsistency in results. The 
correlation between social performance, social disclosure and economic performance is 
determined by overall management strategy. A three-dimensional model is offered to 
explain the conflicting results regarding the correlation between social disclosure, social 
and economic performance: (i) stakeholder power where it is positively associated with 
social performance; (ii) strategic posture where active managers seek to influence 
stakeholders through engaging in social and environmental activities; (iii) past and 
current economic performance that determine the level of social demands.  Ullmann 
(1985) gives some suggestions and a future outlook by adopting a strategic framework 
and model enhancement that may affect the correlation of social disclosure, social 
performance and economic performance.  
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Based on Ullmann’s (1985) argument, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue that the 
mixed results of previous literature regarding the interrelations among environmental 
disclosure, environmental performance and economic performance might be due to the 
fact that researchers have not considered that these constructs could be endogenous. 
Economic performance was measured using a market-based measure, namely annual 
stock return. Environmental performance was measured using a non-financial ratio 
based on the relative quantity of hazardous waste. Finally, environmental disclosure was 
identified using quantitative disclosure of pollution information. Applying a sample of 
198 firms, OLS regression shows that economic performance is positive and 
significantly associated with environmental performance. Moreover, a positive 
significant relationship was also conducted between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure using three-dimensional research designs. The study shows 
that good environmental performance is significantly associated with good economic 
performance and also with environmental disclosure using quantitative pollution-related 
disclosure. Disclosure, if measured in an RBV framework based on difficulty of 
replication, will be an accurate proxy of managerial strategy. Thus CER is more likely 
determined by independent and separable aspects of managerial strategy that should 
provide a potential theoretical solution to the modelling problems.  
Roberts and Dowling (2002) examine whether firm reputation can be predicted by 
previous financial performance. Based on the RBV of the firm, the study argues that 
corporate reputation is intangible in a way that competitors find difficult to replicate. 
Therefore, this will help in sustaining competitive advantage and value creation. 
Reputational data are obtained from Fortune’s American Most Admired Corporations 
and firm financial performance is measured using return on assets. Using a sample of 
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3,141 firms over 15 years (1984-1998), results show that firms with relatively good 
reputations are better able to sustain superior performance outcomes over time.  
As suggested in Toms’ (2002) study, governance structure would play a mediating 
role in the creation of corporate reputation and enhancing social responsibility. Many 
empirical studies have incorporated CG variables as determinants of social and 
environmental responsibility issues and suggest an association between CG and CSR. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) argue that the substitution effect within internal CG 
mechanisms is behind the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between CG and 
CSR. The study examines the substitution possibilities within internal governance tools 
such as institutional ownership, managerial ownership and board independence. Such 
effects are potentially important considerations when considering the quality of audit 
committee as a variable that might exhibit complementary or substitution effects in 
relation to other governance variables. In addition, the study examines whether the 
relationship between CG and CSR is determined by the level of organisational slack and 
performance attainment discrepancy thus considering positive and negative aspects of 
CSR.  
Using a sample from S&P500 and KLD Domini 400 for the period 2001-2005, the 
study applies social performance ratings as a measure of social responsibility obtained 
from KLD Inc. Findings prove that organisational slack measured using cash and 
account receivables, and debt to equity ratio and attainment discrepancy in financial 
performance measured by return on asset (ROA) and market to book ratio (MBR) 
jointly determine CG hence affecting managerial decision making regarding CSR. 
However, KLD rating has been criticized by not using publicly available data; it could 
be beneficial to apply another measure of CSR.  
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De Villiers et al. (2011) examine the relationship between firm environmental 
performance and board characteristics. The study addresses board attributes that will 
lead to strong environmental performance and discovers two roles played by the board, 
i.e. monitoring and resource provision. Agency theory supports the monitoring function 
of independent directors and those who own shares in the company indicating that they 
are more likely to provide substantive oversight and monitoring over the firm’s 
activities. On the other hand, the resource dependence theory indicates that larger 
boards are composed of resource-rich directors with different skills and expertise and 
knowledge to assist firms to acquire critical resources and initiate new environmental 
projects.  
De Villiers et al. (2011) use a sample of 2,151 firm observations of US publicly 
traded firms for social and environmental performance.  Environmental performance 
was measured using the KLD database for the period 2003-2004 which is based on five 
environmental strengths, namely beneficial products, pollution prevention, recycling, 
clear energy, and other environmental-related issues. Environmental performance 
measure is equal to the number of environmental strengths attained. Board monitoring is 
represented by board independence, board duality, concentration of directors appointed 
after the CEO, and director’s shareholding, while the board resource provision role is 
represented by board size, legal experts on the board, director tenure, and representation 
of active CEO on the board. The study also controls for the list of variables related to 
firm characteristics and industry sensitivity. Results were consistent with agency theory 
and resource independence theory where environmental performance is shown to be 
positively associated with directorial monitoring variables such as board independence, 
and also variables that capture resource provision such as board size. Results indicate 
moreover that firms with a high level of board independence may lack the firm-specific 
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knowledge required for enhancing the environmental behaviour. It would also be of 
importance to examine the role of ACs in enhancing monitoring and assurance and thus 
assessing CER issues that will lead to strong corporate environmental performance.  
Brennan and Solomon (2008) suggest widening the coverage range of CG from that 
traditional goal of maximizing shareholders’ wealth to include stakeholders’ 
accountability and social responsibility as essential factors for sustainable growth and 
social welfare. The study develops an analytical framework with six dimensions that 
considers broadening the theoretical lens, adding more accountability mechanisms, 
applying different methodologies and techniques, expanding the time horizon, and 
finally diversifying sectors. The study calls for a move away from the supremacy of 
agency theory to consider a stakeholder-oriented focus. The study recommends having 
revised codes in CG and embracing a stakeholder-oriented approach and social 
responsibility issues. This new tactic should help researchers to build new ideas and 
develop new techniques from a different perspective of CG.    
Aguilera et al. (2006) investigate the difference in the importance of CSR practices 
between the US and the UK. They argue that CSR is more integrated into CG practices 
in the UK than in the US due to pressure from market participants. The study argues 
that institutional investors in the UK are becoming more aware of the importance of 
social and environmental issues so that they incorporate them in their investment 
decisions. The UK market is dominated by pension funds and insurance companies 
which are more likely to be focused on long-term returns while the US market is 
dominated by mutual funds motivated by short-term return. For that reason, social and 
environmental responsibility activities get greater attention in the UK than in the US. 
The study analyses the motives behind institutional investors’ behaviour in encouraging 
social and environmental disclosure practices viz. instrumental, relational and moral 
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motives. It concludes by giving a recommendation to US institutional investors to adopt 
UK disclosure practices. However this study needs to empirically test the impact of 
institutional investors on CSR by collecting data related to institutional investors in the 
US and the UK.  
Spitzeck (2009) examines the patterns of incorporating corporate responsibility into 
companies’ decision making structures and its impact on the development of 
governance structure. The study uses the Business in the Community Corporate 
Responsibility Index (CRI) as a data source. It is a questionnaire-based index filled out 
by contributing organisations and evaluated by independent experts for accuracy and 
reliability. Results support directors’ role, specifically CEO leadership in corporate 
responsibility matters. They show that having multiple board members accountable for 
corporate responsibility is an effective governance mechanism. Also, the study 
concludes that the corporate responsibility committee measured by the corporate 
responsibility index (CRI) is beneficial to corporate responsibility performance. The 
study applies a stakeholders’ perspective to CG. The research could be led using other 
perspectives such as the strategic aspect of CSR. Moreover, the CRI index is based on 
51 organisations that are continuously participating so they might become better in 
filling out the questionnaire.  
Jamali et al. (2008) explore the interrelationships between corporate governance 
and CSR theoretically by reviewing the literature and empirically by collecting 
managers’ perception of a sample of firms operating in Lebanon. The study introduces 
three relational models examining the association between CG and CSR: (i) CG as 
foundational requirement or pillar for sustainable CSR where CG mechanisms act as a 
basis for CSR activities. Other CSR pillars include human capital, stakeholder capital, 
and environment. Investors and senior management’s attention should be focused on 
116 
 
those pillars in order to enhance firm value-creating. (ii) CSR as an attribute of CG 
where companies need to comply with the social and ethical dimensions of society. 
Hence, being socially responsible should be implanted in CG structure. (iii) CG and 
CSR as complementary components of the same scale where weak governance and 
social responsibility policies are two sides of the same coin.  
Jamali et al. (2008) employ a qualitative approach by interviewing managers of 
different companies in Lebanon and questioning them about issues focusing on 
compliance, transparency, and disclosure. Managers stress the role of the board and 
ACs in supervising the company disclosure practices and compliance with laws and 
regulations. Findings show that CG and CSR should not be considered separately 
regardless of the type of the relationship between CG and CSR.   
Harjoto and Jo (2011) suggest that if managers use effective governance 
mechanisms and CSR engagement to resolve conflicts among stakeholders, CSR 
engagement should be positively associated with those governance mechanisms. The 
study empirically tests four competing hypotheses to explore the relation between CG 
and CSR engagements. The over investment hypothesis is where a negative association 
between CG and CSR is expected since more active governance is related to the lower 
agency problem and therefore less over investment. The strategic choice hypothesis is 
where managers engage in CSR activities for the purpose of securing their jobs, thus a 
positive relation is expected. The product-signalling approach states firms operating in a 
competitive environment provide unique and competing products through managers’ 
efforts, thus no impact of CG on CSR engagement is expected. Finally, the conflict 
resolution hypothesis is where firms use governance effects and CSR engagement to 
reduce conflict of interest between managers and stakeholders. Findings came in favour 
of the conflict resolution hypothesis. US evidence based on Kinder, Lydenberg and 
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Domini’s (KLD) measures suggests that CSR engagements are associated with 
governance characteristics, including board leadership, board independence, 
institutional ownership and analysts following.  
3.2.1 Theory Development  
 Prior literature has aimed to explain accounting disclosure in terms of legitimacy 
theory (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001), and accounting 
disclosure and management strategy using a variety of stakeholder-based approaches 
(Mcguire et al., 1988, Roberts, 1992; Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Gyongyi, 2008; 
Van Der Laan et al., 2008), and agency theory (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). To some 
extent these are mutually exclusive (Gray et al., 1995; Adams 2002) . The RBV quality 
signalling approach builds on the agency approach and the link between competitive 
advantage and CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Mallin et al., 2012) suggesting the 
following sequence of relationships. Firms with greater resource endowments have 
greater incentive and opportunity to integrate CSR into their strategic behaviour. Firms 
with such resource endowments can make strategic investments, for example in 
pollution abatement technology, which competitors will find costly and difficult to 
replicate (Russo and Fouts, 1997). For such investments to be valorised by firms with 
higher capability, it is necessary that they are transmitted positively into the firm’s 
reputational capital, since CSR investments give rise at least in part, if not substantially, 
to intangible asset creation.  
For positive transmission to occur, signals that are difficult to replicate, in other 
words quality signals (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973), are necessary through accounting 
disclosure, which are moderated and reinforced by governance and audit assurance 
mechanisms. Corporate governance arises from the agency problem associated with the 
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separation of ownership and control. Firm resource endowments and pressure from 
shareholders may affect managerial capacity to improve new strategies. The firms 
processes to assimilate, gain and release resources and hence create competitive 
advantage are moderated by corporate governance. Although investors do not perceive 
CSR disclosures to be as important as financial matters, Toms (2002) states 
“environmental disclosures are more likely where investors proactively and continually 
monitor using voice based governance mechanism” (p.260). According to signalling 
theory, signals provided must be genuine and difficult to replicate by competitors, 
therefore they are a strong predictor of managerial behaviour (Toms, 2002).  
Annual reports are central corporate documents that speak about the organisation as 
a whole (Gray et al., 2001: p.350). This leads to the assumption that the most suitable 
place for signalling disclosures is the annual report, especially considering the unique 
resources controlled by the firm, and the most valuable method applied to positively 
transmit the firm specific competitive advantage investments to the market (Toms, 
2002). Following Toms (2002), this study is also based on the assumption that 
reputation can be created and managed through the disclosure process.  
This leads to the relationships suggested in Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.1 
Resource Endowment, Disclosure and CER 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
In Figure 3.1 resources refers to scale and prior profitability, where, all other things 
being equal, greater size, giving rise to scale and scope effects, and higher profits 
provide managers with the resource base to invest in firm specific competitive 
advantage  generating resources. They are likely to do this where suitable projects, 
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including CSR projects, generate positive NPVs. This is increasingly likely as climate 
change and pollution abatement technologies affect the basis of competitive advantage 
(Lash and Wellington, 2007). Competitive advantage investment disclosures refer to 
those that evidence difficult to replicate investments, and will fulfil that condition where 
the disclosure is quantitative, specific and therefore audited or auditable. Such 
disclosures contrast with vague statements of commitment to environmental protection 
or ‘greenwash’ that might be made by a competitor unable to afford similar investment. 
For the framework to operate effectively, corporate governance and audit 
committee are essential moderators of the relationships. As noted above, CSR 
investments should only be made and only enhance competitive advantage where they 
are positive NPV, and weak governance mechanisms associated with free cash flow will 
reduce shareholder value because managers are free to make sub-optimal investment 
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Moreover, as suggested in the 
strategic management literature, if the firm’s capability, and specifically its dynamic 
capability, is defined as the firm’s “processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release 
resources, to match and even create market change”, (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 
p.1107) then effective governance processes are necessarily part of the process of 
generating competitive advantage. 
In Figure 3.1, governance and audit are shown as moderating the relationship 
between resource endowment and disclosure and between the disclosure quality signal 
and the creation of reputation. Audit is specifically important in these relationships for 
several reasons. First, because auditable or audited figures disclosed in annual reports 
are more difficult to replicate; engaging in the audit process is an important part of the 
generation of competitive advantage. Second, firms are more likely to do this when they 
are able to access relevant expertise and experience, for example where the firm’s audit 
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committee comprises suitable professionals. Third, the presence of effective audit as 
part of the governance structure is more likely to lead to support for CSR investments 
that are positive NPV.  
This study examines the impact of disclosures on CER, together with the effects of 
governance and AC mechanisms, controlling for industry, substantial ownership, 
systematic risk and size. A specific aspect of these tests is that quality and volume of 
disclosures are contrasted, where the former refers to difficult to replicate disclosures 
and the latter to generalised, difficult to verify disclosures. Potential expectation is that 
the relationships in Figure 3.1 will be stronger for the former than the latter. 
When constructing suitable tests of these relationships, in parallel with prior 
studies, there are modelling issues that must be considered which tend to confound 
analysis of the links between financial performance, environmental disclosure and 
environmental reputation (Ullmann, 1985). Considering only financial performance and 
CSR engagement studies,  in a survey of over 120 empirical surveys over a thirty year 
period, Margolis and Walsh (2003) note the lack of a conclusive relationship, and 
suggest that they either suffer from measurement problems or fail to deal with causality, 
endogeneity and omitted variable problems, which are often compounded by inadequate 
theory. For Ullmann (1985: p.448), the omitted variable is management strategy. 
Because the RBV quality signalling approach also potentially relies upon all three 
measures, it too must find solutions to these modelling problems. However, in this 
approach, CSR activity and disclosure follows from resource endowment, since without 
such endowments quality signalling of competitive advantage investments is not 
possible. Moreover, if a qualitative ranking of disclosures is used based on difficulty of 
replication, it is likely that disclosures measured thus will be an accurate proxy for 
managerial strategy.  
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It is also possible that corporate governance corresponds closely to managerial 
strategy, as accounting disclosure is a function of governance and the governance 
function can serve to enhance CER. From the CSR literature (Brown and Perry, 1994), 
CER and the other management reputation indices are uncorrelated and therefore CER 
is more likely determined by independent and separable aspects of management strategy 
necessarily expressed through accounting disclosure. Such logic follows from the 
relationship between managerial strategy and competitive advantage, since managerial 
action to improve CER will only have reputational consequences if also disclosed 
outside the firm. Disclosure, if measured in an RBV framework, is therefore a proxy for 
managerial environmental strategy.  
Although this provides a potential theoretical solution to the omitted variable 
problem, there is no reason why empirical tests should not adopt procedures to identify 
and control for endogeneity. Even if the above argument is accepted, there are persistent 
problems associated with reverse causality and joint determination. For example 
disclosure/managerial strategy may simultaneously lead to enhanced CER and 
economic performance, or enhanced economic performance may create the resources 
that allow the managerial strategy to be sustained. These considerations are adapted into 
models and robustness tests in the results section below.  
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3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
The objective of this study is to extend the studies by Toms (2002) and Hasseldine 
et al. (2005) to examine whether or not significance can be attributed to variables 
omitted from these studies and/or measurement of environmental disclosure. Empirical 
tests of Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005) suggest a positive relationship 
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance measured by 
reputational scores with mediating variables included such as firm size, industry, 
systematic risk, substantial ownership, R&D intensity and corporate diversification. 
Toms (2002) tests the quality signalling aspect using a disclosure level scoring system 
based on qualitative hierarchy of disclosure adopted from Robertson and Nicholson 
(1996). The study methodology gives higher qualitative scale to quantifiable and 
specific disclosure due to the difficulty of imitation, and lesser qualitative scale to 
general rhetoric which by definition is easier to imitate. Using such a method, the 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between the quality of environmental disclosure 
and environmental reputation was supported. Hasseldine et al. (2005) adds the 
possibility that the quantity of environmental disclosure measured by normal content 
analysis procedures and environmental reputation are also positively correlated. Results 
suggest that the quality of environmental information disclosed within corporate annual 
reports has stronger impact on the creation of environmental reputation rather than mere 
volume of disclosures.  
These studies used a RBV quality-signalling framework similar to the relationships 
suggested in Figure 3.1. However, they did not consider certain corporate governance 
variables, particularly the role of audit committee. As the above discussion has made 
clear, there are good reasons to expect that audit committees add to the quality of 
environmental disclosure, and by the same virtue increase the CER of the firm by 
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adding credibility to such disclosures. From the perspective of risk management and 
financial reporting oversight, ACs may have an important role to play in ensuring these 
issues receive the attention they require (KPMG, 2010). Understanding the potential 
impact of ecological, social, and reputational risks are essential elements of risk 
assessment in a company. ACs should avoid a rule-based approach for addressing these 
issues, “good behaviour is inspired, not enforced” a note made by Tim Copnell, a 
founder of KPMG audit committee institute in the UK. There are many implications 
perceived from anti-social behaviour on a business including risk of raising costs related 
to higher energy prices and the impact on climate change policy, and damaging the 
firm’s reputation which will have consequences on attracting employees and clients 
(KPMG, 2010).  
AC responsibilities and duties can be summarised as: (i) increasing companies’ 
transparency and encouraging management to disclose more information; (ii) 
overseeing the quality of reported information which will lead to enhancing the 
relevance and reliability of the context and content of annual reports; (iii) overseeing the 
risk management system, i.e. the adequacy and effectiveness of companies’ policies and 
procedures. AC reviews risks associated with CSR on an annual basis and monitors 
performance through the annual control self-assessment process conducted by internal 
audit function; (iv) AC should challenge management on key sustainability issues, and 
the extent to which the risks associated with sustainability and CSR have been 
identified, assessed and mitigated, and evaluate how the company is incorporating them 
to suit its own business strategy and governance objectives (KPMG, 2010).  
Other reasons have been advanced in the literature to explain why CG mechanisms 
may have a positive impact on CER. Stakeholder approaches (Calton and Payne, 2003; 
Harjoto and Jo, 2011) suggest that if managers use effective governance mechanisms 
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and CSR engagement to resolve conflicts among stakeholders, CSR engagement should 
also be positively associated with those governance mechanisms. US evidence based on 
Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini’s (KLD) measures suggests that CSR engagement is 
associated with CG characteristics, including board leadership, board independence, 
institutional ownership and analyst following (Jo and Harjoto, 2011) 
 In combination, the resource base of the firm, and its governance effectiveness, 
specifically the quality of its AC, leads to the hypothesis arising from Figure 3.1: 
H: The CER of the firm is positively related to the quality of environmental disclosure 
and the quality of the AC. 
   
 The literature reviewed above is generally supportive of this hypothesis. Because 
other theories are not associated with enhancement value of assets captured by the firm, 
for example the conflict resolution role in stakeholder theory suggests a redistribution of 
value amongst stakeholders; the expectation is that for the RBV quality-signalling 
approach to be supported, it is necessary that the quality of disclosures is positively 
associated with CER. 
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3.4 METHODOLOGY  
 This section presents the methodology adopted in the conduct of this study. It contains 
the sample selection, the measurement of variables and model specification. 
3.4.1 Sample Selection  
 All companies that were continuously listed in the UK FTSE 350 in the period 
2007 to 2011 inclusive were selected as the initial sample. This created a balanced panel 
with five years’ data per company. Elimination of companies with missing data reduced 
the sample size to 224 firms in each year with a total firm/year sample size of 1,120 
observations. CER is measured using the ratings for that category in the Management 
Today survey of Britain’s Most Admired Companies (BMAC) (Salama et al., 2011). In 
this annual survey, senior executives from 260 British companies and senior specialist 
business analysts are asked to rate the performance of each company on different 
characteristics that have an effect on the main stakeholders, including CER (Hasseldine 
et al., 2005). CER scores were collected for all companies covered by the Management 
Today Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC) 2007-2011 survey and merged with 
the initial sample. This resulted in a final sample size of 775 firm observations. Annual 
reports for these five years 2007-2011 were used to obtain data on community and 
environmental responsibility disclosures and CG variables. Data for financial variables 
were collected from DataStream. 
3.4.2 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement  
The position taken in this study is to explain determinants of corporate reputation, 
how disclosures enhance the external perception of reputation, and the role played by 
CG practices in interpreting such disclosures. Corporate reputation is the most important 
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of intangible assets (Toms, 2002), and accounting disclosure is an important channel for 
the transmission of signals related to these assets. It represents ways on how 
organisations communicate with society and stakeholders, and management free choice 
to provide the information needed for the decision making process (Gray et al., 1995).  
Corporate environmental disclosure has been defined as the preparation and provision 
of information by management on the impact corporate economic activities have on the 
physical or natural environment in which they operate for the use of relevant 
stakeholders in assessing their relationship with the reporting entity (Gray et al., 1993). 
 Content analysis studies have applied two techniques viz. quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative studies provide information about disclosure volume where 
data is captured by words (Gao et al., 2005; Campbell, 2003), sentence count 
(Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Perrini, 2005), pages (Unerman, 2000), disclosure 
frequency (Kolk, 1999), and high/low disclosure ratings (Patten, 1991). The volume of 
disclosure gives an insight about the importance of such disclosures. However, Cowen 
et al. (1987) argue that the volume of disclosure alone cannot be used as a proper 
analysis to decide firm involvement in social responsibility activities due to the fact that 
the firm may not choose to disclose information about such activities in the annual 
report. Toms (2002) argues that the volume of environmental information disclosed in 
UK firms’ annual reports is subject to less regulation than in the US. Therefore, it might 
be more self-congratulatory, less reliable, and insufficient itself to create reputation.  
On the other hand, qualitative analysis typically attempts to capture the meaning by 
disaggregating the narrative into its essential parts and illustrate each part (Beck et al., 
2010; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Wiseman, 1982). It is considered as reliable and 
descriptive to stakeholders who are more interested in the quality, richness, and the 
qualitative character of the narrative (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2010). To 
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gain better understanding of its meaning and the richness of that meaning, the 
qualitative approach tends to give various scores to different levels of social 
responsibility disclosures. Robertson and Nicholson (1996) use a three-level scoring 
system based on a qualitative hierarchy of disclosure. The first level in the hierarchy of 
social responsibility disclosure is the general rhetoric level which relates to corporate 
acknowledgment of the value of the social responsibility issue. It is considered very 
general as it is not accompanied by specific objectives and actions. The second level is 
specific endeavours which consist of CSR initiatives specifically related to the firm and 
its operating environment. The third level in the hierarchy is implementation and 
monitoring of programmes related to environmental audit activities or reviews 
(Robertson and Nicholson, 1996).  
Based on Robertson and Nicholson’s (1996) hierarchy model, Toms (2002) and 
Hasseldine et al. (2005) provide a rating scale for social disclosure taking the score of 
(0) to non-disclosure, (1) to general information, (2) to specific endeavour, policy only, 
(3) policy specification, (4) implementation and monitoring programmes, (5) quantified 
results published. Toms (2002) argues that the hierarchy goes in line with the concept of 
signalling investment in unique resources suggested in RBV as it gives higher scale to 
quantifiable and verifiable information rather than general rhetoric. Moreover, the 
quality signalling perspective does not depend on the volume of information; rather it is 
the credibility of information (signals) that matters.    
Disclosure data in this study were collected applying the CONI (Beck et al., 2010) 
research instrument to environmental disclosures of the sample. CONI applies a matrix 
instrument of 12 categories (Appendix 1) which increases validity for example by 
decreasing the likelihood of double coding (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010). A 
reliability test was run by coders with different experience and academic base in content 
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analysis and environmental disclosure issues. The alpha co-efficient was calculated 
according to the method outlined by Krippendorff (1980). Krippendorff alpha value of 
87.8% was achieved.  
The CONI approach consists of three steps (Beck et al., 2010): Step 1- coding 
content diversity – analysing the narrative of firms’ annual reports at the level of phrase 
or clause; Step 2- coding content quality based on five types; and Step 3- volumetric 
measurement – number of disclosure items per category using phrase counts. The five 
types of disclosure in step 2 provide an indicator of quality of disclosure: Type1- a pure 
narrative disclosure such as issues related to categories definition; Type 2- a pure 
narrative disclosure with more details related to disclosure in each category; Type 3- 
quantitative disclosure addressing issues related to categories mentioned in Appendix 1; 
Type 4- quantitative and qualitative disclosure of the categories; Type 5- quantitative, 
qualitative and comparable disclosure. The typology provides a similar method of 
classifying the quality of disclosures to the one used by Toms (2002) based on the 
relative difficulty of replication. In the language of CONI and indeed RBV, disclosure 
of quantitative information is of higher quality than mere narrative because it either 
cannot be replicated without actual investment at a similar level or can only be claimed 
through deliberate misstatement. 
 The resource base was measured using firm size, which is the natural log of total 
assets (SIZE) and profitability which is a proxy for resource base measured by lag 
return on equity (ROEt-1). ROE is a potentially endogenous variable as higher disclosure 
and CER might lead to superior reputation (Ullmann, 1985). The study specifically aims 
to test the alternative hypothesis that ex ante resources lead to strategies that must be 
disclosed in order to be valorised in the form of superior reputation. Lagging ROE 
provides a test of this hypothesis, and also mitigates endogeneity issues. AC quality is 
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measured in composite fashion to reflect compliance with the recommendations of the 
Smith Report (2003). Compliance is indicated where all committee members are 
independent non-executive directors, there are three or more meetings per year, there is 
at least one committee member with financial expertise and the committee size is 
greater than three. Prior research has indicated that the interactions of these variables are 
likely to reflect more strongly than their separate components (Black et al., 2006;  
Zaman et al., 2011).  
Board size measured by the total number of directors is included to reflect the role 
and effectiveness of the board. Prior literature argues that board size leads to greater 
attention to CSR activities (Halme and Huse, 1997). Larger boards are more likely to be 
diverse and include directors with different skills, experience, knowledge and 
background that are related to different areas including social and environmental 
responsibility (De Villiers et al., 2011). Larger boards are more likely to assist firms to 
acquire critical financial resources and initiate new environmental projects that will 
have an impact on the firm’s corporate image (De Villiers et al., 2011). De Villiers et al. 
(2011: p.1645) state resource-rich directors are more likely to be knowledgable about 
environmental issues and impacts, and are better placed to ensure that firms pursue 
positive environmental performance. Including only board size from board variable set 
helps to avoid the complexity of the testing due to cross-correlation and fixed effects. 
Time invariant variables can be a cause of apparent insignificance and model 
specification issues, a point widely recognised in corporate governance research 
(Roberts and Whited, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2011; Lim et al., 
2007).  
Prior literature indicated the potential importance of further variables that were 
added as controls. The first of these reflects substantial ownership, measured by the 
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presence of block-holders controlling more than 5% of shares. Although in the general 
case substantial shareholders have strong incentive to monitor managers (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), prior research on the relationship between 
disclosure and CER shows that block ownership reduces reputation, reflecting the 
reduced influence of institutional investors (Toms, 2002). Graves and Waddock (1994) 
argue that institutional investors value corporate social and environmental information 
disclosed by firms, and as a result tend to increase their holdings in these firms. On the 
other hand, substantial shareholders will increase monitoring of managers’ behaviour 
and this should be associated with disclosing additional information voluntarily such as 
social and environmental information (Halme and Huse, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
The second control variable, reflecting the influence of debt-holders, is financial 
leverage. Prior studies (for example Cormier and Magnan, 1999; Naser et al, 2006) find 
a positive association between leverage and CSR disclosures, arising from increased 
dependency on capital markets and/or perception of risk. Systematic risk is also an 
important moderator in reputational building strategies
7
. The higher the risk the more 
likely a company is to bear poor environmental reputation. High reputation firms, on the 
other hand, are successful in reducing systematic risk hence lowering the cost of raising 
equity capital (Toms, 2002). Systematic risk is measured by BETA and obtained from 
DataStream
8
. The final control variable is the allocation of the sample to industry 
groups, using DataStream, Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1 industries, 
creating ten groups that reflect the differing exposure of firms to environmental issues 
and their management arising from the nature of their activities. 
                                                          
7 It is worth differentiating between systematic risk and systemic risk to avoid any erroneous reference. 
Systematic risk refers to overall market risk or undiversifiable risk, whereas systemic risk can be 
described as a risk caused by an event that can trigger a collapse of an entire financial system.  
8
 Because of concerns over its reliability, beta was also calculated by running the market model on a 
sample of firm observations; results were consistent. 
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3.4.3 Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
The dependent variable in this study is corporate environmental reputation. Details 
of defining and measuring corporate environmental reputation will be provided in the 
next chapter.  
3.4.4 Model Specification  
In light of the above discussion, all variables are combined into a regression model 
to test the relationship between the quality and the quantity of corporate environmental 
disclosure and corporate environmental reputation. To test the study hypothesis, the 
following model is used: 
       0   1         2       3    t-1  4          5         
   6         7     8       9            
where: 
CER = the firm’s CER Management Today BMAC score 
ENDISC = environmental disclosure aggregate score measured using the CONI 
approach. Two measures were used. First, QUALDISC, which is the highest recorded 
level achieved in step 2 of the CONI typology. Second VOLDISCV, which is the 
volumetric measure used as a proxy for total disclosures according to step 3 of the 
CONI approach. 
SIZE = Natural log of total assets 
ROEt-1 = Prior year return on equity 
ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive directors and 
ACMEET ≥3, and ACEXP ≥1, and ACSIZE ≥3], otherwise=0 
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BODSIZE = number of board members. 
SUBOWN = Total percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders (5% or more)  
LEV= debt to asset ratio 
BETA = systematic risk as measured by the company’s beta factor 
INDUSTRY = Industry classification  
β 0 = intercept 
β1 – β9= Coefficients  
ε  error term 
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3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS   
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 3.1-3.3. In Table 3.1 mean and 
distributional characteristics are reported for each of the variables in the above models. 
Skewness and kurtosis for some variables are of high values indicating that those 
variables are not normal. Of the continuous variables, ROEt-1 demonstrates significant 
non-normality as a function of the outlying observations which were dealt with by 
winsorization. The data reported in tables below are after winsorization at the 1% level 
has been applied to all continuous variables. The mean (median) for environmental 
reputation score in terms of ‘community and environment’ (CER) is 5.604 (5.7) which 
is higher than a mean of 5.5 reported by Toms (2002) but lower than a mean of 5.813 by 
Hasseldine et al. (2005). Regarding environmental disclosure measures, the mean 
(median) for disclosure volume is 41.08 (35) and disclosure quality is 3.167 (4). Of the 
resource base variables, the mean firm size measured by natural log of total assets 
(SIZE) is 14.95 (14.77), and the mean profitability measured using return on equity ratio 
(ROE) is 0.240 (0.172).  
The mean (median) of systematic risk (BETA) is 1.058 (1.03) which is higher than 
a mean of 1.01 reported by Toms (2002) and a mean of 0.889 reported by Hasseldine et 
al. (2005), and the mean (median) for leverage (LEV) is 0.256 (0.240). It is noteworthy 
that the mean for AC quality (ACQUAL) is 0.834 which is higher than the equivalent 
figure of 0.16 applied to a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies between 2001-2004 
inclusive (Zaman et al., 2011), demonstrating the changes brought about by the Smith 
Report (2003) recommendation. The mean (median) of board size (BODSIZE) is 9.572 
(9), and the mean (median) of substantial ownership (SUBOWN) is 0.247 (0.201).   
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Table 3.2 reports mean values of key variables by industry. The data shows that the 
Oil and Gas industry tends to disclose the most by volume and quality of disclosure and 
firms tend to enjoy relatively high reputations. These firms also have large resource 
bases in terms of both capital and profitability. Financial services disclose the least on 
both measures, and these industries illustrate the contrast in relative sensitivity of 
activities towards the environment. In general, industries disclosing high volume tend to 
also make high quality disclosures, although not in all cases. Utilities firms for example 
have high volume disclosures but no correspondingly high quality.  
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Table 3.1- Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables  
 
 
 
CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management today survey; 
VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; QUALDISC = 
qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; SIZE = natural log of total asset; 
PROFIT = return on equity; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are independent non-executive 
directors and ACMEET=>3, and ACEXP=>1, and ACSIZE =>3], otherwise=0; BODSIZE = number of 
members on board; SUBOWN = total percentage of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; 
LEV = debt to asset ratio; BETA = systematic risk 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
        
CER 5.604 5.7 0.873 2.2 8.3 -0.296 3.471 
QUALDISC 3.167 4 1.567 0 5 -0.524 1.784 
VOLDISC 41.08 35 33.26 0 162 1.384 4.931 
SIZE 14.93 14.75 1.618 11.44 19.55 0.693 3.421 
ROEt-1        
ACQUALITY 0.834 1 0.372 0 1 -1.792 4.23 
BODSIZE 9.572 9 2.484 4 18 0.694 3.274 
SUBOWN 0.246 0.2 0.196 0 0.941 1.239 4.736 
LEV 0.256 0.240 0.181 0 1.131 0.629 3.457 
BETA 1.05 1.03 0.593 -0.72 4.09 0.669 4.75 
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Table 3.2- Independent Variables by Industry 
 
CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management today survey; VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; 
QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; SIZE = natural log of total asset; PROFIT = return on equity; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are 
independent non-executive directors and ACMEET=>3, and ACEXP=>1, and ACSIZE =>3], otherwise=0; BODSIZE = number of members on board; SUBOWN = total percentage 
of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; LEV = debt to asset ratio; BETA = systematic risk. 
 
 
 
 
Variable CER QUALDISC VOLDISC SIZE ROEt-1 ACQUALITY BOARDSIZE SUBOWN LEV BETA 
Oil & Gas 5.723 3.656 70.06 16.108 0.233 0.968 11.406 0.234 0.138 0.975 
Basic Materials  5.381 3.097 49.07 15.238 0.191 0.805 9.902 0.271 0.237 1.033 
Industrials  5.784 3.373 50.78 14.313 0.242 0.804 8.902 0.216 0.234 1.068 
Consumer Goods 5.847 3.041 39.05 14.913 0.322 0.917 9.268 0.246 0.256 1.073 
Health Care 5.509 3.190 34.67 15.384 0.251 0.857 10.428 0.157 0.272 1.001 
Consumer Services  5.507 3.277 37.47 14.634 0.329 0.782 9.4 0.284 0.307 1.098 
Telecommunications  5.103 3.586 41.21 15.336 0.214 0.552 10.517 0.232 0.243 1.068 
Utilities  5.721 3.276 53.83 16.154 0.195 0.965 9.862 0.179 0.233 0.995 
Financials  5.488 2.431 17.18 15.991 0.130 0.922 10.588 0.226 0.221 1.023 
Technology  5.503 3.111 40.55 13.673 0.477 0.852 7.888 0.328 0.085 0.987 
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3.5.2 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3.3 shows the correlation matrix for all the variables in the models, with 
Pearson or Spearman coefficients as appropriate. Correlation above 0.8 between 
independent variables indicates that multicollinearity is present and might affect the 
results (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Gujarati, 1995). Correlation coefficients in Table 3.3 
show that collinearity is not present. Moreover, VIF is within acceptable limits (1.28). 
Table 3.3 shows that environmental reputation is positively correlated with resource 
base variables viz. SIZE and ROE. Quality disclosure (QUALDISC) is positively 
correlated with environmental reputation while substantial ownership (SUBOWN) is 
negatively correlated with reputation. As Table 3.3 shows, there is a high degree of 
cross-correlation between key variables including governance variables. Time invariant 
variables are often highly relevant with high expected correlations in the cross-sectional 
dimension especially with time-varying variables of interest. This means that care is 
required when constructing models to capture their individual and joint effects.  
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Table 3.3- Correlation Matrix  
 
*** indicates p<.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, applying two tailed tests. Pearson correlation is used for pairs of continuous variables below the diagonal and 
Spearman correlation for discrete variables above the diagonal. 
CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management today survey; VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; 
QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; SIZE = natural log of total asset; PROFIT = return on equity; ACQUAL  = 1 [if all AC members are 
independent non-executive directors and ACMEET=>3, and ACEXP=>1, and ACSIZE =>3], otherwise=0; BODSIZE = number of members on board; SUBOWN = total percentage 
of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; LEV = debt to asset ratio; BETA = systematic risk. 
 
 
Variables VIF CER QUALDISC VOLDISC SIZE ROEt-1 ACQUALITY BODSIZE SUBOWN LEV BETA 
            
 
CER 
  
1.00 
 
0.107*** 
 
0.008 
   
0.153*** 
 
0.2241*** 
   
QUALDISC 1.39  1.00 0.592*** 0.138*** 0.019 0.103*** 0.088** -0.019 0.039 0.065* 
VOLDISC 1.38   1.00 -0.010 0.093** 0.046 0.046 0.053 0.075** 0.023 
SIZE 1.83 0.295***   1.00  0.199*** 0.626***    
ROEt-1 1.02 0.070
*   -0.138*** 1.00 -0.019 -0.091**    
ACQUAL 1.06      1.00 0.144*** -0.059 -0.045 0.001 
BODSIZE 1.72       1.00 -0.192*** 0.039 -0.052 
SUBOWN 1.06 -0.289***   -0.187*** -0.093***   1.00   
LEV 1.01 0.068*   0.010 -0.007   -0.029 1.00  
BETA 1.01 -0.002*   -0.059 -0.001   -0.020 0.013 1.00 
MEAN VIF 1.28           
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3.5.3 Results and Discussion  
Results of tests of regression model are shown in Table 3.4. Before running the 
regression, care is required to mitigate the effects of any potential endogeneity in the 
regression model. Because the level of disclosure captured by the QUALDISC variable 
results from managerial decisions about specific investments that are non-replicable, it 
follows that it is not random and arises as a result of managerial selection. To 
accommodate the potential effects of selection, a two-step Ordered Probit approach is 
applied (Chiburis and Lokshin, 2009)
9
. The selection model uses quality score as 
the dependent variable and ROEt-1, SIZE and IND as the selection variables. The latter 
specifically impacts on disclosure through selection because industry membership to 
some degree determines the types of necessary investment in environmental protection. 
Industry membership does not, on the other hand, directly impact on CER, as the 
rankings are determined by intra-industry peer group observations. In the two-step 
approach, the six estimated lambdas are not statistically significant (with p-values of 
0.333, 0.157, 0.289, 0.534 0.053 and 0.347). Therefore, rather than take a two-step 
estimation approach, the determinants of environmental disclosure and of environmental 
performance are tested separately in turn
10
, supported by further tests to deal with 
potential endogeneity issues as appropriate.  
All tests use panel data random effects with robust standard error. Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan LM tests confirm this as the correct specification and Durbin-Wu tests 
confirm the absence of residual endogeneity. It is noteworthy that corporate governance 
variables are time invariant variables so that their influence cannot be captured by fixed 
effects model. On the other hand, random effects model is more likely to allow the 
                                                          
9
 Using the .oheckman STATA command 
10
 Referring to the first model of the thesis: determinants of environmental disclosures 
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estimation of time-invariant variables effects (Bai et al., 2004: p.610). Despite the 
abovementioned, as a further robustness test of endogeneity and to secure additional 
support of the random effects, the regression models were tested using fixed effects 
specification. The main regression model is run in parts. The results of the impact of 
quality and volume disclosures variables and resource variables on reputation are 
reported in models 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. The effects of adding the governance variables are 
shown in models 3.4, 3.5.  
Model 3.1 and Model 3.2 show that disclosure quality and volume have opposite 
signs. Model 3.1 shows the impact of quality and volume disclosure variables on 
environmental reputation. Although significant in this model, VOLDISC has negative 
sign and therefore no positive association with CER. QUALDISC, as predicted, is 
positive and significant in all models tested. Model 3.3 confirms that in the absence of 
quality, volume alone has no effect. A possible interpretation is that volume alone could 
be interpreted as ‘greenwash’ in the process of reputation creation. SIZE and SUBOWN 
are significant in all models, with SIZE taking the predicted positive value. The results 
suggest that large firms are able to create greater reputation, possibly as a result of 
resources generally available and as a consequence of their greater ability to make 
higher quality disclosures.  
The significance of SIZE is increased when regressed with the SIZE * SUBOWN 
interaction variable. SUBOWN is significant with a negative sign, suggesting that 
blockholders detract from reputation, and the negative sign on the interaction co-
efficient suggests that although reputation increases with scale, blockholders detract 
reputation for any given resource base. This finding is consistent with Toms (2002) 
suggesting that managers are held more closely to account on environmental reputation 
by professional institutional investors than by insiders or other block shareholders. 
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ROEt-1 is marginally significant in all models, suggesting that there is a positive direct 
association between prior profit and reputation. Firms possessing cash and resources are 
more likely to be able to invest in difficult to replicate CSR projects. It is necessary for 
such investments to be transmitted positively into firms’ reputational capital.  
 The effects of governance and audit quality are shown in models 3.4 and 3.5. Both 
models show that BODSIZE and ACQUAL are positively associated with reputation. 
Table 3.3 shows that ACQUAL is correlated with BODSIZE and SIZE, ACQUAL 
remains significant in retests of the models without these variables. These results 
suggest that insofar as large boards contribute to increased reputation, they do so 
directly and not through the agency of increased disclosures or disclosure quality. Audit 
quality is associated with increased disclosure and increased reputation. In model 3.5, 
the joint effect of quality and volume of disclosure is shown in a new variable 
(QUALVOL), which, though significant, does not add substantially to models that 
include QUALDISC. It could be interpreted that the investment community anticipates 
a certain amount of specific and quantifiable information therefore quantity disclosure 
has no incremental effects on their insight of reputation.  
Of the remaining control variables, only IND is significant. Industry effects were 
referred to in the discussion on Table 3.2 above. LEV and BETA are insignificant in all 
models tested. Comparing the typical coefficients for the significant variables, the 
results suggest that SIZE and ACQUAL have approximately four times the effect of 
QUALDISC. BODSIZE, although significant in all models, has a weaker effect than 
QUALDISC. Moreover, large firms are able to create greater reputation, possibly as a 
result of resources generally available and as a consequence of their greater ability to 
make higher quality disclosures.  
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Results support the study hypothesis that the firm environmental reputation is 
determined by the quality of environmental disclosures and the quality of audit 
committee. Although fixed effects specification reduces the power of the model, results 
were confirmed and consistent with random effects tests except for BODSIZE. 
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Table 3.4- CER Determinants 
 
Variable 3. 1 3.2 3. 3 3.4 3.5 
 RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
QUALDISC 0.043** 0.045* 0.043** 0.044*   0.044** 0.045*   
VOLDISC -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006** -0.005* 
QUALVOL  
 
       0.001** 0.001* 
SIZE 0.188*** 0.207** 0.199*** 0.214** 0.206*** 0.218** 0.160*** 0.181* 0.160*** 0.179* 
ROEt-1 
 
0.219* 0.062 0.224* 0.062 0.211* 0.060 0.236** 0.07 0.220* 0.066 
ACQUAL  
 
     0.174*** 0.152** 0.170*** 0.150** 
BODSIZE  
 
     0.033** 0.024 0.031** 0.021 
SUBOWN -0.627*** -0.282         
LEV 0.186 -0.106 0.185 -0.109 0.174 -0.142 0.204 -0.002 0.211 -0.003 
BETA -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.12 -0.008 -0.009 
SIZE*SUBOWN   -0.040*** -0.017 -0.040*** -0.017 -0.039*** -0.016 -0.039*** -0.016 
IND dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
_cons 2.480*** 2.510* 2.318*** 2.401 2.284*** 2.438 2.422*** 2.208* 2.567*** 2.694* 
R-sq 0.216 0.115 0.216 0.114 0.212 0.107 0.229 0.128 0.228 0.127 
N 772 772 772 772 772 
Hausman Test 11.71 13.01 13.60 13.45 12.50 
BP-LM 186.03*** 185.73*** 185.05*** 182.88*** 184.28*** 
Durbin-Wu 0.837 
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1  
CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management today survey; VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category using CONI method; 
QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; SIZE = natural log of total asset; PROFIT = return on equity; ACQUAL = 1 [if all AC members are 
independent non-executive directors and ACMEET=>3, and ACEXP=>1, and ACSIZE =>3], otherwise=0; BODSIZE = number of members on board; SUBOWN = total percentage 
of substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; LEV = debt to asset ratio; BETA = systematic risk; INDUSTRY = industry dummies.  
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3.6 CONCLUSION  
This study uses an RBV and quality signalling approach to examine the 
determinants of firms’ reputation for CSR or specifically CER. It considers the role of 
environmental disclosures as signals of enhancing environmental behaviour and hence 
reputation of this field. The study also forms a natural extension of the RBV framework 
to include governance mechanisms, specifically board size and audit committee 
moderating effects. Results suggest that in terms of the key competitive advantage asset 
of firm reputation, this is added by the quality but not volume of disclosures, and the 
quality of audit committee. The quality of environmental disclosures rather than mere 
volume has a stronger effect on the creation of environmental reputation. These results 
are consistent with Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005) in terms of signs and 
significance of the coefficients of disclosure quality variable (QUALDISC).  
Volume alone does not appear to offer any help apart from mere rhetoric in creating 
reputation. It could be interpreted as vague statements of commitment to environmental 
protection or ‘greenwash’ that might be made by competitors unable to afford similar 
investment. Firm reputation is also added by the quality of AC, suggesting that such 
committees promote reputation directly and through their determination of better quality 
disclosures. In RBV terms, therefore, audit committee is a competitive advantage asset 
because its governance skills add directly to reputation and also because it promotes 
quality disclosures that are difficult for competitors to replicate, thereby signalling firm 
specific competitive advantage investments to the market. Larger boards also contribute 
to increased reputation through a direct association between board size and 
environmental reputation rather than the agency of increased disclosures or disclosure 
quality.  
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Another determinant of reputation is firm size that forms a proxy of scale and scope 
of the firm. Large firms are likely to increase the quality of disclosures because these 
firms are able to engage in activities that are difficult to replicate by competitors. Prior 
profitability is also shown to be associated with increased environmental reputation. 
Although inconsistent with Toms (2002) finding that does not show significant relation 
of prior profitability, the author argues that the absence of significant results in his 
survey may be a function of using only two years’ data; this study overcomes the 
timescale issue by extending the sample to cover five years’ data. Findings show that 
firms that possess cash and resources are more likely to be able to invest in difficult to 
replicate CSR projects. Moreover, results suggest that although reputation increases 
with scale, blockholders detract from reputation by any given resource base.  
Based on this study, two important implications for accounting researchers are, 
first, mere volume of disclosures is insufficient for signalling facts about environmental 
strategies. The quality of information provided is an important conduit and of a higher 
value due to the difficulty of replication by companies not genuinely committed to 
environmental good practice. Second, the role of ACs could help in assessing CER 
issues when auditing financial reports. This is based on risk management and financial 
reporting oversight.  Audit assurance, moreover, will help discriminate between true 
claims and false claims by competitors about commitment to sustainability, so the latter 
is unlikely to result in added value. The study forms a clear message to managers 
seeking to promote environmental reputation of their firms that they should pay careful 
attention to the quality difficult to replicate disclosures rather than mere volume. Such 
disclosures help to create VRIN assets, such as environmental reputation that leads to 
competitive advantage. The following chapter will tackle the ongoing debate about 
whether a good environmental reputation provides firms with competitive advantage 
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over their rivals and engenders a positive impact on their financial performance, or 
whether it is linked to additional net costs.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REPUTATION AND FIRM FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
It is important to encourage financial markets to act in a manner less incompatible 
with social and environmental aims of sustainability and this could be acheived through 
engendering engagement in social and environmental activities. This chapter 
investigates the economic impact on a firm of its environmental responsibility 
performance if I take that to be correlated with and measured by environmental 
reputation. The relationship between corporate environmental reputation and firm 
financials has recently drawn the attention of many academics, investors and business 
leaders (Russo and Fouts, 1997;  Murray et al., 2006; Wahba, 2008; Hussainey and 
salama, 2010). The ongoing debate is about whether a good environmental reputation 
provides firms with a competitive advantage over their rivals, or whether it is linked to 
additional net costs. Such debate is of great importance as it has likely implications for 
the corporate image of cleaner technologies. It is important to encourage financial 
markets to act in a manner less incompatible with social and environmental aims of 
sustainability and this could be acheived through engendering engagement in social and 
environmental activities. 
It does appear currently that companies are incorporating social and environmental 
factors in more strategic practices and decision-making processes which ostensibly help 
achieve sustainability. Such moves may enhance rather than reduce financial value in at 
least two ways: they may be associated with economic efficiency gains (e.g. reduced 
wastage) and they may attract ethical investors and customers who are interested in 
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supporting sustainable companies, thus pushing up financial value (Van de Velde et al., 
2005). Investing in social and environmental activities may generate long-term growth 
opportunities, for example via energy saving programmes and the developing and 
improving of more eco-friendly technologies (Van de Velde et al., 2005).  
This study shall elaborate further on the potential benefits below. Indicators of 
social and environmental performance could play a very important role in attracting 
financial market attention here (Murray et al., 2006). Hussainey and Salama (2010) 
recommend that accountants and managers should put stress on the completion and 
improvement of environmental practices due to this being useful information for market 
participants. Negatives and threats such as global climate change and habitat destruction 
incur potential risks that need management responsiveness. Thus environmental 
information can impact on investors’ decision-making (Murray et al. (2006). For Van de 
Velde et al. (2005), “a socially responisble company puts the interests of its 
shareholders on a par with the social, community and environmental interests of third 
parties or stakeholders involved in its activities” (p.129). In any event, a question that 
arises is whether such apparently socially responsible strategies are financially 
profitable. This study will in its empirical focus examine whether companies investing 
in environmental initiatives engender an impact on their financial performance, and 
whether such impact is a positive, negative or neutral.  
A positive impact could be explained by the relatively low outlay costs of an 
environemntal initiative that may be compensated by the benefits. The benefits include 
potentially better employee morale and productivity benefits (McGuire et al., 1988; 
Stanwick, 1998). The study stresses here that investment in corporate environmental 
initiatives helps firms to develop new resources, enhance organisational efficiencies, 
and build positive reputation and goodwill towards external stakeholders (Orlitzky et 
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al., 2003). The resource-based view supports the argument that competitive advantage is 
achieved when firms with organisational and knowledge-based resources can make 
strategic investment, for example in pollution abatement technologies (Blanco et al., 
2009). The firm’s ability to collect, control and exploit resources will result in a greater 
long-term financial performance and competitive advantage (Russo and Fouts, 1997). In 
the RBV of the firm, firms with intangible assets that are valuable and rare such as 
environmental reputation (or what lies behind it) enjoy a sustainable competitive 
advantage that leads to the earning of higher returns. 
On the other hand, a negative impact could be explained by the fact that investing 
in environmental activities incurs costs that will put firms in economic disadvantage 
when they are better off avoiding such costs (Wahba, 2008). Finally, a neutral impact of 
recent environmental involvement on financial performance, so that costs and benefits 
are the same, could be further explained by the fact that firms might invest in 
environmental initiatives until the point where marginal costs of such investment equal 
marginal benefits (Elsayed and Paton, 2005).  
Overall, research on the association between measures of environmental 
performance and firm financial performance is generally inconclusive and studies have 
failed to uncover any consistent relationship. Previous findings have been mixed where 
a positive, negative or no linkage has been proposed. In terms of econometric methods, 
the study suggests this may be due to many factors such as model misspecification, 
differences in the measurement of environmental responsibility and financial 
performance, and/or limited data (Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000; Murray et al., 2006).  
This study aims to add to academic literature and provide further empirical 
evidence on the relationship between the environmental performance and the financial 
performance of companies. The focus is on companies highlighted by the Management 
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Today Britain’s Most Admired Companies (MAC) survey in terms of ‘community and 
environmental responsibility’ for the recent years 2007-2011. In doing so, this study 
aims to extend previous literature and address the controversy regarding the impact of 
environmental performance, taken to correlate with environmental reputation, on firm 
financial performance.  Such controversy relates to the proper role and activities of 
corporations. For instance, do and should businesses concentrate only on profit making 
or compromise on profits by extending environmental friendliness?  
Empirically, although there has been a lot of work in this area since the 1970s, 
continuing controversy suggests the need to extend the prior empirical evidence by 
reference and comparison to the performances of UK companies in recent times. Firm 
performance is measured using both accounting and market-based measures. Moreover, 
this study uses a regression method that has been used in longitudinal studies, 
specifically random/fixed effects panel data analysis with robust standard errors, which 
helps to control for outliers and firms’ unobserved specific effects and consequently to 
get more valid results (Elsayed and Paton, 2005).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: literature review and 
hypothesis development; elaboration of reseach method; analysis and discussion of 
results; concluding comments including reflection on the implications of the analysis.   
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Many empirical studies have been made to assess the relationship between 
corporate social and environmental performance and firm performance (Mcguire et al., 
1988; Belkaoui, 1976;  Stanwick, 1998;  Van Der Laan et al., 2008).  
A study by Mcguire et al. (1988) examines the relationship between firms’ CSR 
policies and financial performance. The study argues that there is a relationship between 
firm prior performance and CSR. Good financial position will motivate firms to be 
involved in social and environmental activities especially that CSR is not without cost. 
In contrast, less profitable firms will be less inclined to engage in CSR. The study uses 
three different measures of financial performance arguing that focusing on different 
choices of performance variables in studies of CSR could have better impact on the 
relationship between financial performance and CSR policies rather than concentrating 
on CSR measures. Financial performance measures used in the study are: (i) 
accounting-based measures which represent the historical aspect of firm performance; 
(ii) market-based measures which represent investors’ insights of firms’ ability to 
generate profit.  
CSR is measured using data from Fortune magazine’s annual survey of corporate 
reputation. This survey covers the largest firms in about 20 industry groups where 
executives and outside directors and corporate analysts give a scale from 0 (poor) to 10 
(excellent) on different attributes including community and environmental 
responsibility. Results show that accounting-based measures, specifically return on asset 
(ROA) are significantly related to CSR than market-based measures. A drawback of 
Mcguire et al.’s (1988) study is that using Fortune ratings as a measure of CSR is 
considered subjective and could be affected by evaluators’ preferences.  
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A study by Cochran and Wood (1984) extends prior empirical work by using 
different measures of financial performance and adding additional variables. The study 
uses a large sample and industry specific control group during two-time periods: 1970-
1974 and 1975-1979. Moreover, it controls for average age of corporate asset due to the 
high correlation between such a variable and CSR. It is found that firms with older 
assets are less likely engaged in social and environmental activities, especially that 
regulatory restraints were less severe. Cochran and Wood (1984)  applied reputation 
index as a measure of CSR, and it uses three accounting measures of financial 
performance viz. operating earnings to asset ratio, operating earnings to sales ratio, and 
excess market valuation. Results show weak evidence of a positive relationship between 
financial performance and CSR.  
Pava and Krausz (1996)  examine time trends to compare the performance of 
socially responsible firms identified by CEP (The Council of Economic Priorities) over 
a seven-year period. Financial performance was measured using accounting-based 
measures, market-based measures and risk measures. Moreover, the study controls for 
some firms’ specific variables such as size, capital intensity, number of lines of business 
and dividend pay-out ratio. Findings show that socially responsible firms have a 
financial performance at least at par better than other firms.  
Wahba (2008) provides empirical evidence to explore the relationship between 
corporate environmental responsibility and firm market value in a developing country. 
The study applies different theoretical perceptions to demonstrate such a relationship 
viz. stakeholder theory and resource-based view. According to stakeholder theory, a 
firm’s profitability will improve when engaging in environmental projects that satisfy 
the needs of a variety of stakeholders. This will help the firm to achieve a competitive 
advantage. The RBV states that the firm that utilises its resources with environmental 
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awareness will achieve competitive advantage and maximise its returns. Using a sample 
of 156 firms established in Egypt, environmental responsibility was measured using a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm receives an ISO14000 environmental 
certificate and zero otherwise.  
Firm market value was measured by Tobin’s q ratio. The study also controls for 
capital intensity, firm risk, firm age, size, ownership structure and industry. Moreover, 
the study tests the existence of endogeneity biases by employing Hausman specification 
test arguing that profitable firms are more likely engaged in environmental activities, 
and able to allocate resources that serve such matters. Not rejecting the null hypothesis 
confirms the absence of endogeneity effects. Findings show that the market rewards 
those firms that care for the environment. However, using environmental certificate as a 
measure of environmental responsibility might not be the best measure, especially since 
firms’ environmental management system may be determined by other external and 
internal factors such as customers’ contentment needs and export guidelines.  
The inconsistency in results in previous research may be due to the missing 
variables as has been suggested by Mcwilliams and Siegel (2000). The study examines 
the equation estimated by Waddock and Graves (1997) on the relationship between CSR 
and firm profitability, and argues that such a relationship is misspecified because it does 
not include investment in R&D and other factors such as advertising intensity. 
Investment in R&D is associated with enhancing firms’ long-term economic 
performance and productivity. Moreover, it is highly correlated with investment in 
social responsible activities because both are linked to product differentiation strategy. 
The study uses a sample of 524 US firms in the period 1991-1996. It also measures CSR 
using CSR ratings provided by the firm of Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD). 
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Results indicate that the model that incorporates both investment in R&D and other 
industry factors proves the neutral impact of CSR on firms’ financial performance.  
Hussainey and Salama (2010) examine the importance of corporate environmental 
responsibility for investors using CER ratings. It investigates whether corporate 
environmental responsibility contains value relevant information useful to investors in 
anticipating future earnings. The study argues that current earnings will not reflect the 
full image of a firm’s value to investors, and hence their decision to purchase firm 
securities. Other information is also needed, such as firm’s environmental behaviour. 
The study uses the RBV to link between corporate environmental responsibilities and 
investors’ ability in predicting future earnings. Environmental reputation is considered 
one of the valuable resources that could be utilised in order to achieve a sustainable 
advantage over a long period of time which will lead to long-term financial 
performance. A sample of 889 non-financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) during the period 1996-2002 was used. Corporate environmental responsibility is 
measured using reputational scores of Britain’s MAC published by Management Today 
survey. The study concludes that corporate environmental reputation affects investors’ 
decision to anticipate future earnings. It also recommends accountants and managers to 
stress the completeness and improvement of environmental disclosure practices due to 
the useful information they provide to market participants.  
Van De Velde et al. (2005) investigate whether socially responsible investors 
incorporating social and environmental issues in their investing policy expect better 
firm performance and higher returns than traditional ones. They examined whether there 
is cost involved with incorporating sustainable dimension in firms’ investment policy. 
The study states that there are two sides of the argument regarding the interaction 
between CSR and financial performance. Socially responsible firms divide their 
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interests between shareholders and ethical stakeholders which will lead to a decrease in 
share price. On the other hand, socially responsibly investment could boost shareholder 
wealth by reducing non-financial risk and generate long-term growth opportunities. The 
study uses Vigeo CSR ratings of European quoted companies as a measure of CSR. It 
also performed four portfolios based on firms’ total sustainability ratings and divided 
CSR into different dimensions. Results show that sustainable investment out-performed 
the market. However, although sustainable investment performed better than traditional 
investment but not to the extent to be statistically significant, this is due to the short 
time horizon employed in the study. Therefore, a longer time horizon and other rating 
scale may enhance the results.  
Russo and Fouts (1997) examine the role of environmental policy in creating 
competitive advantage that allows the firm to capture profit. The study bases its 
argument on the RBV theory and provides two modes of environmental policy viz. 
compliance strategy and prevention strategy. The policy choice affects the firm’s ability 
to generate profit. It argues that industry growth moderates the impact of environmental 
performance on economic performance.  The study uses a sample of 243 firms over a 
two-year period 1991-1992. Environmental performance is measured based on Franklin 
Research and Development Corporation (FRDC) environmental ratings. It also applies 
lagging for independent variables to control for causality effect. Firms’ financial 
performance was measured using return on asset, and control variables include growth, 
size, capital intensity, and advertising intensity that have been prominent in previous 
literature.  
Russo and Fouts (1997) empirically estimate a significant relationship between 
improved financial results and proactive environmental performance by firms. Findings 
show that environmental policy allows for modest variations in firms’ performance. 
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Such findings stem from proactive firms being endowed with tangible, intangible, and 
personnel-based resources. The study concludes that managers need to use renewals and 
environmental initiatives to improve industry growth and enhance returns to their 
resources. Such conditions require innovative thinking. The study applies one financial 
performance measure, i.e. ROA, applying other measures should add validity and 
robustness to results attained.  
Dowell et al. (2000) examine the relation between adopted global environmental 
standards of a sample of US-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their market 
value. The study argues that US multinational firms that use a single stringent global 
environmental standard have significantly higher market value than firms that apply 
either US or other legal standards. Two arguments were made: firms that apply lax 
environmental standards will endure lower costs, because these slight regulations will 
lead to lower fines or liabilities. A contradictory view states that firms that don’t follow 
strict regulations will have to pay for the correction of any environmental damage. 
Higher environmental standards should focus on employee morale and productivity 
enrichment.   
Dowell et al. (2000) control for causality effect between firm market value and 
adopted environmental standards. Using a sample of US-based firms in the period 1994-
1997, the study measures firms’ market value using Tobin’s q ratio. MNEs’ 
environmental standards were taken from the Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
(IRRC) Corporate Environmental Profile. Findings prove a positive correlation between 
environmental standards and firm market value after controlling for industry, R&D 
intensity, advertising intensity, leverage, and size.  The study concludes that firms might 
improve their financial performance by strengthening their environmental conduct with 
respect to legal requirements. However pressure from regulators might be compensated 
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if firms enhance their environmental attitude. Regulation compliance complements 
rather than displacing or absorbing self-organising practices (Blanco et al., 2009).  
Van Der Laan et al. (2008) investigate the mechanisms that compose the positive 
relationship between corporate social performance and firm financial performance. Such 
a relationship is based on the interaction of the firm with different stakeholder groups. 
Primary stakeholders are those who have direct exchange relationship with corporations 
and are subject to explicit contracts, i.e. employees, whereas secondary stakeholders are 
not subject to explicit contracts or direct exchange relationship, i.e. environmental 
groups and the local community. The study argues that secondary stakeholders are more 
concerned with firm social reputation since they do not have direct access to 
information resources. Therefore, firms need to invest more in reputational capital to 
deal with secondary stakeholders’ demands that are related to corporate financial 
performance. On the other hand, primary stakeholders have direct exchange with firms. 
Hence, firms do not need to secure good corporate social image to signal their good 
relation with primary stakeholders.  The relationship between corporate social 
performance and primary stakeholders is not linked to the firm financial performance.    
The study measures corporate social performance using KLD ratings for S&P500 firms 
in the period 1997-2002. Moreover, firm financial performance is measured using return 
on assets to capture efficiency, and earnings per share to capture effectiveness. After 
controlling for size and leverage variables, results show that the relationship between 
corporate social performance and financial performance is based on the nature of the 
relationship between various stakeholder groups of the firm. Bad corporate social 
policies have worse impact on firm financial performance than good social policies, 
especially for secondary stakeholders. 
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Cohen et al. (1995) argue that the lack of objectivity to evaluate environmental 
performance is the reason behind the discrepancy in empirical findings. The study 
reports a new objective data set based on a relatively comprehensive list of S&P500 
companies where environmental performance consists of nine different measures; eight 
of these measures are coming directly from government data, and one is taken from 
corporate 10-K fillings as required by US Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Environmental performance is the average of these measures over three year period 
(1987-1989). Cohen et al. (1995) measure firm financial performance using accounting-
based measures viz. return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) arguing that 
accounting return can be directly realised by shareholders. They also use market-based 
performance measures, specifically total return to common shareholders before and 
after adjustment for risk. Such return represents true gains to shareholders through both 
dividend paid and appreciated stock prices. Control variables included in this study 
were size and industry. The study constructs two industry-balanced portfolios, one of 
“high polluters” and one of “low polluters” during the period 1987-1989. Financial 
returns of the “high pollution” portfolios were compared to those of “low pollution” 
portfolios. Results show that there is no penalty in investing in companies that are 
environmental leaders in their respective industries. Investors who choose to invest in 
green portfolios were found to do as well and sometimes better than other portfolios.    
Mahoney and Roberts ( 2007) extend the prior large scale of empirical research by 
examining the potential relationships between corporate social performance (CSP), 
financial performance, and institutional ownership for a large sample of publicly held 
Canadian firms. The study applies a CSP database for Canadian firms – the Canadian 
Social Investment Database (CSID) – that provides a broad set of ratings for each firm 
across different dimensions of social performance such as community, employees, 
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environment, international, product and others. Such ratings provide the possibility to 
test both the overall measure of CSP and individual components of corporate social 
performance ratings. Thus, this method allows investigation of the impact of each 
dimension of corporate social performance on the tested relationship between CSP and 
firm performance.  
Mahoney and Roberts ( 2007) also focus on the behaviour of institutional investors 
with respect to CSP. They argue that institutional owners tend to make deep analysis 
and evaluate their alternatives more carefully before making any investment decisions.  
Mahoney and Roberts (2007) measure firm performance using traditional accounting 
measures viz. ROE and ROA. They also control for size, industry and leverage. Using a 
sample of 352 Canadian firms drawn from CSID for the years 1997-2000, no significant 
relationship between the composite measures of social performance and firm 
performance was shown. However, significant relationship was found between 
environment and international dimensions of CSP and firm performance. Also results 
indicate that institutional investors invest more heavily in firms with higher levels of 
CSP. This study employs only traditional accounting-based measures of firm 
performance; using other measures such as market-based performance may enhance the 
results.  
Perrini et al. (2011) examine the link between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and corporate financial performance (CFP) using the stakeholder-based approach and 
questioning the consequences of incorporating CSR voluntarily into business operations 
and relationships with stakeholders. The study argues that academic research has mainly 
discussed the link between an overall score of CSP and various measures of CFP 
without examining the underlying drivers of performance impact associated with CSR, 
i.e. organisational, customer, supply chain, society, natural environment, and 
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governance. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the organisational, managerial, or 
market gains related to specific activities in order to understand the outcome of CSR 
performance. CSR supports firms in the creation of intangible assets and strengthening 
the firm ability to identify, manage and give value to inimitable resources such as skills, 
competence, knowledge and innovation, trust, and reputation which will create 
competitive advantage.  
Perrini et al. (2011) adopt the stakeholder lens and emphasize firm-stakeholders 
interaction towards the impact of CSR on firm performance and its competitiveness. 
However, giving consideration to the industrial organisation or strategic aspects of CSR 
is of increasing importance, especially in that there is a paucity of research where such 
actions establish intangible resources or competences that lead to competitive advantage 
(Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2011). RBV helps quantify the strategic value of the company 
engaging in CSR and the impact it has on firms’ bottom line and competitive advantage. 
Such innovative behaviour will create opportunities for more reliable and robust 
investment.   
Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. (2011) examine the relationship between ISO 
accreditation firms and their financial performance, and the extent that such a 
relationship can be attributed to causality.  The study argues that firms which intend to 
pursue ISO14001 certification have higher ROA and sales growth indicating the impact 
of ex-ante selection resources on firms that seek ISO14001 certification. Moreover, 
there is an ex-post improvement effect on firm financial performance due to the impact 
that such certification creates, also called treatment effects. The study uses the trade-off 
hypothesis and stakeholder theory where firm’s survival is not only dependent on its 
shareholders but also the variety of stakeholders. Failure to meet stakeholders’ needs 
and expectations will generate market fears that will increase firm risk premium and 
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ultimately result in higher costs and decrease in revenues. The authors argue that an 
environmental management system can provide opportunities to reduce costs and 
increase revenues where costs are associated with the risk management system and 
relationship with stakeholders, while revenues can be enhanced through product 
differentiation and initiating pollution control technology.  
 Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. (2011) use a six-year time period (2000-2005), and 
analyse the comparative financial performance of ISO accreditation firms before and 
after accreditation. The sample is composed of 268 certified firms and 7,232 non-
certified firms. Firm performance is measured using ROA and sales growth. Findings 
prove the selection effects where firms with better financial performance and sales 
growth become registered to ISO14001. After accreditation, this better performance 
lasts but is not significantly enhanced by ISO treatment effects. The study argues 
enhancing firms’ reputational image motivates them to use their fund to get 
accreditation. Environmental performance could be measured using other measures of 
performance which should provide an additional support to the treatment-effects vs. 
selection effects.  
 Soana (2011) examines a possible relationship between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) in the banking sector 
and questioned whether the banking sector can be ethical. Therefore, it overcomes the 
limitations of previous literature that does not measure the ethical behaviour of the 
banking sector. Banks have started to initiate socially responsible programmes and 
increasingly focus on safeguarding their reputation in the light of recent financial crisis. 
The study argues that competitive advantage is related to the firm ethical behaviour and 
is achieved through sustaining a corporate reputation. CSR contributes to good 
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reputation by reducing the unforeseen harmful effects of events that as a result affect the 
firm profitability.  
Soana (2011) measures CSP using multidimensional ethical ratings based on 
interviews and consultation of public documents regarding quantification procedures of 
ethical ratings used by specialized agencies operating in Italy. Using a sample of 21 
international banks and 16 Italian banks rated by different ethical agencies, CFP was 
measured using both accounting and market-based measures. Results show no 
statistically significant link between CSP and CFP, and that investment in social 
initiatives does not lead to financial advantage. However, in spite of the absence of 
significant evidence, no negative correlation was conducted. The study argues that 
Italian banks were successful in directing investment ethically without having to stand 
any financial loss. The absence of certain methods of determination of ethical ratings 
where CSP is measured based on the receipt of different evaluations from different 
agencies could affect the results. Therefore, other proxies of corporate social 
performance (CSP) need to be applied such as reputational measures conducted by 
Fortune Magazines.  
 Iwata and Okada (2011) examine the relationship between environmental 
performance and financial performance. They investigate the different characteristics of 
environmental issues and responses from various markets and stakeholders’ behaviour. 
The fact that social and economic benefits might contradict requires government 
intervention to solve any implications arise from anti-social behaviour of a firm. 
However, the existence of a positive relation between CSR and financial performance 
will allow market mechanisms to solve such implications. The study argues that 
increasing revenues and reducing costs of environmental activities leads to improving a 
firm’s financial performance. Increasing revenue is sustained through product 
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differentiation, better access to capital markets, and pollution abatement technologies, 
while reducing costs is achieved through having a risk management system and control 
over costs of materials, energy, capital and labour. The study captures two 
characteristics related to environmental issues, i.e. waste and green gas emission 
arguing that employing the amount of waste and green gas emission enables us to 
investigate the differences in the market evaluation of environmental issues. It also 
argues that the existence of various channels from which environmental performance 
affects financial performance is behind the mixed findings in prior literature.  
Iwata and Okada (2011) use a sample of 268 Japanese manufacturing firms during 
the period 2004-2008, and apply seven different financial performance measures to 
clarify how various financial performance indices that reflect different stakeholders’ 
behaviour are influenced by different environmental issues. Data of waste and 
greenhouse gas emission was taken from the CSR Database in Japan. Results show no 
significant relation between waste emission and financial performance supporting that 
condition where firms follow regulations, stakeholders such as stockholders, investors 
and financial institutions cannot respond to increases or decreases in waste emissions. 
Results also show that green gas reduction increases long-term financial performance. 
Therefore, firms addressing global warming issues will anticipate improving their 
reputational image in the future. The study captures the impact of two characteristics of 
environmental issues. However, there are other characteristics related to pollution rate, 
environmental damage, existence of regulators and environmental treaties which also 
require attention due to the impact they have on firms’ future profit.  
Hassel et al. (2005) examines how environmental performance impacts the market 
value of firms in conjunction with financial statement information. It focuses on the 
value relevance of environmental performance and how it is reflected in the expected 
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future earnings that determine market value. The current debate on the relationship 
between environmental performance and market value is divided into two schools: (i) 
the cost-concerned school where investments in environmental initiatives incur costs 
that have an adverse impact on market value and firms’ earnings; (ii) the value creation 
school where firms collecting resources towards their environmental agenda help 
achieve competitive advantage and improve financial returns to investors.  
Hassel et al. (2005) use accounting-based valuation model where market value of 
equity is a function of book value of equity, accounting earning and environmental 
performance. Environmental performance information was obtained from 
CaringCompany (CC) Research, an international network that collects information on 
ethical and environmental behaviour of firms and gives ratings based on different 
criteria including environmental objectives, implementation of policies, production and 
service firm-related issues. The study includes only firms that operate in the 
manufacturing and service sectors arguing that high environmental performance is 
expected to be more costly for manufacturing firms because they are engaged in 
activities more sensitive to the environment. Using a sample 337 of Swedish-listed 
firms during the period 1998-2000, results show a negative relationship between 
environmental performance and market value of equity indicating that firms highly 
engaged in environmental programmes are not highly appreciated by investors. 
Therefore, the study provides support for the cost-based school. However, the sample 
size applied in the study is small and the time period studied is relatively short where a 
longitudinal test might affect the results. Moreover, industry classification is crude, and 
the value relevance of environmental performance in various industries is needed.  
Janney and Gove (2011) examine how firms’ prior signals regarding ethical 
behaviour through CSR initiatives may both enrich and exacerbate market reactions. It 
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extends prior related literature on strategic CSR and reputation, and documents 
dynamics in the relationship between CSR and financial performance.  The study argues 
that qualitative signals are important due to the fact that it is costly and difficult for 
lower quality competitors to replicate. The authors investigate the firms’ choices in the 
stock option backdating scandal where several firms tended to falsify the dates of 
awarded stock options. Backdating refers to awarding stock options on a past date at a 
prior price, thus lowering the option strike price (Janney and Gove, 2011: p.1567). The 
study argues that such behaviour is not illegal if it is disclosed prior to the awards. 
Voluntary disclosure is a strategic decision therefore; managers play a role in reducing 
information asymmetry by adopting an optimal disclosure policy that needs to prepare 
investors for possible future bad news, lowering its resultant severity.  
Janney and Gove (2011) explore the changes in investors’ responses depending on 
the setting of CSR disclosures that form the corporate identity of the firm. They argue 
that firms’ reputation develops from an accrual of signals with positive signals 
enhancing the firm reputation, negative signals damaging it, and consistent signals 
making for stable corporate identity. Using a sample of 80 US publicly-listed firms, 
results show firms with enhanced overall reputation for CSR are partially safeguarded 
from scandal exposure. However, if a firm has good governance system that provides an 
oversight over CSR behaviour, backdating scandal will lead to an adverse market 
reaction because investors will interpret this mistake as hypocrisy. 
Table 4.1 summarises some previous empirical studies on the relation between 
corporate social and environmental responsibility and financial performance. 
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Table 4.1 
Previous Empirical Studies of the Relation between Corporate Social and 
Environmental Responsibility and Financial Performance 
Author(s) Corporate social 
responsibility  
measure 
Financial 
performance 
measure 
Control 
variables 
sample Results 
      
(Mcguire et 
al., 1988) 
Fortune annual 
survey of corporate 
reputation for 
responsibility to 
the community and 
environment 
Accounting 
based 
measure: 
ROA, total 
assets, sales 
growth, asset 
growth, op. 
income 
growth 
Market based 
measure: risk 
adjusted 
return , total 
return 
Accounting 
risk measure: 
debt to assets, 
op. leverage, 
S.D. of op. 
income, S.D. 
of total return 
 
 
Beta 98 US firms 
form Fortune 
most admired 
companies 
1977- 1884 
 
Negative 
relationship 
between 
accounting 
based risk 
measures and 
social 
responsibility. 
Op. income 
growth has a 
negative 
correlation, 
positive 
relationship 
between ROA 
and total 
assets. 
 
Cohen et al. 
(1995) 
US government 
data & corporate 
from 10K fillings 
that are required by 
the SEC 
 
Accounting- 
based 
measure: 
ROA, ROE 
Market based 
measure: 
unadjusted 
total return to 
shareholders, 
risk-adjusted 
total return to 
shareholders 
 
Size, industry S&P500 
companies 
divided into two 
portfolios: high 
polluters and 
low polluters 
1987-1989 
Either no 
penalty or 
positive return 
from green 
investing) 
 
Diltz (1995) CEP index( 
Council on 
Economic 
Priorities) 
Daily 
individual 
stock price 
return 
 
Beta 159 big-sized 
US firms from 
different 
industries listed 
by the CEP 
index 1989-
1991 
 
No correlation 
Pava and 
Krausz 
(1996) 
CEP index Accounting- 
based 
measure: 
Size, industry Sample 
identified by 
CEP vs. 
Socially 
responsible 
firms have 
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ROA, ROE, 
EPS 
Market based 
measure:  
market 
return, P/E 
ratio, 
Market/Book 
ratio 
Risk based 
measure: 
current ratio, 
quick ratio, 
debt to 
equity, 
interest 
coverage, 
beta 
Others: 
capital 
investment, 
size, number 
of lines of 
business, 
dividend pay-
out ratio 
 
 
 
 
matched pairs 
not identified 
by CEP 
1985-1887, 
1989-1991 
 
been shown to 
have equal 
financial 
performance, 
if not better 
than other 
firms. 
 
Russo and 
Fouts (1997) 
Franklin research 
and Development 
Corporation 
(FRDC ratings) 
 
ROA Industry 
concentration, 
industry 
growth rate, 
firm growth 
rate, capital 
intensity, 
advertising 
intensity 
243 US firms 
chosen from 
FRDC database 
of 
environmentally 
rated firms 
1991-1992 
 
Positive 
correlation 
Balabanis et 
al. (1998) 
Rating by NCG- a 
UK public interest 
research 
organization 
Accounting 
based 
measures: 
average 
ROCE, 
average ROE, 
average 
growth rate 
Market-based 
measures: 
average beta, 
average 
excess market 
value 
 
Size, industry 56 British firms 
in LSE and 
rated by NCG 
(new consumer 
group) 1988-
1989, 1990-
1994 
Negative 
association 
between 
involvement 
of 
environmental 
protection 
activities and 
subsequent 
financial 
performance 
Dowell et al. 
(2000) 
Firms’ position 
regarding 
international 
environmental 
policy derived 
from investor 
Tobin’s q Size, industry, 
R&D 
intensity, 
advertising 
intensity, 
leverage, 
89 
manufacturing 
and mining 
firms in 
S&P500 1994-
1997 
Past changes 
in 
environmental 
standards 
predict current 
changes in 
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responsibility 
research centre 
(IRRC) Corporate 
environmental 
profile 
foreign assets/ 
total assets 
 
market value 
(positively 
correlated). 
Firms 
applying 
global 
environmental 
standards 
outperform 
those applying 
US or internal 
standards 
Mcwilliams 
and Siegel 
(2000) 
Dummy variable 
taken the value of 
“1” if the company 
included in Domini 
400 social index 
(DSI 400) and “0” 
otherwise. 
 
Unspecified Size, industry, 
risk, R&D 
intensity, 
advertising 
intensity. 
 
524 US firms in 
Domini 400 vs. 
those that are 
not 1991-1996 
No correlation 
Van De 
Velde et al. 
(2005) 
 
Four portfolios 
based on total 
sustainability 
rating derived from 
Vigeo Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
scores ( CSR 
agency that screens 
European quoted 
companies on 
CSR) 
 
Portfolio 
return 
None 1112 European 
companies 
chosen form 
Vigeo 
Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Agency 
2000-2003 
High-
sustainability- 
rated 
portfolios 
outperform 
low 
sustainability-
rated ones 
Murray et al. 
(2006) 
UK social and 
environmental 
disclosure by the 
top 100 UK 
companies derived 
from the Centre for 
Social and 
Environmental 
Accounting 
Research (CSEAR) 
 
Share returns size UK top 100 
companies 
listed by The 
Times 1000, 
1989-1997 
No direct 
relationship 
between share 
returns and 
disclosure, 
longitudinal 
data revealed 
a positive 
correlation 
between 
consistent 
high/low 
return and the 
predicted to 
high/low 
disclosure 
Mahoney 
and Roberts 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
CSID ratings  ROA 
ROE 
Size, industry, 
leverage  
352 Canadian 
firms during the 
period  1997-
2000 
Positive 
correlation  
Wahba 
(2008) 
Binary variable 
taken the value of 
“1” if the company 
has been certified 
Tobin’s q Size, capital 
intensity, firm 
risk, firm age, 
ownership 
156 Egyptian 
firms where 84 
firms have an 
ISO14000 and 
Positive 
correlation 
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for ISO14000 
environmental 
certificate 
published by the 
Ministry of State 
Environmental 
Affairs- Egyptian 
Environmental 
Affair agency 
structure, 
industry 
the rest are 
chosen form 
Egyptian 
market index 
published by 
the Egyptian 
Capital Market 
agency 
(ECMA) 2003-
2005 
 
Hussainey 
and Salama 
(2010) 
Reputational index 
of Britain most 
admired 
companies(BMAC) 
published by 
Management 
Today 
Annual stock 
return, annual 
earning, EPS, 
asset growth 
rate. 
 
None 889 non-
financial firms 
listed on the 
London Stock 
Exchange 
1996-2004 
Positive 
correlation 
 
Heras-
Saizarbitoria 
et al. (2011) 
 
 
ISO accreditation 
 
ROA 
Sales growth 
 
size 
 
268 certified 
firms and 7232 
non-certified 
firms  
2000-2005 
 
Not 
significant  
 
Researchers have applied different theoretical perspectives to demonstrate the 
association between corporate environmental performance and firm performance. The 
RBV focuses on firm performance and provides an analysis on how corporate social and 
environmental policies impact the bottom line of the firm (Wahba, 2008). Hart (1995) 
states that “competitive advantage can be sustained only if the capabilities creating the 
advantage are supported by resources that are not easily duplicated by competitors” 
(p.988). According to RBV, the firm ability to collect, control and exploit resources 
such as physical resources, financial assets, reputation, technology, and human 
resources will result in a greater long-term financial performance and attain competitive 
advantage (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Hussainey and Salama, 2010). 
There are two types of environmental policies developed by Hart (1995) viz. 
compliance strategy which applies the enforcement of environmental legislation, and 
prevention policy that emphasises source reduction and process innovation. The firm 
choice of policy affects its ability to generate profit. These types link the imperative of 
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capturing competitive advantage with securing social legitimacy through capabilities 
that facilitate environmentally sustainable economic activities (Hart, 1995). Firms that 
devote more resources to support their environmental commitment and improve their 
environmental performance will enhance their value in the market, hence, secure a 
better financial performance (Wahba, 2008). RBV states that the ability to create unique 
assets equates reputation with credibility, trustworthiness, reliability and responsibility. 
These factors endure the value of difficult to replicate assets. Managers need to be 
aware of the appropriate channels to be used to convincingly convey the details of 
intangible assets’ investments to capital market (Toms, 2002). 
Stakeholder theory suggests that firms seek to gain not only stockholders’ and 
bondholders’ satisfaction and support, but also other stakeholders’ groups such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, environmental activists and community (Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000). Companies place priorities on some stakeholder groups over others 
depending on the power they hold over the organisation and their importance as a major 
resource provider. Hence, failure to satisfy their needs will cause deterioration in the 
company’s performance. Low social responsibility may weaken the image of the firm 
management where it will be seen as a riskier investment for investors while firms 
engaged in a high level of social responsibility activities will be exploited to a low level 
of financial risks and gain credibility from special community groups such as 
environmental activists and government (Mcguire et al., 1988). Stakeholder theory 
proposes a positive correlation between corporate environmental responsibility and firm 
financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Investment in environmental activities 
creates opportunities to improve firm financial performance. Moreover, investors who 
target environmentally responsible firms do not suffer financial penalty (Salama, 2005). 
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Mcwilliams and Siegel (2001) focus on the supply and demand side when investing 
in social and environmental activities. They argue that the impact of corporate social 
and environmental responsibility on profitability will be neutral. This is because firms 
that devote resources to improve their products’ environmental attributes will offer their 
product at higher prices due to the higher costs involved, while not investing in 
corporate environmental responsibility will have lower costs and lower prices. 
Therefore, investment in CSR for a firm will be evaluated by considering the marginal 
costs and benefits.  On the other hand, Walley and Whitehead (1994) suggest that 
environmental initiatives have financial costs where managers will face a trade-off (at 
least in the short run) between environmental and financial matters. The study argues 
that there is a remarkable appeal in the idea that ‘green’ projects will lead to an increase 
in profitability. 
The expected effect of firm environmental performance on financial performance is 
inconclusive according to the existing theoretical framework where a positive, negative 
or no impact have been proposed. 
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4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Previous research has yielded mixed results. This may be due to many reasons such 
as lack of theory, issues of measurement and an underspecifying of the model 
(Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000, Murray et al., 2006), issues of applying trend analysis, 
and issues of using different measures of corporate environmental responsibility such as 
reputational index or content analysis of corporate annual reports. Hence, further 
research and examination is required in response to such issues. Researchers have 
hypothesised and have given rational theoretical justification for negative, positive, and 
neutral links between corporate social and environmental performance and firm 
financial performance.  
Proponents of the positive effects base their argument partly on stakeholders theory 
and the concept “ it pays to be green” (Wahba, 2008; Blanco et al., 2009). The RBV 
also supports the positive effect of corporate environmental performance in enhancing 
firm performance and signalling long-term future prospects to market participants 
(Hussainey and salama, 2010). Firms with intangible assets that are valuable and rare 
such as environmental reputation enjoy a sustainable competitive advantage that may 
expect to earn higher returns. Assets that are difficult to replicate may achieve sustained 
superior financial performance (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Corporate environmental 
performance is viewed as a reflecting valuable resource that can be utilised to achieve 
competitive advantage of the firm over its opponents (Wahba, 2008).  
Researchers in line with a positive association argue that the explicit cost of 
corporate environmental responsibility is minimal and can be compensated by employee 
morale and productivity benefits (McGuire et al., 1988, Stanwick, 1998).  Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) argue that social and environmental performance is positively correlated with 
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firm financial performance due to internal and external factors. Firms’ engagement in 
socially and environmentally responsible activities is determined by management 
decisions, thus it increases managerial capabilities. Moreover, investment in corporate 
environmental activities helps firms to develop new resources and enhance 
organisational efficiencies. These resources allow investment in sustainable projects 
which will influence environmental performance of a firm. Finally the firm will be able 
to build a positive reputation and goodwill towards external stakeholders. 
On the other hand, proponents of a negative association argue that socially 
responsible firms incur costs that will put them at an economic disadvantage where they 
are better off avoiding such costs (Wahba, 2008). They argue that positive social and 
environmental performance causes the firm to incur costs that reduce profits and 
shareholders wealth (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). Friedman (1970) argues that the 
firm social responsibility is to maximise its profits. Pava and Krausz (1996) translate 
Friedman’s position vis-a`-vis the tension between environmental responsibility and 
profit maximisation: “business managers have a responsibility to shareholders- the 
owners of the corporation- to maximise firm value. Managers, acting as agents to 
shareholders, have no mandate to embark on socially- responsible projects that do not 
enhance the income generating ability of the firm” (p.322).  Another argument by 
Friedman (1970) is that  managers are specialised in producing products, selling them, 
and financing them. They have no competitive advantage in implementing social and 
environmental programs since they have neither the necessary expertise nor the time 
needed. A final point stated by Jaggi and Freedman (1992) maintains that the market 
does not reward corporate environmental responsibility. 
Proponents of a neutral impact between corporate environmental performance and 
corporate financial performance take a position in between the above argument and/or 
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are theorising of a supply and demand or marginalist economics. Environmentally 
friendly products will be tendered at higher prices due to higher costs associated with 
their production while products without environmentally responsible attributes are 
offered at lower prices (Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000). Each firm will supply a different 
amount of social and environmental products based on the unique demands for social 
and environmental attributes that each firm experiences. At equilibrium, profits will be 
maximised. Also, at the margin, the benefit of social and environmental production will 
equal its costs (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007).  From the above, there is no clear view 
regarding the relationship between corporate environmental responsibility and corporate 
financial performance, and environmental responsibility has always been controversial. 
There is also an underlying normative or prescriptive debate: should businesses 
concentrate efforts towards profit or shareholder wealth maximisation (subject to the 
law) or should they compromise on profits by extending environmental friendliness? Or, 
in what circumstances should they aim to do one or the other? Descriptively, in this 
regard, there is a further issue about the relative autonomy of the business corporation 
vis-a`-vis any trade off.   
While there have been several studies assembling the relation between social, 
environmental and financial performance since the 1970
s,
 the above underscores the 
argument that more empirical work in to a broadly conceived resource-based view of 
the firm is needed. And UK companies provide an appropriate sample. Social and 
environmental responsibility activities get great attention in the UK for that UK market 
is dominated by pension funds and insurance companies which focus on long-term 
return. Such fact causes CSR to be more integrated in corporate managerial practice due 
to pressures from market participants (Aguilera et al., 2006). In undertaking such 
research, the choice between employing accounting-based measures and market-based 
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measures of firm performance is not without controversy. Accounting measures capture 
past performance and therefore provide an insight into how firm results historically have 
been influenced by environmental performance. On the other hand, market measures are 
forward looking and indicate shareholders’ prospects. Combining both measures with 
appreciation of environmental performance helps incorporating the different prospects. 
The study explores whether changes of environmental reputation predict current 
changes in firm financial performance under the assumption gains recognised from 
greener firm images may be realised in the current year or later. Applying lagging of 
independent variables will help to control for the possibility of causality effects among 
our variables and get more valid results (Elsayed and Paton, 2005, Russo and Fouts, 
1997).   
 A resource base analysis of the link between environmental reputation and financial 
performance leads to the following hypothesis: 
H: there is a positive and significant association between a firm’s environmental 
reputation and its concurrent and subsequent financial performance 
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4.4 METHODOLOGY  
This section presents the methodology adopted in the conduct of this study. It contains 
the sample selection, the measurement of variables and model specification. 
4.4.1 Sample Selection 
All companies that were continuously listed in the UK FTSE 350 in the period 
2007-2011 inclusive were selected as the initial sample. Elimination of companies with 
missing data created a balanced panel with five years’ data per company and reduced 
the sample size to 224 firms in each year with a total firm/year sample size of 1,120 
observations. CER is measured using the ratings for that category in the Management 
Today survey of Britain’s Most Admired Companies (BMAC) (Salama, Anderson and 
Toms, 2011). CER scores were collected for all companies covered by the Management 
Today BMAC 2007-2011 survey and merged with the initial sample. This resulted in a 
sample size of 772 firm observations. Since the study undertakes panel data analysis, 
and for the purpose of the use of lags of independent variable, we include only those 
firms with at least two consecutive evaluations over the studied period. This creates a 
final sample size of 618 firm observations.  
4.4.2 Independent Variables Definition and Measurement  
For the purposes of testing the main hypotheses of this study, explanatory variables, 
which attempt to explain the examined relationship, are divided into: (i) the primary 
causal variable, corporate environmental reputation, and (ii) control variables  
4.4.2.1 Defining Corporate Environmental Reputation  
 Reputation is arguably the most important of intangible assets (Toms, 2002). Good 
reputation helps the company to operate in a more effective and efficient way and 
pursue better opportunities. It pays off in both operational and financial terms (Dowling, 
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2001). Corporate reputations are critical because of the likelihood of value creation, and 
their intangible properties that make them difficult to replicate (at least in the short 
term) by competing firms (Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Dowling, 2001; Toms, 2002). 
Roberts and Dowling (2002) argue that good reputation allows superior financial 
performance to be sustained over time.  
Different stakeholders may have different perspective on the reputation of the same 
company based on their own economic, social, and personal background (Fombrun, 
1996). Corporate reputation has been defined by many researchers. For example, it is 
defined by Gotsi and Wilson, (2001)  as “a stakeholder’s overall evaluation of a 
company over time. This evaluation is based on the stakeholder’s direct experience with 
the company, any other form of communication and symbolism that provides 
information about the firm’s actions and/or a comparison with the actions of other 
leading rivals” (p.29). In another definition, Fombrun (1996) defines reputation  as “a 
perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe 
the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared to other leading 
rivals” (p.72).  
Reputation is also a sign of the quality of a firm’s product and services where 
customers may be willing to pay a premium for them (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
Moreover, a firm with good reputation may also possess a cost advantage due to 
employees’ and suppliers’ attitudes towards high reputation firms. Suppliers will be less 
concerned about contractual hazards accompanied with transactions. Good reputation 
should also lead to lower contracting and monitoring costs. On the other hand, 
employees are keen to work harder for good reputation firms and even accept lower 
remuneration (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
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Based on different views and definitions by researchers of corporate reputation, 
Salama (2003) defines corporate environmental reputation as “relatively stable, long 
term and collective judgments by different stakeholders of an organisation’s 
environmental responsibility actions and achievements. If the company minimises (or 
ideally eliminates) its negative environmental impacts and acts in conformity with 
environmental expectations, then the stakeholders will develop trust and confidence in 
that company resulting in a good corporate environmental reputation” (p.206).  
4.4.2.2 Measuring Corporate Environmental Reputation  
Research studies employ different measures of corporate environmental 
responsibility (Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Pava and Krausz, 1996). Some studies use 
questionnaire surveys completed by managers and directors which are then assessed and 
analysed by experts of corporate policies based on expertise and qualification of those 
making the evaluation. The level of firm social performance reflects managers’ 
perception of such behaviour (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Soana, 2011). Other studies used 
pollution emissions as a measure of corporate environmental responsibility (Spicer, 
1978). This measure seems to be only valid for certain industries and cannot be 
generalised to all industries. There are studies that apply ethical ratings, a multi-
dimensional index calculated by specialized agencies each given a score which is 
combined into an aggregate final score (Soana, 2011). 
Other researchers use content analysis techniques that measure the amount of social 
and environmental information published within corporate public documents (Wiseman, 
1982; Campbell, 2003). The level of information disclosed is captured by word, page, or 
sentence count regarding social information, or a quality analysis (Soana, 2011).  
Variations in governance structures affect management incentives to inform capital 
markets about their environmental behaviour (Toms, 2002). Moreover, Verrecchia 
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(1983) argues that firms may be motivated to both share and hide information regardless 
of whether the news is good or bad. Toms (2002) tests the quality signalling aspect of 
corporate disclosure where the credibility of signals provided is more important than the 
volume of information. Quality signals could be sent to the market using separate 
environmental reports, kite-mark accreditation, and international environmental 
standards certification ISO14000. Those measures signalling firms’ environmental 
behaviour are costly to acquire, and difficult to replicate (Toms, 2002).  
Finally, researchers also use corporate reputational indices as a measure of 
corporate environmental responsibility (Mcguire et al., 1988; Diltz, 1995; Jaggi and 
Freedman, 1992). In this study, the reputational index of Britain’s Most Admired 
Companies which is published in Management Today is used as a proxy to measure 
corporate environmental performance. Despite the degree of subjectivity inherent in the 
ranking, this method is still one of the most popular methods because of its 
comprehensiveness and availability (Hussainey and Salama, 2010). Many US surveys 
have been conducted based on the reputation rankings published annually in Fortune 
magazine to assess corporate social and environmental performance (Mcguire et al., 
1988). Karake (1998) states this method has two main advantages. First, it summarises 
the responses of a key representatives of various firms. Second, it tends to be internally 
consistent because one evaluator is applying the same (although usually subjective) 
criteria to each firm. In addition to Fortune, reputational ratings are starting to appear in 
other countries including Asian Business’ “Asia’s Most Admired Companies MAC”, 
The far Eastern Economic Review’s “Review 200” and The Financial Times “ Europe 
Most Respected Companies” (Hussainey and Salama, 2010).  
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In Britain, a corporate reputation survey has been published in Management Today 
since 1994
11
 which applies same methodology as in the US Fortune survey. Elsayed 
and Paton (2005) indicate that “these different types of reputational indices do not refer 
only to firm community and environmental performance, but are the aggregation of 
several different evaluation criteria” (p.401). Therefore, researchers get around this 
problem by using one dimension of various social responsibility aspects viz. 
Management Today’s community and environmental responsibility (CER) scores as a 
measure of environmental performance rather than the firm’s overall score (Elsayed and 
Paton, 2005; Toms, 2002; Salama et al., 2011). They argue that CER scores are a useful 
proxy for corporate environmental performance. Elsayed and Paton (2005) argue that 
CER scores is the only component in the fortune rating that does not seem to be affected 
by the halo effect generated by financial performance.  
The Britain’s Most Admired Companies survey is held annually and is based on the 
opinion of senior executives’ from 260 of Britain’s largest companies. Financial 
analysts for each sector are also included in the survey. Senior directors and specialist 
business analysts are asked in this survey to give a rating between 0 (poor) and 10 
(excellent) using nine characteristics, one of which is community and environmental 
responsibility (Hasseldine et al., 2005), which is used in this study as an empirical proxy 
for corporate environmental reputation.  
4.4.3 Control Variables  
In choosing control variables, this study began with a list of control variables that 
were perceived to act as intervening factors that may have an impact on firm 
performance and/or social and environmental performance, and therefore should be 
controlled for in the empirical tests. They are industry concentration, firm size, 
                                                          
11
 It started its first publication in 1989 in the Economist.  
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systematic risk, research and development intensity and advertising intensity.  Research 
and development was dropped from the test because many data were missing causing 
variables to be consistently insignificant in the trial regression
12
. Firm size (SIZE) is 
considered one of structure-related variable that have an impact on environmental 
performance. Balabanis et al. (1998) argue that firm size and environmental impact are 
inter-correlated. Moreover, Elsayed and Paton (2005) state that “firm size may be 
relevant for several reasons such as the possible existence of scale economies inherent 
in environmentally oriented investment” (p.402). Larger firms are highly visible and 
tend to be subject to increased public pressure; therefore, they are more likely to show 
better environmental performance in order to fulfil stakeholders’ demand (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Ullman (1985) argues that larger firms are more likely to have the 
necessary financial, managerial and technical knowledge required to undertake costly 
environmental programmes than smaller firms. Firm size is measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets  (Dowell et al., 2000; Elsayed and Paton, 2005). 
Systematic risk (beta) is another control variable applied in this study. Firms with a 
lower level of systematic risk are expected to have a higher level of CSR and higher 
returns (Balabanis et al., 1998). Low risk companies enjoy good reputation and stability 
in their stock market returns so they can attract more investors. Investors holding shares 
in companies with good environmental reputation will require a lower risk adjusted rate 
of return (Toms, 2002).  Systematic risk (beta) is defined by the covariance of the 
expected return of the stock with that of the overall market divided by the variance of 
the return of the market. It is the slop of the regression line of the firm returns against 
market returns (Belkaoui, 1976; Balabanis et al., 1998). 
                                                          
12
 Several other variables commonly used in social and financial performance studies as controls, such as 
capital intensity and sales growth, were excluded from the final model. These variables did not add to 
the explanatory power of the model.  
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Previous literature (e.g. Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000; Dowell et al., 2000; Elsayed 
and Paton, 2005) argues that the omission of R&D and advertising intensity from 
models examining the relationship between social responsibility and firm performance 
is likely to lead to misleading results. Elsayed and Paton (2005) argue that advertising 
may help to increase customer consciousness of environmentally friendly products and 
to prefer them to other products. The study states “advertising can be seen as a signal of 
the environmental responsiveness of the firm to the market” (p.402). Since no 
appropriate advertising data are available at the firm level and following Elsayed and 
Paton (2005), we use the ratio of total intangible assets to total sales to capture the 
effects of advertising.  
The relationship between environmental responsibility and firm market value can 
also be affected by substantial shareholding (SUBOWN) where diverse institutional 
ownerships are associated with positive environmental reputation (Toms, 2002; Wahba, 
2008). Management are more responsive when shareholdings are dispersed since ethical 
investors and ethical funds are proactively involved in the monitoring and decision 
making process of corporate governance, and more likely interested in sustainable 
projects (Toms, 2002). Substantial ownership is measured by the percentage of 
outstanding common shares (5%) or more held by substantial shareholders. Finally, 
another factor that could have an impact on the relationship between environmental 
performance and financial performance is the type of industries to which firms belong. 
Different industries display different levels of environmental attributes. Hence, 
environmental performance may be particularly important in certain industries (Elsayed 
and Paton, 2005; Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000). Industry effects are measured by the 
allocation of the sample to industry groups, using the DataStream, Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1 industries, creating ten groups that reflect the 
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differing exposure of firms to environmental issues and their management arising from 
the nature of their activities.  
4.4.4. Dependent Variable Definition and Measurement 
Previous research has come up with mixed results regarding the relation between 
corporate environmental performance and firm performance (Ullmann, 1985; 
Mcwilliams and Siegel, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988). 
Measurement of financial performance could be behind such conflicting results. This 
study will apply both accounting-based measures and market-based measures as proxies 
of financial performance.  
There is a wide literature on the appropriate measurement of financial performance. 
This study considers four alternative measures of financial performance: return on 
assets, return on equity, Tobin’s q ratio, and share price return. It has been argued that 
market-based measures are better proxies of firm financial performance for many 
reasons: they reflect actual shareholders’ wealth, and some suggested that share price 
returns are not subject to managerial manipulation, and that they represent investors’ 
assessment of firms’ ability to generate economic profit in the future. On the other hand, 
accounting-based measures represent an audited historical record of firm financial 
performance, albeit subject to accounting conventions that may be considered 
controversial. While market-based measures and accounting-based measures are not 
without controversy, combining both together in this study adds to the argumentation.  
4.4.4.1 Market-based Measures 
Tobin’s q (Q) ratio (TOBINSQ hereafter) was measured according to Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) as follows: 
[MV (CS) + PS + Debt] / TA where: 
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MV (CS) is the market value of common stock (share price times the number of shares 
outstanding). 
PS is preferred stock 
Debt is the value of short-term liability net of short-term assets plus the book value of 
long-term debt. 
TA is the book value of total assets of the firm (King and Lenox, 2002; Elsayed and 
Paton, 2005; Wahba, 2008). 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) define Tobin’s q (Q) as “the ratio of the firm market 
value to the replacement cost of its assets”. For Q to be meaningful, it requires accurate 
measures of both firm market value and replacement costs of firm assets (Lindenberg 
and Ross, 1981).  In an equilibrium situation, the Q ratio has a value of 1.0. When Q 
ratio is more than 1 then the firm market value is higher than the value of the company’s 
recorded assets. This will encourage investors to invest more in the company’s capital. 
While Q ratio lower than 1 suggests that the market may be undervaluing the company 
hence lower incentive to invest (Kim et al., 1993). Martin (1993) suggests “Q and 
profitability measures should be regarded as complementary rather than substitutes. 
Both contain information about market power and there is no compelling reason to think 
that either type of measure dominates the other” (p.516). For this reason it might be 
beneficial to consider other measures of performance (Elsayed and Paton, 2005) 
Dowell et al. (2000) and Elsayed and Paton (2005) argue that Chung and Pruitt’s 
(1994) simple approximation of TOBINSQ and a more comprehensive estimate for 
TOBINSQ obtained via Lindenberg and Ross (1981) often yield qualitatively similar 
results. Dowell et al. (2000) state “the key is whether the use of book – instead of 
market – value of debt, of inventory, and of plant and equipment introduces any 
systematic biases; such biases are likely to be linked to industry and firm size” (p.1063). 
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Since we incorporate both industry effects and firm size in regression model, we should 
be able to control for any systematic biases. 
The second market-based measure applied in this paper is share price return 
(RETURN hereafter). Financial market responses to environmental responsibility may 
be measured through share price returns. They help to get a view of whether investors 
find environmental matters decision useful, in effects examining investor  behaviour 
(Milne and Chan, 1999). Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue that the annual stock return 
represents an objective and comprehensive measure of economic performance due to 
the proposition that stock price should impound information about the firm future 
prospects from a vast array of both financial and non-financial measures” (p.456).  
The academic finance literature generally employs the log-return formulation where 
return across assets can be easily compared. Brooks (2008) argues that applying the log-
return formula has the property of being continuously compounded returns so that the 
frequency of compounding does not matter. Therefore this formula can be applied 
whether the study requires annual, monthly or daily stock price (Brooks, 2008). The 
share price of each company for the year reputational scores have been published and 
the previous year, are obtained from DataStream. RETURN is computed as follow: 
Rit= ln(Pit/Pit-1) 
Where Rit is the return earned by company (i) in the year t 
 Pit is the share price at the end of year t 
P it-1 is the share price at the start of year t.   
Previous studies have shown no direct relation between share return and 
environmental responsibility (Diltz, 1995; Murray et al., 2006; Ullmann, 1985). 
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Therefore, the question of whether share market price is sensitive to social and 
environmental data has remained unanswered. This study will follow the arguments of 
Gray et al. (2001) and Murray et al. (2006) that it is more likely for any relationship to 
reveal itself over a period of time; this helps to better capture environmental 
performance impact on share price movement.  
4.4.4.2 Accounting-based Measures  
This chapter will use return on equity (ROE hereafter) and return on asset (ROA 
hereafter) as a measure of firm performance. Mcguire et al. (1988) argue that 
accounting-based measures represent only the historical aspect of firm performance. 
They are subject to managerial manipulation and differences in accounting practices. 
Moreover, accounting-based measures should be adjusted for risk, industry effects, and 
other firm variables (Mcguire et al., 1988; Ullmann, 1985). However, Hackston and 
Milne (1996) argue that measuring firm profitability using ROE and ROA over a trend 
period is claimed to provide more reliable results. Moreover, Stickney (1995) argues 
that ROA “takes the particular set of environmental factors and strategic choices made 
by a firm as given and focuses on the profitability of operations relative to the 
investments (assets) in place” (p.161).  
ROE is measured by the ratio of income available to common shareholders to 
average amount of common equity. It is argued that ROE should be underlined as a 
suitable tool for addressing profitability since it is related to cash flows for investors 
(Pava and Krausz, 1996; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988). ROA is measured by the ratio of 
income available to common shareholders to total assets. Iwata and Okada (2011) argue 
that ROE includes stockholders’ evaluation and performance of good market while 
ROA not only includes equity capital contributed by stockholders but also borrowed 
capital provided by creditors and investors.  
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Jaggi and Freedman (1992) use ROE and ROA as measures of firm performance on 
a sample of US firms during the period 1973-1974; no correlation was found between 
firm performance and environmental responsibility. Balabanis et al. (1998) and Mcguire 
et al. (1988) show negative correlation between environmental responsibility and firm 
performance measured using ROE and ROA respectively. Mcguire et al. (1988) argue 
that accounting-based measures after controlling for risk are more significantly related 
to corporate social and environmental responsibility than market-based measures, 
especially that the perception of risk and performance is more firm specific. Moreover, 
a positive correlation was proved by Russo and Fouts (1997) between firm performance 
measured using ROA and environmental performance.  
4.4.5 Model Specification 
In light of the above discussion, the main hypotheses and variables are combined 
into a multiple regression model to test the impact of corporate environmental 
reputation on concurrent and subsequent financial performance.  The empirical form of 
the models is set out below. 
    
 0   1C     2       3       4      5          6            
   t+1 = 
 0   1C     2       3       4      5          6            
where: 
CFP = concurrent and subsequent financial performance of a firm as measured by both 
sets of accounting-based measured and market-based measures. 
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CER = corporate environmental reputation as measured by the community and 
environmental responsibility rating for the Management Today survey of Britain’s 
MAC.  
SIZE = natural log of total assets as a measure of corporate size 
BETA = systematic risk as measured by the company’s beta factor 
ADV = advertising intensity as measured by the ratio of total intangible assets to total 
sales 
SUBOWN = substantial shareholding; the total percentage of shareholders groups with 
a stake of 5% or more  
INDUSTRY = industry classification, SIC code (two digits) 
β 0 = intercept 
β 1- β6 = coefficient of slop parameters  
ε   = error term 
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4.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
This section presents the econometric analysis and results of this study. It contains 
the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables in the data set together 
with regression analyses which are used to test the research hypothesis. 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive information (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values, and skewness and kurtosis) on the dependent and independent 
variables of interest employed in the current study are presented in Table 4.2 and the 
coefficient of correlation between the key variables are presented in Table 4.3. 
Continuous variables viz. ROE, ROA, TOBINSQ, RETURN, SIZE, ADV, and 
SUBOWN are winsorised (reset) at the 1 per cent and 99 per cent levels; they perform 
non-normal characteristics although not all at same level. Winsorised regressors are 
generally more robust to outliers, and variables are less skewed after winsorising 
(Artiacha et al., 2010). 
The mean (median) for accounting-based measures of firm financial performance 
are:  the mean (median) of ROAs (ROA) is 0.076 (0.065) which is higher than a mean 
of 0.06 reported by Elsayed and Paton (2005) but similar to the mean of 0.08 reported 
by Van der Laan et al. (2008); the mean (median) of return on equity (ROE) is 0.259 
(0.162) which is higher than a mean of 0.088 reported by Balabanis et al. (1998). The 
mean (median) for market-based measures are: the mean (median) of share price return 
(RETURN) is 1.55 (1.34) which is higher than a mean of 0.064 reported by Murray et 
al. (2006) and a mean of 0.08 reported by McGuire et al. (1988). The mean (median) of 
Tobin’s q ratio (TOBINSQ) is 1.235 (1.075) which is lower than a mean of 1.44 
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reported by Elsayed and Paton (2005) but higher than a mean of 0.825 reported by 
Wahba (2008).  
The mean (median) for environmental reputational score in terms of ‘community 
and environment’ (CER) is 5.601 (5.7) which is higher than a mean of 5.5 reported by 
Salama et al., (2011) and Toms (2002) but lower than a mean of 5.813 reported by 
Hasseldine et al. (2005). The mean (median) of firm size (SIZE) measured by natural 
log of total assets is 14.95 (14.77), and it ranges from 11.528 minimum to 19.529 
maximum. The mean (median) of advertising intensity (ADV) measured by total 
intangible assets to sales is 0.354 (0.192) which is higher than the mean of 0.121 
reported by Elsayed and Paton (2005). The mean (median) of systematic risk (beta) is 
1.058 (1.03) which is higher than a mean of 1.01 reported by Toms (2002) and a mean 
of 0.889 reported by Hasseldine et al. (2005). Finally, the mean (median) of substantial 
ownership is 0.247 (0.201). Skewness and kurtosis results show that most of our 
variables are not normally distributed, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
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Table 4.2 - Descriptive Statistics for Financial Performance, Environmental 
Reputation and Control Variables 
 
 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q 
ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management Today survey; 
SIZE = firm size measured by log of total assets; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; 
SUBOWN = substantial ownership.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ROE 0.259 0.162 0.585 -0.442 4.676 5.762 40.75 
ROA 0.076 0.065 0.079 -0.151 0.4 1.124 7.194 
RETURN 1.55 1.34 1.068 0.043 4.976 0.944 3.579 
TOBINSQ 1.235 1.075 0.712 0.079 3.733 1.111 4.266 
CER 5.601 5.7 0.881 2.2 8.3 -0.305 3.456 
SIZE 14.95 14.77 1.611 11.528 19.529 0.638 3.368 
BETA 1.058 1.03 0.593 -0.72 4.09 0.671 4.766 
ADV 0.354 0.192 0.479 0 2.351 2.395 9.017 
SUBOWN 0.247 0.201 0.198 0 0.947 1.257 4.792 
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4.5.2 Correlation Matrix  
The study performs Spearman correlation for all variables included in the system 
equation since some data shows non-parametric characteristics and is suffering from 
skewness and kurtosis issue although trying to control it by using winsorised variables. 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 4.3. Correlation above 0.8 between 
variables indicate that multicollinearity is present and might affect the results (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005; Gujarati, 1995)
13
. Table 4.3 shows that collinearity is not present; the 
highest correlation is 0.8 between ROE and ROA, these two measures representing firm 
financial performance and they will be tested separately in the regression test.  
The correlation matrix shows a positive correlation between environmental 
reputation and firm financial performance for all measures applied, i.e. ROE, ROA, 
TOBINSQ and RETURN. Moreover, firm size measured by the natural log of total asset 
is positively correlated with firm financial performance for all measures used. 
Advertising intensity (ADV) is positively correlated with firm financial performance 
measured by TOBINSQ and RETURN. Substantial ownership (SUBOWN) is 
negatively correlated with financial performance measured by ROE and ROA and 
TOBINSQ. Finally, systematic risk (beta) is negatively correlated with firm financial 
performance measured by TOBINSQ and RETURN. The depicted relations represent 
consistency with theoretical explanation. 
  
                                                          
13
 Variance inflation factor (VIF) is within acceptable limits (mean 1.05). 
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Table 4.3- Spearman Correlation Matrix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; **  
Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published 
by Management Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership.    
 
 
 
Variable VIF ROE ROA Q RETURN CER SIZE BETA SUBOWN ADV 
           
           
ROE  1.000 
        
ROA  0.800*** 1.000 
       
Q  -0.002 -0.035 1.000 
      
RETURN  0.005 0.024 0.087** 1.000 
     
CER 1.11 0.119*** 0.101*** 0.036 0.025 1.000 
    
SIZE 1.11 0.061* 0.059 0.041 0.110*** 0.018 1.000 
   
BETA 1.02 0.015 0.030 -0.202*** -0.21*** 0.026 0.036 1.000 
  
SUBOWN 1.11 -0.191*** -0.168*** -0.010 0.020 -0.303*** 0.009 -0.016 1.000 
 
ADV 1.03 -0.033 -0.047 0.141*** 0.027 -0.042 0.116*** -0.151*** 0.031 1.000 
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Table 4.4 examines the study regression variables by industry. The mean variables 
were compared among industry sectors. Results in Table 4.4 suggest some important 
industry effects with high means for environmental reputation and corporate financial 
performance. Firms from the Oil & Gas industry report the highest reputational scores 
and financial performance for most measures used, specifically ROE, TOBINSQ, and 
RETURN. On the other hand, firms from the Telecommunication sector report the 
lowest average environmental reputation score of 5.103 and the lowest ROE, ROA and 
RETURN, and considerably low TOBINSQ.  These results suggest that firms enjoy 
high environmental reputation and a green image are more profitable.  
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Table 4.4- Independent Variables by Industry 
 
Variable ROE ROA TOBINSQ RETURN CER SIZE SUBOWN ADV BETA 
          
Oil & Gas 0.220 0.093 1.103 1.704 5.723 14.849 0.268 0.217 0.975 
Basic Materials  0.290 0.113 1.422 1.628 5.381 14.493 0.271 0.462 1.033 
Industrials  0.207 0.078 1.266 1.576 5.784 15.005 0.216 0.404 1.068 
Consumer Goods 0.203 0.052 1.117 1.473 5.847 14.880 0.247 0.348 1.073 
Health Care 0.263 0.112 1.164 1.148 5.509 14.742 0.157 0.348 1.001 
Consumer Services  0.382 0.075 1.275 1.552 5.507 15.050 0.284 0.323 1.098 
Telecommunications  0.161 0.071 1.332 1.395 5.103 14.786 0.237 0.445 1.068 
Utilities  0.244 0.074 1.361 1.558 5.721 15.346 0.190 0.358 0.995 
Financials  0.151 0.061 1.151 1.558 5.488 14.915 0.227 0.324 1.023 
Technology  0.338 0.107 1.151 1.798 5.503 14.927 0.328 0.333 0.987 
 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published 
by Management Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership 
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4.5.3 Data Analysis       
The analysis of Table 4.2 reveals that winsorising continuous variables moderate, if 
it does not entirely eliminate, the problem of outliers. This is shown by the skewness 
and kurtosis issue that these variables suffer from specifically ROE, ROA, and 
advertising intensity, and the gap between minimum and maximum values of these 
variables. For Salama (2005) “outliers, which are a common feature in financial 
performance measures, are troublesome because we want our statistical models to 
reflect the main body of the data, not just single observations. OLS procedures are 
influenced strongly by outliers; this means that a single observation can have excessive 
influence on the fitted model, the significance tests, the prediction intervals, etc.” 
(p.415). 
Mcwilliams and Siegel (1997) argue that removing outliers from sample 
observation under the assumption that these data points reflect noise and measurement 
errors is problematic. It is possible that outliers provide an important signal of the 
presence of confounding effects. Added to that, it is not reasonable to remove all 
outliers from the data set as a solution for outlying cases since most of our financial 
variables suffer from it. Salama (2005) argues that data transformation and deletion are 
important tools but should not be viewed as a solution for the outlaying cases. Using 
robust standard errors, which are known as white corrected standard errors, instead of 
the traditional standard errors should help reduce the impact of outliers. Salama (2005) 
states  “these estimates are considered robust in the sense that they provide correct 
standard errors in the presence of unequal variances throughout the population 
regression line, a condition called heteroscedasticity” (p.417) .   
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As mentioned previously, ordinary least squared methods (OLS) are influenced 
strongly by outliers. These methods are likely to be inefficient in finding answers to 
some economic questions, or bias or both. They might also give false implications 
(Hussainey and Salama, 2010). Using panel data analysis with robust standard errors 
should help in solving the outlying case. Hsiao (2003) states “panel data usually give 
the researchers a large number of data points, increasing the degree of freedom and 
reducing collinearity among explanatory variables – hence improving the efficiency of 
econometric estimates” (p.3). Moreover, panel data sets allow controlling for 
unobservable firm-specific effects which are unlikely to be recognised using pooled 
data set. Consequently, this should attain more valid results (Elsayed and Paton, 2005; 
Dowell et al., 2000). Wintoki et al. (2011) argue that panel data estimation can solve the 
bias arising from unobservable heterogeneity. This study employs the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (LM) to assign between panel data regression and a 
simple OLS regression. Results show evidence of significant differences across units, 
hence the presence of significant firm heterogeneity. Therefore, simple OLS regression 
is inappropriate and panel data analysis is better to use.  
The study applies both fixed effects and random effects estimates. Random effects 
assume that it is not necessary to estimate a parameter for each firm since firm-specific 
terms are randomly distributed, while variables in fixed effects estimation behave 
differently. Hausman test assigns the best estimator to use. A significant value of 
Hausman test indicates variations of independent variables over time where random 
effects estimator will be inconsistent and fixed effects estimator is more appropriate 
(Gujarati, 1995).  
The study tests whether corporate environmental reputation and corporate financial 
performance are jointly determined. Profitable firms will be able to dedicate more 
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resources to green activities, and build up  a good environmental reputation and this will 
lead to better financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wahba, 2008). In the 
case of endogeneity presence, endogenous variables are expected to be correlated with 
the error term which will lead to biased results. The study reports the Durbin-Wu test 
(Hausman, 1978) to investigate the presence of endogeneity (Gujarati, 2003). Not 
rejecting the null hypothesis that variables are exogenous confirms the absence of 
endogeneity effects. Durbin-Wu-Hausman results confirm that the hypothesis could not 
be rejected as the F-test is not significant for each measure of firm performance. Thus, 
there is no virtuous cycle between corporate environmental reputation and firm 
performance (Wahba, 2008). Finally the study controls over causality effects by 
applying lagging of independent variables arguing that investing in environmental 
initiatives creates competitive advantage  and affects the firm’s ability to generate profit 
which is captured at the same year or subsequently (Russo and Fouts, 1997). Panel data 
provides better analysis to the causality question between environmental performance 
and financial performance, and assesses the predictive link between the variables of 
interest (Blanco et al., 2009).  
The main objective of the analysis is to investigate the research hypothesis 
concerning the impact of corporate environmental reputation on concurrent and 
subsequent financial performance. The main model was run for five separate regressions 
including both sets of accounting and market-based measures of financial performance 
during 2007-2011. Results obtained from running static panel data estimates for both 
fixed effects and random effects are presented in Tables 4.5-4.12 which set out five 
versions of the model that best summarise the relationship between the environmental 
reputation of UK firms and their concurrent and subsequent financial performance.  
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Model 1 shows the results using environmental reputation as the only explanatory 
variable. Model 2 shows the results including environmental reputation and corporate 
size, systematic risk, and substantial ownership. Model 3 shows the results including 
environmental reputation, corporate size, systematic risk, substantial ownership and 
industry. Model 4 shows the impact of environmental reputation on firm performance 
when incorporating advertising intensity as the only control variable included in the 
econometric regression. This helps to test the impact of the inclusion of ADV on the 
regression model and whether this would affect the impact of environmental reputation 
on firm performance. Model 5 shows the results when all explanatory variables are 
included. Such modelling technique helps test the power of various sets of variables in 
improving the model. 
Model 1 presents the static data estimates of firm performance measured using 
accounting and market-based measures and environmental reputation. The study 
estimates fixed effects as well as random effects. Results show that environmental 
reputation is positive and significant with concurrent financial performance for all 
measures used except for RETURN. When firm performance is measured by ROE, it is 
positively significant at p<0.05 level. Also when it is measured using ROA and 
TOBINSQ, environmental reputation is positive and significant at p<0.01 level. These 
findings mostly support the hypothesis concerning the positive impact of environmental 
reputation on concurrent financial performance.  
Moreover, results show that the coefficients on lagged reputation are positively 
significant with firm performance for all measures used at p<0.01. Results support the 
hypothesis in relation to the significant and positive impact of environmental reputation 
on subsequent financial performance. These findings are consistent with Russo and 
Fouts (1997) and Dowell et al. (2000) and the win-win perspective whereby 
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environemtal involvment should improve productivity and profitability. It also provides 
evidence for the RBV of the firm, that is, the reputation for leadership in environmental 
affairs is associated with better financial performance. The study results are also 
consistent with the findings of Hussainey and Salama (2010) that show firms with 
unique and valuable resources, such as environmental reputation, have an advantage 
over their rivals in their ability to signal their long-term future outlook to investors. 
Their study examines the potential usefulness of corporate environmental information to 
investors in predicting future earning within the framework of RBV theory.  
Model 2 presents the results when adding control variables viz. corporate size, 
systematic risk and substantial shareholding to the relationship between environmental 
reputation and concurrent and subsequent firm performance. Corporate size is shown to 
have significant positive impact on firm concurrent and subsequent financial 
performance when measured by ROE at p<0.05 level for both fixed effects and random 
effects, and on firm concurrent financial performance when measured by RETURN at 
p<0.01 for both fixed and random effects estimator. The study results support the 
argument that larger firms are more likely to have the knowledge required to undertake 
costly environmental programmes and show better pollution control to fulfil 
stakeholders’ demands. Systematic risk (BETA) is negatively related to subsequent 
financial performance when measured by ROE at the p<0.01 level for both fixed effects 
and random effects estimates. When firm performance is measured by TOBINSQ, beta 
is shown to be significant and negatively correlated with concurrent and subsequent 
financial performance at p<0.01 level, and finally beta is significant and negatively 
related to concurrent financial performance when measured by stock return (RETURN) 
at p<0.01. These findings supports the argument that firms with a lower level of 
systematic risk enjoy a  good reputation and attract more investors for whom holding 
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shares in such companies will require lower risk adjusted returns (Balabanis et al., 1998; 
Toms, 2002).  
Substantial shareholdings (SUBOWN) is shown to have a significant and negative 
impact on concurrent and subsequent financial performance when measured by ROA at 
the p<0.10 and P<0.01 level respectively. Moreover when firm performance is 
measured by TOBINSQ, the substantial shareholding factor is shown to be significantey 
and negatively impact on concurrent financial performance at p<0.10, and on 
subsequent financial performance at p<0.10. This is consistent with the argument that 
substantial shareholders see corporate environmental responsibility as a long-term 
strategy with uncertain returns. Reputational scores also remain positively significant, 
consistent with Model 1 findings.  
Model 3 supplements Model 2 with the inclusion of dummy variables for each two-
digit industry code for random effects estimates
14
. Environmental reputation is not 
affected by the inclusion of these variables and remains consistent with Model 1 and 
Model 2 findings where is shown positive and significant impact on concurrent and 
subsequent financial performance for all measures used.  
Advertising intensity (ADV) is the only control variable included in the 
econometric specification of Model 4. Mcwilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that 
economic models used in previous empirical studies were misspecified because they did 
not control for investment in research and development and advertising projects.  
Results show that incorporating advertising intensity in the economic model does not 
affect the significance of coefficients on corporate environmental reputation. 
                                                          
14
 It is not possible to identify the impact of industry effects in the fixed effects model. The existence of 
dummy variables as part of explanatory variables in the estimated model is considered as an obstacle 
for the estimating of fixed effects, since the latter is computed by counting dummy variables of N groups 
in the model (Greene, 2006) 
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Advertising intensity (ADV) is found to be significant and positively related to 
concurrent and subsequent firm performance when measured by ROE at the p<0.05 and 
p<0.01 level respectively. This variable is shown to have a positive and significant 
association with concurrent and subsequent financial performance measured by ROA at 
the p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively. Finally, advertising intensity is found to be 
significant and positively associated with concurrent and subsequent financial 
performance when measured by Tobin’s q at p<0.05 for both fixed effects and random 
effects estimators.  
Model 5 tests the full model including all explanatory variables. Results show that 
there have been positive significant relationships between corporate environmental 
reputation and economic performance indicators that is ROE, ROA, TOBINSQ. Results 
on the impact of environmental performance on Tobin’s q ratio are consistent with 
Wahba’s (2008) findings when environmental performance exerted a positive and 
significant impact on the firm market value measured by Tobin’s q ratio suggesting that 
the market compensates those firms that care about their environment. Moreover, our 
results show that share return (RETURN) is sensitive to past environmental data where 
reputational scores are shown to have positive and significant impact on subsequent 
firm performance measured by stock return at the p<0.01 level.  
Consequently, the hypothesis that there is a positive significant association between 
corporate environmental reputation and concurrent and subsequent financial 
performance of the firm is supported. Therefore, based on panel data results reported in 
this study, it is more likely that good environmental reputation will lead to out-
performance. Overall, findings are consistent with the RBV of the firm. According to 
RBV, corporations looking to regain trust with investors and other stakeholders need to 
take steps to allocate some resources toward the environmental agenda. This kind of 
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innovation will push them financially. It provides evidence of how corporate social 
resources can be seen as valuable tools, difficult to imitate, and are considered to be key 
to the firm competitive advantage. Intangible resources such as reputation, if utilised, 
will have an impact on the firm bottom line. They may be the main contributors to the 
profit and growth of the company (Russo and Fouts, 1997). 
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Table 4.5- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Concurrent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (ROE) 
Independent  Dependent variable= concurrent financial performance (ROE)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.052** 
(2.10) 
0.048** 
(2.16) 
0.046* 
(1.84) 
0.044** 
(2.06) 
0.046* 
(1.84) 
0.048** 
(2.12) 
0.052** 
(2.12) 
0.048** 
(2.16) 
0.047* 
(1.88) 
0.048** 
(2.12) 
SIZE   0.024** 
(2.17) 
0.024** 
(2.48) 
0.024** 
(2.17) 
0.023** 
(2.45) 
  0.022** 
(2.05) 
0.024** 
(2.41) 
BETA   -0.006 
(0.25) 
-0.011 
(0.42) 
-0.006 
(0.25) 
-0.011 
(0.42) 
  0.01 
(0.37) 
0.011 
(0.43) 
SUBOWN   -0.057 
(0.62) 
-0.014 
(0.16) 
-0.057 
(0.62) 
-0.048 
(0.57) 
  -0.068 
(0.74) 
-0.049 
(0.57) 
ADV       0.051** 
(2.50) 
0.012 
(0.75) 
0.042** 
(2.21) 
0.005 
(0.31) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.031 
(0.22) 
-0.017 
(0.15) 
-0.384 
(2.03) 
-0.366** 
(2.05) 
-0.384*** 
(2.03) 
-0.399* 
(1.95) 
-0.050 
(0.36) 
-0.022 
(0.19) 
-0.381** 
(2.03) 
-0.399* 
(1.95) 
R-sq 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.037 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.036 
N 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 
Hausman  0.03 0.56 1.06 8.78 7.32 
BP-LM 306.46*** 330.94*** 275.15*** 299.94*** 269.95*** 
Durbin-Wu 0.974 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY  = industry effect. 
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Table 4.6- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Subsequent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (ROE) 
Independent  Dependent variable= subsequent financial performance (ROE)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.100*** 
(3.73) 
0.112*** 
(4.28) 
0.054** 
(2.19) 
0.081*** 
(3.48) 
0.054** 
(2.19) 
0.084*** 
(3.70) 
0.075*** 
(3.07) 
0.108*** 
(4.28) 
0.033* 
(1.46) 
0.082*** 
(3.67) 
SIZE   0.074** 
(2.17) 
0.029** 
(2.01) 
0.074** 
(2.17) 
0.029* 
(1.74) 
  0.064** 
(2.17) 
0.082 
(1.64) 
BETA   -0.114*** 
(2.69) 
-0.073*** 
(2.76) 
-0.114*** 
(2.69) 
-0.073*** 
(2.78) 
  -0.110** 
(2.55) 
-0.070*** 
(2.65) 
SUBOWN   0.102 
(0.88) 
0.012 
(0.17) 
0.102 
(0.88) 
-0.007 
(0.10) 
  0.072 
(0.64) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
ADV       1.04*** 
(3.64) 
0.096 
(1.00) 
1.06*** 
(3.83) 
0.121 
(0.94) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.282* 
(1.890 
-0.355*** 
(2.61) 
-1.052** 
(2.03) 
-0.556** 
(2.14) 
-1.051** 
(2.03) 
-0.626** 
(2.09) 
-0.385** 
(2.49) 
-0.357*** 
(2.61) 
-1.024** 
(2.21) 
-0.605** 
(2.02) 
R-sq 0.059 0.059 0.051 0.065 0.051 0.087 0.008 0.055 0.019 0.083 
N 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 
Hausman  0.44 9.29 10.84** 20.29*** 30.96*** 
BP-LM 177.91*** 126.73*** 113.74*** 177.36*** 175.22*** 
Durbin-Wu 1.05 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect.  
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Table 4.7- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Concurrent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (ROA) 
Independent  Dependent variable= concurrent financial performance (ROA)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.016*** 
(4.56) 
0.009*** 
(2.95) 
0.015*** 
(4.37) 
0.007** 
(2.40) 
0.015*** 
(4.37) 
0.008*** 
(2.70) 
0.016*** 
(4.59) 
0.009*** 
(2.95) 
0.016*** 
(4.14) 
0.008*** 
(2.71) 
SIZE   0.002 
(1.36) 
0.002 
(1.58) 
0.002 
(1.36) 
0.002* 
(1.67) 
  0.002 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(1.55) 
BETA   0.004 
(1.17) 
0.005 
(1.57) 
0.004 
(1.17) 
0.005 
(1.66) 
  0.005 
(1.33) 
0.006 
(1.74) 
SUBOWN   -0.028* 
(1.71) 
-0.035** 
(2.38) 
-0.028* 
(1.71) 
-0.038*** 
(2.36) 
  -0.026* 
(1.56) 
-0.038*** 
(2.60) 
ADV       0.009** 
(2.40) 
0.004 
(1.23) 
0.008** 
(2.15) 
0.003 
(1.05) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.018 
(0.88) 
0.022 
(1.20) 
-0.042 
(1.46) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.042 
(1.46) 
-0.011 
(0.34) 
-0.021 
(1.03) 
0.021 
(1.08) 
-0.041 
(1.45) 
-0.010 
(0.33) 
R-sq 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.064 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.062 
N 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 
Hausman  8.30 12.57** 11.09** 16.37*** 16.15** 
BP-LM 310.93*** 288.99*** 257.26*** 306.07*** 252.75*** 
Durbin-Wu 1.95 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect.  
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Table 4.8- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Subsequent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (ROA) 
Independent  Dependent variable= subsequent financial performance (ROA)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.021*** 
(2.94) 
0.020*** 
(3.98) 
0.016** 
(2.22) 
0.018*** 
(3.59) 
0.016** 
(2.22) 
0.023*** 
(4.68) 
0.018*** 
(2.91) 
0.020*** 
(4.02) 
0.015** 
(2.14) 
0.023*** 
(4.66) 
SIZE   0.006 
(0.97) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.006 
(0.97) 
0.004 
(1.41) 
  0.006 
(0.81) 
0.004 
(1.45) 
BETA   -0.004 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.004 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
  -0.004 
(0.46) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
SUBOWN   -0.037 
(1.51) 
-0.064*** 
(3.36) 
-0.037 
(1.51) 
-0.067*** 
(3.48) 
  -0.039 
(1.64) 
-0.066*** 
(3.42) 
ADV       0.098* 
(1.81) 
0.008 
(0.40) 
0.092 
(1.14) 
0.013 
(0.52) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.032 
(0.84) 
-0.031 
(1.12) 
-0.095 
(0.99) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.095 
(0.99) 
0.007 
(0.14) 
-0.042 
(1.22) 
-0.031 
(1.11) 
-0.092 
(0.96) 
0.009 
(0.18) 
R-sq 0.034 0.034 0.044 0.062 0.044 0.139 0.008 0.008 0.022 0.139 
N 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Hausman  0.01 4.16 8.52 4.49 10.84 
BP-LM 102.56*** 78.87*** 42.06*** 100.19*** 41.80*** 
Durbin-Wu 2.03 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect.  
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Table 4.9- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Concurrent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (TOBINSQ) 
Independent  Dependent variable= concurrent financial performance (TOBINSQ)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.082* 
(1.70) 
0.074*** 
(2.60) 
0.072 
(1.50) 
0.069** 
(2.34) 
0.072 
(1.50) 
0.079*** 
(2.67) 
0.083* 
(1.71) 
0.076*** 
(2.67) 
0.074 
(1.55) 
0.081*** 
(2.73) 
SIZE   0.009 
(0.40) 
0.008 
(0.41) 
0.009 
(0.40) 
0.007 
(0.39) 
  0.004 
(0.17 
0.004 
(0.22) 
BETA   -0.131*** 
(2.94) 
-0.164*** 
(3.99) 
-0.131*** 
(2.94) 
-0.167*** 
(4.11) 
  -0.122*** 
(2.74) 
-0.158*** 
(3.96) 
SUBOWN   -0.361* 
(1.87) 
-0.051 
(0.41) 
-0.361* 
(1.87) 
-0.045 
(0.34) 
  -0.332* 
(1.73) 
-0.05 
(0.38) 
ADV       0.132** 
(1.98) 
0.124** 
(2.08) 
0.11* 
(1.660 
0.094* 
(1.65) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons 0.773*** 
(2.85) 
0.819*** 
(5.05) 
0.922** 
(2.08) 
0.911*** 
(2.67) 
0.922** 
(2.08) 
0.982*** 
(2.61) 
0.724*** 
(2.66) 
0.765*** 
(4.74) 
0.932** 
(2.09) 
0.983* 
(2.59) 
R-sq 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.028 0.021 0.045 0.016 0.016 0.026 0.049 
N 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 
Hausman  0.04 3.21 3.67 0.08 4.14 
BP-LM 2.28* 1.84* 0.80* 2.24* 0.82* 
Durbin-Wu 0.932 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect. 
 
 
211 
 
Table 4.10- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Subsequent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (TOBINSQ) 
Independent  Dependent variable= subsequent financial performance (TOBINSQ)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
CER 0.229*** 
(5.23) 
0.254*** 
(6.95) 
0.168*** 
(3.74) 
0.228*** 
(5.98) 
0.168*** 
(3.74) 
0.225*** 
(5.69) 
0.206*** 
(5.20) 
0.237*** 
(6.55) 
0.150*** 
(3.49) 
0.221*** 
(5.63) 
SIZE   0.094** 
(2.39) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
0.094** 
(2.39) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
  0.086** 
(2.24) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
BETA   -0.077* 
(1.68) 
-0.124*** 
(3.15) 
-0.077* 
(1.68) 
-0.119*** 
(2.96) 
  -0.073* 
(1.61) 
-0.111*** 
(2.74) 
SUBOWN   -0.014 
(0.09) 
-0.204* 
(1.78) 
-0.014 
(0.09) 
-0.231* 
(1.94) 
  -0.011 
(0.07) 
-0.222* 
(1.86) 
ADV       0.968* 
(1.81) 
0.500** 
(2.37) 
0.901* 
(1.67) 
0.293 
(1.24) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.175 
(0.72) 
-0.300 
(1.56) 
-1.17** 
(2.01) 
0.066 
(0.17) 
-1.17** 
(2.01) 
-0.119 
(0.29) 
-0.271 
(1.05) 
-0.321* 
(1.67) 
-1.147** 
(2.04) 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
R-sq 0.123 0.123 0.062 0.154 0.062 0.241 0.110 0.134 0.079 0.244 
N 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Hausman  1.60 29.21*** 29.78*** 4.41 35.88*** 
BP-LM 268.08*** 212.85*** 180.35*** 263.44*** 175.10*** 
Durbin-Wu 0.801 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect. 
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Table 4.11- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Concurrent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (RETURN) 
Independent  Dependent variable= concurrent financial performance (RETURN)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
CER 0.130* 
(1.76) 
0.055 
(1.32) 
0.091 
(1.34) 
0.063 
(1.46) 
0.091 
(1.34) 
0.061 
(1.38) 
0.131* 
(1.78) 
0.056 
(1.36) 
0.092 
(1.36) 
0.061 
(1.39) 
SIZE   0.079** 
(2.40) 
0.086*** 
(3.03) 
0.079** 
(2.40) 
0.086*** 
(3.00) 
  0.076** 
(2.33) 
0.085*** 
(2.94) 
BETA   -0.346*** 
(4.57) 
-0.322*** 
(4.92) 
-0.346*** 
(4.57) 
-0.322*** 
(4.90) 
  -0.342*** 
(4.50) 
-0.320*** 
(4.85) 
SUBOWN   -0.547 
(1.20) 
-0.329 
(1.36) 
-0.547 
(1.20) 
-0.278 
(1.10) 
  -0.533 
(1.18) 
-0.276 
(1.10) 
ADV       0.142 
(1.42) 
0.094 
(1.14) 
0.051 
(0.53) 
0.019 
(0.23) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons 0.822** 
(1.99) 
1.243 
(5.32) 
0.354 
(0.59) 
0.163 
(0.33) 
0.354 
(0.59) 
0.137 
(0.24) 
0.766* 
(1.86) 
1.19*** 
(5.06) 
0.358 
(0.60) 
0.358 
(0.60) 
R-sq 0.001 0.001 0.027 0.052 0.027 0.058 0.002 0.002 0.027 0.058 
N 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 749 
Hausman  1.43 8.77 8.08 2.28 8.80 
BP-LM 2.82** 2.44** 1.99* 3.14** 1.99* 
Durbin-Wu 2.58 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect. 
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Table 4.12- Fixed/ Random Effects Regression of Subsequent Financial Performance on Environmental Reputation and Control Variables (RETURN) 
Independent  Dependent variable= subsequent financial performance (RETURN)  
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
 Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  Fixed Random  Fixed  Random  
           
CER 0.185*** 
(4.51) 
0.188*** 
(7.98) 
0.155*** 
(3.44) 
0.189*** 
(7.36) 
0.155*** 
(3.44) 
0.183*** 
(6.95) 
0.181*** 
(4.37) 
0.188*** 
(7.98) 
0.152*** 
(3.330 
0.184*** 
(6.940 
SIZE   0.035 
(1.15) 
0.006 
(0.54) 
0.035 
(1.15) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
  0.034 
(1.12) 
0.003 
(0.320 
BETA   -0.099 
(1.20) 
-0.013 
(0.35) 
-0.099 
(1.20) 
-0.021 
(0.53) 
  -0.099 
(1.19) 
-0.019 
(0.51) 
SUBOWN   -0.098 
(0.50) 
-0.013 
(0.16) 
-0.098 
(0.50) 
-0.008 
(0.09) 
  -0.094 
(0.48) 
-0.006 
(0.08) 
ADV       0.149 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.139 
(0.34) 
0.018 
(0.21) 
INDUSTRY      YES    YES 
_cons -0.877*** 
(3.85) 
0.897*** 
(6.95) 
-1.158*** 
(2.66) 
-0.792*** 
(4.13) 
-1.15*** 
(2.66) 
-0.814*** 
(3.79) 
-0.892*** 
(3.82) 
-0.897*** 
(6.93) 
-1.154*** 
(2.68) 
-0.811*** 
(3.79) 
R-sq 0.112 0.112 0.092 0.110 0.092 0.128 0.108 0.112 0.088 0.128 
N 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 615 
Hausman  0.01 4.97 4.33 0.21 4.50 
BP-LM 1.29* 1.30 1.06 1.29 1.07 
Durbin-Wu 0.537 
*** Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels; ** Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels; *Correlation is significant at 0.1 levels 
ROE = return on equity; ROA = return on assets; Return = share price return; TOBINSQ = Tobin’s q ratio; CER = ‘community and environment’ reputation scores published by Management 
Today survey; SIZE = firm size; BETA = systematic risk; ADV = advertising intensity; SUBOWN = substantial ownership; INDUSTRY = industry effect. 
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4.6 CONCLUSION   
The study provides an empirical investigation based on recent data of the 
relationship between corporate environmental performance, taken to be correlated with 
and measured by environmental reputation, and concurrent and subsequent financial 
performance within the British context.  Previous studies have come up with mixed 
results and this appears to be for many reasons in terms of econometric method: (i) lack 
of reliable, conventional, and effective definitions of social or environmental 
performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Mcwilliams and Siegel, 1997); (ii) differences 
in the measurement of environmental and financial performance (for instance, the use of 
the event study is likely in this context to give results that are only valid in the short run 
and they can provide for a perception of the impact of firm environmental attitude only 
on shareholders rather than all firm stakeholders, Mcwilliams et al., 1999), while they 
are sensitive to outliers due to the small sample sizes involved, Mcwilliams and Siegel, 
(1997);  (iii) limited data so that relying on a very small sample might not well reflect 
the relationship between environmental and financial performance; (iv) model 
misspecification due to omitted variables that might be considered as key factors for 
profitability.  
Research studies have employed different measures of corporate environmental 
responsibility such as corporate environmental indices (Mcguire et al., 1988; Diltz, 
1995;  Jaggi and Freedman, 1992), pollution emission (Spicer, 1978), quantitative and 
qualitative disclosure of environmental information within corporate annual reports 
(Wiseman, 1982; Campbell, 2003), and Management Today’s “community and 
environmental responsibility” reputation scores (Salama et al., 2011; Hasseldine et al., 
2005). The study applies the Management Today Britain’s Most Admired Companies 
(MAC) survey method. It uses the Management Today evaluation criteria, namely 
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community and environmental responsibility scores, taking this as a proxy of the 
environmental performance of UK firms.  
The econometric method applied in this study is panel data analysis. Using OLS 
multiple regression analysis to assess the relation between environmental 
performance/reputation and profitability is affected largely by outliers and will not be 
able to capture firms’ unobserved effects. Kennedy (1998) argues that outliers can have 
an impact on standard errors, hypotheses tests, R-square, and other statistics. They 
perform poorly in the presence of fat-tailed error distributions. Therefore, the study 
applies panel data analysis with robust standard errors to control for firm heterogeneity 
and the outlying case, and as a result, has the potential to provide a more powerful 
evidence base. The variation over time in the environmental measure allows us to 
control for firm heterogeneity using a fixed effects estimator as well as a random effects 
estimator. Elsayed and Paton (2005) state that “unfortunately, random effects estimators 
yield consistent estimates only if we impose the rather strong assumption that firm 
effects are uncorrelated with the regressors” (p.398). 
Panel data results show a positive impact of corporate environmental reputation on 
firm concurrent and subsequent performance measured by ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s q. 
Results also show that stock return is sensitive to lagged environmental data where a 
positive and significant relation has been shown between environmental reputation and 
subsequent financial performance. Findings indicate that larger firms with lower 
exposed risks are more likely to enjoy a good reputation and engage in environmental 
programmes that create competitive advantage and enhance their economic value. 
Moreover, block ownership reduces reputation, reflecting the reduced influence of 
institutional investors who appear to give greater attention in environmental 
responsibility and value CER information provided by management. Finally, results 
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support the role of advertising in enhancing customer awareness of and preference for 
environmentally friendly products.  
 Results are in line with the resource-based view of the firm. A perception where a 
firm’s unique resources are considered to be key to its competitive advantage, it offers 
corporate environmental responsibility researchers a means for refining the analysis of 
how environmental reputation, as one of the firm’s bundle of unique resources, can help 
the firm to maintain superior long-term financial performance (Hussainey and Salama, 
2010). The panel data results reported in this study are important for researchers 
investigating the relationship between corporate environmental performance and 
financial performance in the sense that they should pay attention to the methodology 
applied, and the fact that results attained could be affected by the existence of outliers in 
the observation sample, heterogeneity effects, and/or limited data. 
Moreover, the study results suggests a clear message for managers that they have to 
develop an environmental policy and build up a green image that attracts not only 
shareholders but also various environmental stakeholders such as environmental groups, 
environmental regulators, and the environmental public more generally. Firms 
allocating resources towards the environmental agenda and developing innovative 
projects in this regard are achieving higher competitive advantage.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The study examines the relationship between certain corporate governance 
characteristics and environmental disclosures. The key investigation was focused on 
audit committee quality and its impact. It investigates the positive impact of resource 
based firm value and corporate governance (CG) quality specifically effective audit 
committees on the quality of environmental disclosures. Therefore, the study builds on 
prior literature that examines the determinants of the volume of disclosures and their 
quality which include scale, financials and industry effects, by also including the 
specific impact that audit committee adds to the quality of environmental disclosures. 
Audited figures disclosed in annual reports are quantifiable, specific and therefore 
difficult to replicate by competitors. 
The study in its second empirical chapter investigates the positive impact of CG 
quality, audit committees in particular, and the quality of environmental disclosures on 
corporate environmental reputation using the RBV perspective. Therefore, the positive 
effect of audit committee quality on environmental disclosures will eventually feed 
through to environmental reputation and financial performance.  
Finally, the study provides an up-to date empirical investigation on the relationship 
between corporate environmental reputation and corporate financial performance within 
the British context. The study shows that concern for the environment measured by 
rated or scored assessments of environmental performance has positive impact on firm 
financial performance. Therefore, the positive impact goes beyond the trade off point 
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between environmental concern and financial performance. Resource based view (RBV) 
supports a positive relation where CSR is a valuable, difficult to replicate, tool. 
Consequently, CSR here appears key to competitive advantage. 
The study uses a sample of UK FTSE 350 companies during the period 2007-2011 
and thereby updates the evidence from earlier empirical studies that have shown a 
stronger impact for higher quality difficult to replicate disclosures (Toms, 2002; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005). Targeting the FTSE 350 firms ensures both statistical power in 
the tests and more availability of data. Disclosures in corporate annual reports are 
measured using the consolidated narrative interrogation instrument (CONI) method 
(Beck et al., 2010). CONI is based on dual qualitative and volumetric measurement, 
which is therefore particularly suited to a study of this kind, which requires a measure of 
disclosure quality that corresponds to the difficulty of replication in terms of VRIN 
characteristics as well as an aggregate volume measure. As a consequence, this study 
will be the first to apply the CONI approach to examine CG variables, and related 
determinants of environmental disclosures. This chapter provides a summary of the 
study in relation to its main objectives. Its purpose is to briefly summarise the aims and 
findings of the study in relation to previous research on the relationship between 
environmental disclosure, environmental reputation and financial performance. It is 
important to shed light on the limitations to the conducted study as they can provide 
guidance for the direction of further research.  It is noteworthy that understanding 
limitations of the study helps define its scope. The sections that follow provide a 
summary of the empirical findings. They also provide an overall conclusion and 
comprehensive recommendation for future research based on these results. The 
implications of the findings for managers are also being discussed.  
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5.2 SYNOPSIS AND FINDINGS  
The study is divided into three empirical parts. The first part examines the 
determinants of environmental disclosure in terms of volume and quality, which include 
scale, financial, and industry effects, with particular reference to the role of audit 
committees. In doing so, the study distinguishes between the volume and quality of 
environmental disclosures using the CONI method by Beck et al., (2010) which is based 
on dual qualitative and volumetric measurement sufficient to capture the quality and 
volume of information disclosed. A quantitative measurement is employed based on 
number of disclosure items per category using phrase counts while a qualitative measure 
is based on testing type (1-5) disclosures referred in CONI. The typology provides a 
similar, incremental, hierarchical method of classifying the quality of disclosures to the 
one used by Toms (2002) that applies thresholds according to relative difficulty of 
replication.  
The study uses RBV and the quality signalling approach to examine the extent that 
disclosures are determined by the presence of robust governance procedures, including 
the use of audit committees subsequent to the Smith Report (2003) and the combined 
code. According to this approach, firms with resource endowments have greater 
opportunity to invest in strategic investments that create competitive advantage. 
Managers have a strong incentive to signal the value of their investment using annual 
report disclosures; such disclosures will help in the creation of reputational assets that 
are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-replicable (VRIN), these assets are a source of 
competitive advantage. Corporate governance mechanisms promote the quality and 
quantity of accounting disclosures through providing their moderating, monitoring and 
advising role. Audit committees bringing their accounting and experience to bear will 
have a positive and important influence on disclosures, including CSR disclosure. 
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Managers have potentially strong incentives to utilise governance mechanisms in 
this fashion. As a consequence, effective CG can itself be a source of competitive 
advantage, and it follows that effective AC is essential for effective governance (Zaman 
et al., 2011). Auditable or audited figures disclosed in annual reports are more difficult 
to replicate; engaging the audit process is an important part of the generation of 
competitive advantage, and the presence of AC as part of governance structure is more 
likely to lead to support CSR strategies that are positive NPV. The study proposes that 
where firms create high quality AC, the apparent relationship and specifically how audit 
quality impacts on disclosure practice will be reinforced.  
The empirical findings show that larger firms with higher quality AC make higher 
quality and volume of disclosures. Larger firms with block shareholders tend to have a 
greater volume of disclosures but not higher quality. Larger boards have no role in 
promoting the volume or quality of disclosures. These results show some support for the 
RBV quality signalling approach. Larger firms possess a greater resource base and, 
therefore, have the ability to invest in non-replicable CSR strategies. These firms do not 
merely increase the volume of disclosures, as might be predicted by the political cost 
and legitimacy approaches, but also the quality of disclosures, where such disclosures 
are less easily replicated by weaker competitors. Audit committee, which possess Smith 
Report compliant features, also promote quality disclosure, which is not as strongly 
achieved by increasing the size and therefore the expertise of the board.  
A notable feature of the results was the lack of significance of individual 
governance variables, either as features of AC or the board. It could be concluded that 
Smith recommendations are only effective in combination. The composite fashion of 
AC quality reflects compliance with Smith Report (2003) features. Moreover, it could 
be because accounting expertise does not individually enhance corporate environmental 
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responsibility, then accounting skills and training are not useful for promoting this kind 
of practice or that board diversity has no effect. The time invariant character that many 
of these variables enjoy can be a cause of apparent insignificance and model 
specification issues which require caution when interpreting the results and coming to 
conclusion.  
The second part of the study examines the role of environmental disclosures in the 
creation and sustenance of firms’ reputation for their community and environmental 
performance. It therefore compares the impact of volume of environmental disclosure 
with the effects of specific quality signals on firms’ environmental reputation. The study 
updates the evidence from earlier empirical studies that have shown a stronger impact 
for higher quality, difficult to replicate disclosures (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 
2005). These studies did not consider certain corporate governance variables, 
particularly the role of audit committee in reputational capital creation. There are good 
reasons to expect that ACs add to the quality of environmental disclosures and by the 
same virtue increase firm environmental reputation.  
 In parallel with previous studies, there are modelling issues that must be 
considered which tend to confound analysis of the links between financial performance, 
environmental disclosures and environmental reputation where these relationships suffer 
from measurement problem, fail to deal with causality, and omitted variables problem, 
which are often compounded by inadequate theory. Due to the fact that RBV also 
potentially relies upon all three measures, it must also find a solution to these modelling 
problems. Firms with resource endowments will be able to engage in strategic 
investment including CSR investment. Without such endowment, these investments are 
not possible. Moreover, if a qualitative ranking of disclosures is used based on difficulty 
of replication, it is likely that disclosures measured thus will be an accurate proxy for 
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managerial strategy, and it follows that environmental reputation is an outcome for 
managerial strategy. Accounting disclosures is a function of CG that serves to enhance 
reputation; therefore CG also corresponds closely to managerial strategy.  
Although this provides a potential theoretical solution to the omitted variable 
problem, the study adopts procedures to identify and control for endogeneity. Since the 
level of disclosure captured by quality disclosure results from managerial decisions 
about specific inimitable investments, it follows that it is not random and arises as a 
result of managerial selection. The study applies a two-step ordered-Probit approach to 
accommodate the potential selection bias. The selection model uses quality disclosure 
scores as the dependent variable, and financial, size, and industry as the selection 
variables. A possibility that these variables impact on disclosure through selection is 
more likely. The absence of significant lambdas in the two-step approach confirms that 
it is appropriate to test the determinants of environmental disclosure and environmental 
reputation separately in turn rather than taking a two-step estimation approach. Further 
tests to deal with potential endogeneity issues are also adopted.  
Results suggest that firm reputation is added by the quality but not the volume of 
disclosure, and the quality of AC. The quality of environmental disclosures, rather than 
mere volume, has a stronger effect on the creation of environmental reputation. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005) on 
more recent data, and also suggest that quality signalling does not depend on the volume 
of environmental information; rather it is the credibility of signals that is important. On 
the other hand, volume alone does not appear to offer any help than mere rhetoric in 
reputation creation. Firm reputation is also added by the quality of AC. In RBV terms, 
therefore, audit committee is a competitive advantage asset because its governance 
skills add directly to reputation, also because it promotes quality disclosures that are 
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difficult for competitors to replicate, therefore signalling the firm specific competitive 
advantage investment to the market.  
The third part of the study provides an up-to-date empirical investigation of the 
relationship between corporate environmental reputation and concurrent and subsequent 
financial performance within the British context. Previous literature has come with 
mixed results due to methodological differences in the measurement of environmental 
and financial performance, limited data, and/or model specification issues. This study is 
documented and analysed in terms of methodology applied and findings. The 
econometric methodology applied in this study is panel data analysis with robust 
standard error. Using OLS regression analysis to assess the influence of different factors 
(amongst them environmental performance) on firm profitability is affected largely by 
outliers and will not be able to capture firm unobserved effects. Outliers perform poorly 
in the presence of fat-tailed error distribution (Kennedy, 1998).  
Panel data allows controlling for firm heterogeneity. It helps improve model 
efficiency by using data with more variability and less collinearity. Moreover, panel 
data is better able to study the dynamics of adjustments where cross-sectional 
distributions that look relatively stable may suffer from a large amount of variation 
(Baltagi, 2001). The study employs accounting-based measures of firm performance 
that provide an insight on firm historical performance, and market-based measures that 
are forward looking and capture shareholders’ prospects.  
Results support the resource-based view perspective where firms’ unique resources 
are considered to be key to its competitive advantage that helps to enhance the firm 
long-term financial performance. According to Mcwilliams and Siegel (2011), CSR 
attributes, such as alternative-fuel energy, and actions such as recycling and pollution 
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abatement are RBV resources that create competitive advantage. Results show a 
positive impact of corporate environmental reputation on firm financial performance. 
Moreover, findings indicate that larger firms with lower exposed risks are more likely to 
enjoy good reputation and engage in environmental programmes that create competitive 
advantage and enhance economic value. 
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5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The results in this study have implications for managers and researchers. In terms 
of disclosure practices, it is noteworthy that mere volume of disclosures is insufficient 
for signalling facts about environmental strategies. The quality of information provided 
is an important conduit and of a higher value due to the difficulty of replication by 
companies not genuinely committed to environmental good practice. Companies need to 
reduce their exposure to environmental risks by mitigating, evaluating and managing 
these risks while seizing new opportunities (Lash and Wellington, 2007), for example 
taking the lead in certain environmental initiatives such as developing low carbon 
technologies and climate change policies. They also need to provide quantifiable, 
specific and inimitable signals to investors, customers and employees about their 
environmental behaviour, for example quantifying carbon foot print, and arrange 
inventory with an accurate account of firm’s green gas emission. Those signals will 
enhance firm reputation, boost its earning, and consequently achieve competitive 
advantage. Therefore “doing well by doing good” will not be enough: you have to be 
better at it than your competitor (Lash and Wellington, 2007: p.8), and you need to 
know how to signal efficiently your innovative behaviour to the market. 
The study, moreover, contributes to the effectiveness of corporate mechanisms by 
providing evidence of UK firms on the impact of effective audit committees in 
improving environmental practices. Although social and environmental reporting is not 
mandatory, it eventually could become a standard aspect of the company’s annual 
report. Corporate Responsibility Reporting in a survey made by KPMG in 2008 
indicates that 80 per cent of Global 250 companies report on corporate responsibility 
issues in some form. Although CSR and sustainability were viewed as extras, an 
increasing number of firms now perceive them as fundamental elements in their 
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business strategy and their risk assessment effort (KPMG, 2010).  Another survey by 
KPMG Global Audit Committee, in 2013, captures the views of some 1,800 audit 
committee members around the world on different issues, such as financial reporting, 
disclosure, and risk management, and in terms of questions related to CSR, respondents 
assert the high prominence of risks resulting from social and environmental behaviour, 
and the fact that CSR issues take up part of the discussion during their periodic, annual 
and every meeting (KPMG, 2013). Therefore, this study calls for a new amendment in 
the UK CG code where it should mention explicitly the role and duties played by audit 
committee in assessing CSR issues and engaging these issues in the audit process, for 
example including identification and assessment of risks associated with social, ethical 
and environmental matters, making sure that these issues are reviewed on a regular basis 
and discussed during AC meetings, and monitoring performance through the annual 
control self-assessment process conducted by the internal audit function. 
ACs need to address social and environmental responsibility issues as vital 
elements of firms’ business strategies and they need to highlight the risk associated with 
these issues and their potential impact on the business environment. ACs could help in 
assessing CER issues when auditing financial reports. Audit assurance will help 
discriminate between true claims and false claims by competitors about commitment to 
sustainability, so the latter is unlikely to result in added value. The study aims to 
provide managers and institutional investors with a better view of how governance can 
impact the settings of environmental goals and enhance accountability in relation to the 
performance for these goals.  
The study suggests a clear message to managers seeking to promote the 
environmental reputation of their firms so that they pay careful attention to the quality 
of difficult to replicate disclosures rather than mere volume. Such disclosures help to 
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create VRIN assets. Companies are encouraged to integrate social and environmental 
responsibility issues into the core decision making process based on the long-term value 
they add (Mallin et al., 2012). Mcwilliams and Siegel (2011) argue that companies 
engaging in CSR-based strategy can generate an abnormal return only if they prevent 
competitors from imitating their strategies. This could only be achieved when looking at 
CSR as VRIN assets. CSR strategy in the resource-based perspective can be a valuable 
tool that creates competitive advantage and enhances reputational capital (p. 1419). 
Managers need to develop an environmental policy and build up a green image that 
attracts not only shareholders but also various environmental groups, environmental 
regulators, and the environmental public. Companies building a new environmental 
framework will be able to maintain a market share. Investors are willing to pay a 
premium on shares of green firms, while they are on the other hand discounting the 
share price of firms poorly positioned to compete in an environmentally powerful world 
(Lash and Wellington, 2007). Firms allocating resources towards the environmental 
agenda and developing innovative projects in this regard are achieving higher 
competitive advantage.  
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5.4 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
In addressing the study findings, its limitations must be borne in mind. The study 
includes only UK firms and examines their environmental disclosures within recent 
published annual reports during the period 2007-2011. Therefore, the study findings 
cannot be assumed to extend beyond UK firms or prior time periods. Although similar 
relationships may hold under the existence of similar regulations, governance and 
financial reporting, this study still lacks comparable international evidence (Toms, 
2002). Future research could focus on an international comparison to show whether the 
legal, cultural, and institutional environment affects firms’ accounting practices and 
their prospective determinants.  
 In addition to this, as with all methods, there is an element of subjectivity involved 
in volume- and quality-based measures of environmental disclosures. It has been argued 
that volume measures may tend to overweight wordiness and environmental narrative in 
terms of actual business activities. On the other hand, quality may tend to place a halo 
around the firm where quantification and verification are occurring in only certain areas 
of activities (Toms, 2002). Although the subjectivity issue in the study has been dealt 
with by employing a scoring system consistent with the theoretical framework, and 
testing of alternative modelling in the empirical section, other qualitative methods, such 
as case studies and interviewing methods may be appropriate and open the door for 
future research in terms of comparability analysis of the results attained in different 
methods.  
Further, the study measures the scope of environmental reporting based on 
information disclosed in annual reports. There are other sources of disclosures, for 
example companies use other media sources to get information across to the public. 
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Further research could extend to include other media sources such as advertising focus 
groups, employee councils, booklets, school education and so on  (Said et al., 2009;     
Gray et al., 2001).   
Concerning CG variables, in relation to construct validity, while the study assumes 
independent directors act independently, it is hard to capture the real independence in 
the thinking, attitude, and actions of directors. Moreover, the study constructs a 
compound metric based on the individual AC characteristics to capture its effectiveness. 
Further research can extend the results by providing anecdotal evidence about the ‘real 
impact’ of the role of audit committees when determining the level of environmental 
disclosures.  
Additionally, the study uses Britain Most Admired Companies measurement of 
‘community and environmental responsibility’ as a measure of firms’ environmental 
reputation. It is argued that corporate environmental responsibility ratings are affected 
by evaluators’ expertise where those with financial skills may not evaluate corporate 
social and environmental responsibility issues as other less financially-oriented 
evaluators causing biases in their ratings (Mcguire et al., 1988). Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
argue that reputational indices are more highly correlated with corporate financial 
performance than other indicators of corporate environmental responsibility. Although 
MAC ratings in this study refer to both community and environmental reputation and 
not the firm’s overall reputation, and the fact that CER and other management 
reputation indices are uncorrelated (Brown and Perry, 1994), perhaps this does not 
accurately measure environmental performance. Additional research, therefore, could 
use multiple sources of data in order to assess firms’ environmental performance. 
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Finally, future research may consider incorporating other control variables and/or 
other potential determinants of disclosure and CER. It might consider incorporating an 
earning management or accruals quality measure as a control variable. Prior literature 
has indicated that lower accruals quality or lower disclosure quality can act as substitute 
proxies for higher information risk (Mouselli et al., 2012).  
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APPENDIX 
Categories Used in CONI Method 
Adapted from Beck et al. (2010: 218-219).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
 
Definition 
 
 
GEN 
 
 
RES 
 
POLL 
 
SUSTAIN 
 
LIAB  
 
ACT 
 
BRR 
 
PRESS 
 
SER 
 
ENE 
 
IRP 
 
 
 
 
General environmental-related disclosures: any mention dealing with 
environmental policy and concern for the environment 
 
Who is responsible for the implementation and the environmental behaviour  
 
Pollution-related disclosure  
 
Disclosure related to sustainability  
 
Environmental liabilities  
 
Environment-related activities  
 
Business-related risk  
 
Pressure groups  
 
Separate environmental report 
 
Energy-related disclosure  
 
Information retrieval process to obtain feedback from stakeholders  
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